PRESSING THE EU'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN: FACTS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 000348

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: EAID EUN PGOV PREL PTER SNAR NATO MARR AF EU
SUBJECT: PRESSING THE EU'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN: FACTS,
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Classified By: CDA Christopher M. Murray, for reasons 1.4, b and d.


1. (C) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will soon have a
political discussion about Afghanistan. We believe this is
an opportune time for the USG to make a renewed effort at
convincing the EU to increase its contributions. The EU
institutions have participated in Afghanistan reconstruction
since 2002, but have never participated - financially or
otherwise - as fully as they could have. Although
significant obstacles stand in the way of enhanced EU
contributions, there are several promising areas where the EU
can do more. One focus could be on the EU's EUR 2 billion
stability instrument fund. The EU has asked us for ideas on
how to spend this money. We recommend continued creative
thinking and collaboration among the U.S., the EU, and the
member states to stimulate greater EU "soft power"
contributions to the Afghanistan mission. End Summary.

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Past and present EU contributions
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2. (U) DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: The European Commission's
(EC) assistance to Afghanistan totaled EUR 1 billion for the
period 2002-2006 (the Commission cites EUR 3.7 billion as the
combined EC-EU member state contribution for this period).
EC projects included rural development, infrastructure,
primary health care and support to public services through
both budget support and technical assistance.


3. (U) The EC has announced plans to provide EUR 610 million
for the period 2007-2010. Its assistance strategy reflects
the priorities laid out in the Afghanistan Compact and the
interim Afghan National Development Strategy (i-ANDS),
launched by the Afghanistan Government at the London
Conference in early 2006. EC priority sectors include
governance (EUR 244 million),rural development (EUR 183
million),and health (EUR 122 million),with smaller
allocations for social protection (EUR 25 million),mine
action (EUR 25 million) and support for regional cooperation
(EUR 11 million). Conspicuously absent are funds for
counter-narcotics, which is in general a member state
competence and activity.


4. (U) Funds earmarked to support governance will focus on
justice and public administration reform, particularly at the
local government level, to create the fully functional
justice system the EC considers necessary to combat the
narcotics trade. Rural development funds will continue to
support the Afghan government's national programs, but will
shift focus to a more local level with special attention for
the traditionally poppy-rich provinces of the east and north
east. The EC cites the reduction of poppy cultivation in
Nangarhar province as one of its successes. As in the past,
the EC's health package will focus on primary health services
in Afghanistan and aim to lift coverage of basic health
services from around 75% of the population at present to near
100% by the end of 2010.


5. (C) EUPOL: The EU launched a police mission in
Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) in June 2007 with a mandate
for three years. EUPOL's emphasis is on high-end criminal
investigations (major organized crime, financial crime,
corruption, and witness protection),border police training,
and education. When fully deployed, EUPOL AFGHANISTAN will
consist of some 195 police, law enforcement, and justice
experts assigned at central, regional, and provincial levels
(Kabul, the five regional police commands, and on
European-led PRTs, respectively). EUPOL is now deploying
across most of the country and should be fully operational by
spring 2008. The mission and the budget will be under review
beginning in March, and there is some political willingness
to consider a significant increase in the number of officers.
Germany has indicated that it would consider doubling its
contribution. The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC)
is charged with providing strategic direction for the
mission, which was hobbled in
its early stages by management controversies and ambiguities
about its relationship with NATO structures. The mission is
still unwilling to deploy to U.S.-led PRTs, due to the lack
of a technical agreement between the EU and the U.S.


6. (U) NOTABLE MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS: The UK, as the
second largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan (after the
U.S.),has led on counter-narcotics and assisted the Afghan
government in drawing up the National Drugs Control Strategy
in 2005. The UK, the EC, and several EU member states are
also actively involved in the field of rural development,
which is critical for the provision of sustainable
alternative livelihoods for farmers involved in opium-poppy
cultivation. Germany has played a key role in the effort to
reform the Afghan police, providing a foundation for the EU's
police mission. It has spent about EUR 70 million on police
reform, mostly in training 4,300 Afghan policemen. Italy has
focused on justice sector reform, providing some EUR 40
million to date.

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What else can be done? What else is available?
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7. (U) The European Commission's total external assistance
budget will total EUR 72.2 billion for the period 2007-2013.
Instruments applicable to Afghanistan include the Development
Cooperation Instrument for Asia, Latin America, and the
Middle East (approx. EUR 16.6 billion or 23% of total); the
Instrument for Stability for crisis response and support to
peacekeeping activities (approx EUR 2 billion or 4% of
total); and the Humanitarian Aid instrument (EUR 5 billion).


8. (SBU) There are two main pools of funds that are not
being fully utilized: The EU Stability Instrument and the EC
PRT Fund. These funds total EUR 2.16 billion through 2013.
In addition, there are examples of how the EC can, when it
deems necessary, find yet additional funding sources.


9. (SBU) STABILITY INSTRUMENT: In 2007, the EU adopted the
new Instrument for Stability (IFS) to facilitate rapid
responses to crisis situations, and to build effective
response capacity in crisis-prone regions. Because the EU
sets its budgets in multi-year cycles and allows little
flexibility in re-programming appropriated funds, this large
package will improve the ability of the EU to deploy funds
and resources rapidly following a crisis. It could be
compared to the K fund at the Department of State or the
short term projects of USAID's Office of Transition
Initiatives. Of the EUR 2.06 billion allocated for
2007-2013, EUR 1.48 billion is earmarked for short-term
assistance, while EUR 484 million is dedicated to supporting
longer-term projects lasting up to 18 months. Priorities for
the 2007-08 programming of the long-term component include
"counteracting global and trans-regional threats," a heading
already being used to fund counter-narcotics efforts aimed at
curbing the opium poppy trade in an around Afghanistan. The
Commission has invited the USG to provide input on IFS
programming for 2008 and beyond. Given the seemingly broad
mandate of the IFS, this would be an excellent opportunity to
provide the EU with specific programs they could support
using IFS funds.


10. (SBU) EC PRT FUND: The European Commission has earmarked
roughly EUR 10 million to support member state PRTs.
However, member states have been slow to request and use
these funds. EC contacts think the reasons include quick
staff turnover at PRTs (i.e., as personnel rotate in and out
of the country, they don't learn about the fund soon enough
to take advantage of it). Additionally, large member states
don't think the effort of applying for the funds is worth it,
given the limited money available. Embassy Kabul could (in
consultation with the EC) encourage member state embassies in
Afghanistan to take advantage of these funds. The EU could
also assist in marshaling enhanced bilateral member state
support for Afghanistan, particularly among recent entrants.
We believe that smaller, recent EU entrants have been
reluctant to take on the responsibility of an entire PRT on
their own because of staffing and funding limitations. The
EU could provide both financial support (possibly via PRT
funds) and overall coordination for groups of small member
states who could take on entire PRTs, or specific tasks as a
group.


11. (SBU) THE ROLE OF EASTERN EUROPE: Eastern European
member states could be asked to assist with agricultural
development in Afghanistan. Many of these states have
recently completed difficult transitions to market-based
economies, and most also have strong technical agricultural
extension services. As an alternative to poppy cultivation,
perhaps these states can help Afghan farmers learn to grow
flowers for export to European markets. Highly valuable and
highly perishable crops can justify transport by air,
avoiding well documented problems in bringing lower-value
crops to market by truck.


12. (SBU) THE EC-LEBANON MODEL: It is useful to examine the
methods used by the EU to quickly deliver assistance to
Lebanon following Israel's response to Hizballah in the
summer of 2006. The Commission responded then within days of
the cessation of hostilities, announcing a package of nearly
EUR 100 million. While the bulk of the pledge came in the
form of humanitarian assistance (approx. EUR 50 million) the
EC also allocated: (a) EUR 18 million to support the
Lebanese private sector, (b) EUR 10 million for technical
assistance for reconstruction, (c) EUR 4 million to support
rule of law and internal security, and (d) an additional EUR
10 million to meet the priority needs of the Lebanese
government. The seven year budget cycles of the EU give the
impression that there is little budget flexibility for
mid-stream changes, but the Lebanon example is proof that the
EC can quickly mobilize additional resources if the required
political will is present.

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Obstacles to Enhanced Contributions
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13. (C//NF) PUBLIC OPINION: EU leaders' political will to
significantly increase EU contributions to Afghanistan is
largely dependent on public opinion in their countries. EU
interlocutors have told us that many Europeans do not
perceive events in Afghanistan as directly threatening their
security. Furthermore, some of those who do perceive a
threat prefer to fight the threat through less expeditionary
means that they consider more effective and less expensive
(e.g., using MI5 to fight Afghan-origin and other terrorism
within the UK). Europeans are aware of their governments'
military support for the Afghanistan effort to date, and feel
that the EU is already doing enough. The average European
does not differentiate between civilian and military support
for reconstruction and feels that Europe, through its initial
and ongoing military efforts, has already "checked the box"
for Afghanistan. Finally, some European citizens are
skeptical that any additional contributions from their
governments will actually make a dent in what they perceive
to be the uphill battle the international community faces in
Afghanistan. Although Europeans are responsive to
humanitarian arguments for increased contributions, they do
not see a strategic imperative for Europe to become more
deeply involved in Afghanistan reconstruction.


14. (C//NF) SECURITY: A lack of secure operating and
"humanitarian" space in Afghanistan lowers opportunities for
EU interventions. In one example, EC officials cited the
lack of security at border crossings as a reason for
non-engagement on building Afghan capacity for securing the
flow of people and goods at border locations. Donors and
NGOs tell a similar story regarding the inability to operate
in war zones, which are increasingly hostile to humanitarian
and development assistance implementers.


15. (SBU) COMPETING PRIORITIES: While the EU acknowledges
the importance of Afghanistan reconstruction and regional
stability in South Asia, its immediate foreign policy
priorities lie closer to its physical borders. Because of
Kosovo's recent declaration of independence, and because of
pre-EU accession demands, the Western Balkans will demand a
significant amount of the EU's human and monetary resources
for the foreseeable future. Building relationships with
countries under the auspices of the European Neighborhood
Policy is also necessary to address regional stability and
mitigate migration worries. Europe's role in the Middle East
should not be understated, given the European Commission's
EUR 800 million contribution (2003-2007) to Iraq
reconstruction and lead role in providing assistance to the
Palestinians. Additionally, the EC and member states
maintain a multi-billion Euro assistance program for Africa,
as Europe fulfills what it considers its duty as a former
colonial power. These competing foreign policy priorities
have left many member states without an active Asia policy
and the EU feeling at risk of overstretch if it takes on much
more.


16. (U) BUDGET CONSTRAINTS: The overall foreign assistance
budget for the EC was cut for the 2007-2013 budget cycle.
The EC has tried to protect funds destined for Afghanistan as
much as possible, but Afghanistan was also victim to the
across-the-board cuts, losing roughly 10% of its annual
allocation (from about EUR 166 million to EUR 150 million per
annum). One important consideration with EU budgeting is the
strict prohibition against deficits, and the inability to
easily shift funds between accounts after a budget has been
approved. Since EUPOL funding comes from the very small
Council Secretariat Common Foreign and Security Policy
account, increases there will be difficult, and any new money
will have to come from the member states.


17. (C//NF) WHAT THE EU THINKS THE USG THINKS OF THE EU:
Some EU officials perceive that except for the EC's
usefulness as a contributor of humanitarian and development
assistance, the EU has been "written off" by the USG as a
potential contributor to the Afghanistan effort. Several
officials have told us that the EU (institutions as well as
member states) might be more inclined to increase
contributions in Afghanistan if EU officials and member
states felt that their policy views (e.g., opposition to
aerial spraying of poppy fields) were being taken into
account. Instead, senior U.S. officials are perceived as
telling them that, "we listen to partners based on the levels
of their contributions" - a message that became the
"headline" of an internal EU report from a recent meeting,
according to contacts inside the institutions.

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Next Steps
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18. (C//NF) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: High level EU contacts have
asked the United States to keep reiterating the message,
publicly and privately, that the EU should be a player on
Afghanistan, and that we need them there. In addition, they
have stressed the need to make clear to European governments,
parliaments, and publics the progress ("good news" stories)
that is being made in Afghanistan, in order to counter
perceptions of drift.


19. (C//NF) There are several upcoming opportunities to
engage EU officials on these issues.

-- UPCOMING GAERCs: As a result of pressure from the UK and
the Netherlands, the EU will soon hold a high level political
discussion on Afghanistan. The timeline for discussions is
still not confirmed, but it looks likely that EU Foreign
Ministers will issue brief conclusions on Afghanistan at the
March 10 General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC). Member state contacts tell us that the conclusions
will reaffirm the EU's commitment and long term support for
Afghanistan; welcome the launch of the ANDS; reiterate
support for JCMB Tokyo discussions, EUPOL, and ISAF's role;
and reaffirm the EU's readiness to work with NATO on
Afghanistan. The Foreign Ministers will then likely hold a
discussion on Afghanistan at the Foreign Ministers' dinner
that will take place March 13, on the margins of the European
Council meeting. According to contacts, that discussion will
focus on the following topics: what the EU is trying to
achieve in Afghanistan, how successful the EU has been, what
challenges lie ahead, how the EU can coordinate better, views
of the Afghan government, and whether the EU should place
more conditions on its assistance. UK and Dutch Perm Rep
contacts have told us they hope the March GAERC discussion
will provide an impetus to additional conclusions that could
come out of the April or May GAERC and focus on EU goals for
the Paris donors conference in June. UK contacts have four
objectives for EU involvement in Afghanistan: increase the
EU's visibility, with a visit by EU High Representative
Javier Solana; get the EU Police mission right; ensure the
European Commission continues funding efforts; and name an
effective new EU Special Representative for Afghanistan.
USEU recommends that after the March 13 Foreign Ministers
discussion, the USG follow up with EU member states in
capitals to coordinate in the lead-up to the Paris donors
conference. Contacts in Brussels have noted that Afghanistan
rarely comes up in high level EU meetings, even though the
same countries talk about it regularly in a NATO context.
They stress the need for much more political energy within
the EU on the Afghanistan issue if the EU is to come up with
additional resources for it.

-- SOLANA'S TRAVEL TO THE REGION: EU High Rep Solana will
likely go to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the next few months.
The date has not been set. We should use the time before
his travel to help shape his visit and message.

-- EU-NATO AFGHANISTAN DISCUSSIONS: Contacts agree that it
would be useful to carry out high level strategy discussions
between the EU and NATO on Afghanistan, but note that such an
idea is difficult to implement because of possible Turkish
resistance. However, they agree that we should be able to
find a way to do it. We should work with the EU and NATO on
creative ways to facilitate this goal.

-- PARIS DONORS CONFERENCE: In the lead-up to the June
conference, we should increase discussions with the
Commission and member states on priority areas for
contribution. Per Dutch Perm Rep contacts, one of the
objectives of the March and April GAERC discussions will be
to coordinate EU positions in the lead-up to Paris. They
have expressed interest in the USG position on the Paris
donors conference.

-- EUPOL MANDATE EXTENSION: This is scheduled for mid-March.
As a first step, we could respond to EUPOL's request for
support through U.S. PRTs. There is a wide desire to
maximize synergies between U.S. and EU police training
efforts. Contacts have suggested a willingness to consider
using European military police to perform police training in
Afghanistan. In response to frequent inquiries by the EU, we
should articulate the U.S. position on the EU's role on the
International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). EU
interlocutors have also asked for an update on the status of
U.S. staffing of the IPCB secretariat: they claim we offered
ten staff members but have only provided one.

-- EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE: Member states have been
invited to put forth candidates, with discussion slated to
begin in March on naming a new EU Special Representative
(EUSR) to Afghanistan. UK contacts have told us they are
concerned that Solana is not doing enough to find a good EUSR
and have asked that the USG raise with Solana and member
states the importance of naming a good candidate who can work
well with a future UN Super Envoy. We should encourage the
EU to include coordination with a new United Nations Special
Representative in the mandate of the EUSR. We should also
discuss with interlocutors the benefits of double hatting the
EUSR to have both a Council Secretariat and Commission
mandate.

-- REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION CONFERENCE: The EC has
conveyed interest in comparing notes beforehand on what we
want to get out of this conference, with an eye toward a
common approach on trade facilitation, increasing the
involvement of the Afghan private sector, and other issues.

-- PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ZONES (ROZs): The EC
has expressed interest in carrying out some activities, such
as vocational training, that complement what the U.S. is
doing on ROZs.

-- PAKISTAN: The EU's stake in Pakistan is increasing, with
a corresponding increase in EC funding and political
engagement. EC aid is focused on the Northwest frontier and
Baluchistan. It is difficult for the EC to operate in the
tribal areas because of European Parliament constraints, but
in recent troika discussions with the U.S., the EU side
agreed that we should increase coordination on this issue
between USAID and the EC delegation in Islamabad.

-- EU-U.S. MEETING ON U.S. VISION FOR POLICE TRAINING:
Council Secretariat contacts have expressed interest in an
informal working-level meeting to discuss our respective
visions and ideas for police training in Afghanistan.
Perhaps we could connect appropriate U.S. interlocutors with
EU staff, either in person or by continuing the series of
video conferences that took place during the planning phases
of the EUPOL mission. The relative recently installed new
head of the EU police mission, German General Jurgen Scholz,
has visited USEU to describe his initial views on how to move
forward the police mission.

-- AFGHAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: It would be helpful to
remind the EU of the importance that training and expansion
of the Afghan prosecutor, defense, judicial, and corrections
components of the criminal justice system will require more
international assistance. This has historically been a
member state role, but the EU could at least provide
financial support for member state activity in this area.


20. (C//NF) While the EU's current appetite for scaling up
civilian efforts in Afghanistan is modest, our Council and
Commission interlocutors remain willing partners who
understand the strategic and humanitarian imperatives that
call for an enhanced European contribution. The EU has by no
means closed the book on Afghanistan.

MURRAY
.