U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 001824

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PARM KNNP EUN IR KN SY RS CH MY
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND
NONPROLIFERATION (CODUN/CONOP),NOVEMBER 6, 2008

Classified By: USEU POL M-C CHRIS DAVIS FOR REASONS 1.4 A. AND D.

Summary


1. (C) Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia McNerney of the
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)
led the U.S. delegation to the semi-annual U.S.-EU Troika
consultations on disarmament and nonproliferation
(CODUN/CONOP). The discussions covered a wide range of
subjects in those areas, both on the conventional and WMD
sides, and the two sides exhibited a large measure of
convergence on such key issues as Iran, the DPRK, missiles,
outer space, and chemical and biological weapons. The EU
side expected to be able to announce soon a contribution to
the NTI fuel bank initiative before the end of the French
Presidency. On conventional weapons issues, i.e., an Arms
Trade Treaty and cluster munitions, the U.S. side expressed
concerns that the Europeans were moving ahead without full
appreciation of security needs.
End Summary

Iran


2. (SBU) Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, Deputy Director of
Strategic Affairs, Security, and Disarmament at the French
MFA, led off the discussion for the EU by commenting that
UNSC Res 1835 had had some positive political impacts in
Iran, even though it contained no new sanctions, because the
Iranians had not expected the resolution. In discussing EU
sanctions, he noted that the EU has gone beyond UN
requirements by, e.g., freezing the assets of the Melli Bank
and freezing export credit, and is now considering possible
new actions vis--vis adding new entities to the EU sanctions
list.


3. (SBU) AA/S McNerney commented that the U.S. was looking at
several fronts, including the IAEA, which was to make a
report before the Board of Governors meeting later in
November. It was important, she said, to maintain pressure
in the IAEA and also in the P-5 context. She noted that the
U.S. was adopting measures in response to the Financial
Affairs Task Force (FATF) guidance that states take
preventive measures and urged other states to take similar
actions to demonstrate to Iran that they were serious about
adopting sanctions if Iran fails to change its behavior.
These actions were having an impact on Iran in areas such as
finance, shipping, and export controls, and demonstrating to
Iran that its current path only leads to isolation.


4. (C) Speaking in his national capacity, Simon Michel
expressed France's concern that a recent European Court of
Justice ruling casting doubt on the validity of
counter-terrorism sanctions could "contaminate"
nonproliferation sanctions. In the counter-terrorism case,
the Court ruled that justification for imposition of the
sanctions on an individual or entity had to be made public;
this was not possible in nonproliferation cases. Simon
Michel noted that Paris was just starting to consider how to
head off this danger, and McNerney commented that undermining
sanctions would defeat the effort to find a middle way
between broad sanctions on an entire country and force.
Annalisa Giannella of the EU Council Secretariat pointed out
that her long experience taught her that the European Court
was very independent. In this light, she urged making sure
UNSC decisions were firmly based.

North Korea


5. (C) McNerney, briefing the Europeans on the status of U.S.
and Six-Party actions, said that the file was somewhat back
on track. The details of a verification protocol still had
to be set down in writing, and the U.S. and DPRK were trying
to schedule a Heads of Delegation meeting at which this could
be done. She noted that the lifting of the state sponsor of
terrorism designation from the DPRK was largely symbolic,
since the DPRK remained under heavy U.S. sanctions.


6. (C) The next stage, she noted, was for the DPRK to give up
its nuclear weapons. She did not think the North Koreans had
decided on whether to take this step, although they seemed
comfortable with current activities. She also said that the
U.S. was pushing for a role for the IAEA, but found the North
Koreans very antagonistic towards the Agency. She was
heading to Vienna the following week to discuss these issues
with the IAEA.


7. (SBU) Simon-Michel said that the EU welcomed the recent
agreement and noted that progress with the DPRK could have an
impact on Iran. In response to a question from him about

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China's role, McNerney said that by promoting the Chinese as
chairs of the Six-Party process, we tried to keep them
feeling they had a stake in the successful outcome of the
process.

Syria


8. (C) According to Simon-Michel, the EU was taking the issue
of Syria's nuclear activity seriously and feared it might be
a new proliferation crisis. It supported an IAEA report and
discussion of the issue at the next IAEA BOG. Pavel Klucky,
Head of the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Unit in the
Czech MFA, said that even robust IAEA activity might not turn
up any evidence, noting that the Agency's principal Syrian
interlocutor had been murdered.


9. (SBU) McNerney said the U.S. was working to ensure that
the next BOG, which will have technical cooperation on its
agenda, makes sure that such cooperation does not provide
Syria with capabilities we do not want it to have. The U.S.
was also urging the IAEA Secretariat to produce its report on
Syria (the Agency had, she noted, some interesting things to
report) and would press the BOG to pass a resolution to give
the Secretariat a direction for its investigations.

U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative


10. (SBU) McNerney expressed her appreciation to France and
others in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for working to
secure a successful result in the NSG. She noted that a lot
of work remained to be accomplished - for example,
negotiation of an Additional Protocol (AP) between India and
the IAEA. We want to ensure, she said, that all states
dealing with India maintain nonproliferation standards and
urged them to encourage work on the AP, application of
safeguards, and adoption of the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage.


11. (SBU) Simon-Michel replied that he was satisfied that the
EU could reach a common position on the initiative in the NSG
and that no EU member objected to it. He commented that
ensuring the implementation of nonproliferation requirements
will be a long-term challenge.

The Transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology


12. (SBU) In response to a question from Klucky on the status
of NSG discussions on the transfer of enrichment and
reprocessing (ENR) technology and equipment, McNerney said
that the U.S. was pushing to have a strong criteria-based
approach adopted by the NSG Consultative Group later in
November. She noted three problems: 1) Canada was not
willing to accept the black box approach to the transfer of
enrichment technology; 2) Brazil objected to a requirement
that a state agree to the Additional Protocol as a condition
for ENR transfer (Senior U.S. Department of Energy personnel
were trying to convince Brazil and Argentina that this
requirement would not have a negative impact on their
indigenous programs); and 3) the Republic of Korea objected
to a criterion that would take into account whether a country
is already party to an agreement relating to renunciation of
domestic ENR. McNerney thought that an agreement at the NSG
would send a good signal following adoption of the Indian
exception and urged the EU to
work for approval.

NPT Review Conference


13. (U) Turning to the NPT review process, McNerney said that
the new administration would review it, but she did not
expect much difference on the core issues. The U.S. hoped
the 2009 PrepCom would agree on an agenda for the RevCon and
on substance the U.S. was likely to keep the focus on
ensuring compliance and on support for civil nuclear energy
in a manner that maintained strong nonproliferation, safety,
and security standards.


14. (SBU) The EU intervention on this issue was made by
Klucky, who noted that progress on U.S.-Russian bilateral
arms control agreements would help the NPT atmosphere and
asked where things stood now. He agreed that the agenda was
a key issue and suggested that the U.S. and EU might provide
the 2009 PrepCom chair with a draft. Klucky also noted that
the EU had presented working papers to the 2008 PrepCom and
would like support from others by the next meeting. He
reported that Russia said it could support the EU paper on
withdrawal from the NPT and noted that the EU also had papers
on peaceful uses and export controls for which it hoped to
secure additional co-sponsors. Finally, Klucky had a request

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for the U.S.: he urged that the Czech Republic, which is in
the Eastern Group at NPT review meetings for organizational
purposes, be allowed to participate in PrepCom WEOG meetings
as EU presidency country.


15. (SBU) In response McNerney said that the U.S. had passed
the text of a post-START agreement to Russia. The new
Administration would certainly review this issue. She agreed
that it would be good idea to provide the PrepCom chair with
a draft agenda. Turning to substantive issues, she noted
that we wanted to discourage withdrawal from the Treaty and
make sure there were consequences to violations committed
before withdrawals, while preserving the right of sovereign
states to withdraw from treaties. McNerney promised to look
into the question of the Czech Republic participating in WEOG
meetings, which seemed on its face to make sense.

Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurances


16. (SBU) Rosine Couchoud, Assistant to the Deputy Director
for Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation, French MFA,
said the EU was giving serious consideration to making a
financial contribution to the proposal of the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI) to establish a fuel bank. She hoped that
the EU would confirm its decision to support this idea by the
end of the year, while at the same time taking part in
defining the fuel bank. She also said that it was important
to expand the dialogue on this subject in general. McNerney
replied that this was "terrific news" and noted that the UAE
had pledged USD 10 million, leaving USD 35 million still to
be raised.


17. (C) After describing steps the U.S. was taking to provide
a source of nuclear fuel, McNerney noted that because of
non-aligned suspicions of various offers, IAEA Director
General ElBaradei was also less enthusiastic recently, even
though he had been a strong proponent. It was necessary, she
thought, to involve the operators, who saw the practical
advantages of fuel supplies, rather than just diplomats or
politicians, who were more concerned with "rights," which
they were not exercising anyway. Couchoud said this was the
EU view as well.

Conference on Disarmament (CD)/Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT)


18. (C) McNerney reported on the current stalemate at the CD
in Geneva, noting that Pakistan - the most significant
obstacle to progress on an FMCT - seemed comfortable with its
position as spoiler. She was skeptical that changing the
U.S. position on the inclusion of verification measures in an
FMCT would help break the logjam, but in any case, that issue
was one for the new Administration to consider. As far as
outer space was concerned, the U.S. preferred the approach it
had been working on with the EU - voluntary transparency and
confidence building measures - rather than a legally binding
treaty such as the one proposed by the Russians and Chinese.


19. (SBU) Simon-Michel said the EU was very committed to
going beyond the stalemate and supported CD/1840, the work
program proposed by the six CD presidents for 2008 (including
the U.S.). Some elements in it had been difficult for France,
which could not make further concessions. Finally he raised
the question of membership in the CD as some EU members
(including the Czech Republic, as Klucky pointed out) are not
members of the CD. The U.S. side noted that its
long-standing position was to oppose further expansion of the
CD as long as it was not engaged in substantive work, but
McNerney promised to take the issue back to Washington and
look at it again.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)


20. (SBU) According to Simon-Michel, the EU considered the
CTBT an important part of the nuclear nonproliferation and
disarmament regime. The EU thought that the new U.S.
Administration and the 2010 NPT RevCon provided a window of
opportunity to bring the Treaty into force, and French
President Sarkozy had appealed to the U.S. and China to
ratify the CTBT. He also described an EU initiative to make
high-level demarches calling for universalization and entry
into force and an EU Joint Action, which would provide
several million Euros in support of the Treaty's verification
mechanisms, including on-site inspections.


21. (SBU) McNerney made clear that the policy of the current
Administration had not changed. She was also not sure that
the Senate would approve ratification, even if the new
Administration favored the Treaty.

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Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
(HCOC)


22. (SBU) The EU, stressed Simon-Michel, attached great
importance to HCOC and feared that the Russian moratorium on
pre-launch notifications (PLNs) and the U.S. failure to
implement them put the Code at risk. To strengthen HCOC the
EU had sponsored a resolution supporting the Code at the UNGA
First Committee and was implementing a Joint Action. The
latter included three programs: 1) the promotion of
universalization through regional seminars; 2) the financing
of a secure communications system for HCOC; and 3) the
financing of a study by the EU's security institute in Paris
to see whether the Code and its implementation could be
improved.


23. (C) McNerney thought the First Committee resolution had
been helpful. She also reiterated the reason for the lack of
U.S. PLNs, namely that the U.S. had decided to use the
notifications made for the U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC),but the JDEC agreement had still not been
implemented because of Russian stalling. She hoped the U.S.
could soon finalize the agreement with Russia, but stressed
that an alternative system did not make sense, given the
amount of money invested in the JDEC and the fear that an
alternative could undermine its completion. The two sides
agreed in their opposition to Russian attempts to water down
the JDEC to attract new participants.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)


24. (SBU) In the brief discussion of the MTCR, Simon-Michel
said some EU states were not MTCR members. The EU would like
all to participate, including the Commission, which has
competence in some areas.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)


25. (C) After reporting on the September PSI Operational
Experts Group meeting organized by France, Simon-Michel
raised the perennial EU request that the EU institutions be
permitted to participate in their own right and not just as
part of member-state delegations. He argued that the EU role
in customs, in nuclear regulation through EURATOM, and in
controlling maritime borders made a case for EU
participation. McNerney said the U.S. had looked at the
issue, but the prevailing view in Washington was the PSI
should focus on rapid operations, which were national
actions.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540


26. (U) EU Council Secretariat staff member Fabio Della
Piazza said the EU was pleased with its collaboration with
the U.S. in this area. He also described the EU's Joint
Action in support of the Resolution, adopted in May 2008.


27. (SBU) McNerney detailed how states were meeting their
obligations under 1540 and noted that they now seemed
comfortable with its requirements. She said that Malaysia
was a key country of focus; we need to keep the pressure on
it to enact and enforce export control legislation. McNerney
also noted that the cooperation between the U.S. and the EU
in this area was useful. Both sides agreed that the recent
meeting on export controls in Croatia was valuable.

Outer Space


28. (C) EU representatives (Simon-Michel and Couchoud)
expressed their appreciation for U.S. support and comments on
the draft EU "Code of Conduct for Space Activities." On the
other hand, both China and Russia had insisted that the Code
make a connection to their draft treaty on the Prevention of
the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space or at least to the
general question of the prevention of an arms race in outer
space (PAROS). According to Couchoud, the EU approach was
much more along U.S. lines, but the EU was looking for some
language that might accommodate the Russians and Chinese
without going too far.


29. (C) McNerney said the U.S. appreciated the EU's work and
would be happy to look at such language, but it did not
support a treaty on arms control in outer space. She also
reiterated that the U.S. would prefer to call the proposal
"confidence building measures" rather than a "code of
conduct" to avoid the impression that it could be binding.

Chemical Weapons Convention

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30. (SBU) McNerney noted that while CW destruction was taking
longer than expected, both the U.S. and Russia were committed
to it. But in any event, as disarmament actions were winding
up, it was important to transition from disarmament to
concerns over CW terrorism, and even some of the non-aligned
were aware of the problem. McNerney noted that despite
Iranian attempts to politicize the April 2008 Review
Conference, we were generally pleased with its outcome,
including the decision to conduct more inspections.


31. (U) Simon-Michel said the EU shared the positive
assessment of the RevCon, including the attention paid to
verification, nonproliferation, and terrorism. He also
called attention to an EU Joint Action on CW, noting that the
EU would hold an event on December 1, promoting its
implementation with emphasis on UNSCR 1540.


32. (C) In response to a question from Klucky, McNerney said
the U.S. position on Russian membership in the Australia
Group was unchanged. We had continuing concerns about
Russian readiness to take on the commitments of the CWC.

Biological Weapons


33. (SBU) Andreas Strub, Coordinator, Office of the Personal
Representative on Non-proliferation in the Council
Secretariat, began by describing other EU Joint Actions --
one to promote universalization of the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) and another with the WHO. McNerney said
efforts were on target for the meeting of BWC state parties
in early December. She stressed that efforts under way to
enhance bio-security, especially in South and South East
Asia, also had the effect of developing contacts with
scientists, which in turn helped promote cooperation in
countering terrorist threats.


34. (SBU) Strub replied that the EU found cooperation easier
if bio-security was wrapped in health programs. He also
noted that the EU's Action Plan on nonproliferation would
have a strong bio component.

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)


35. (SBU) Simon-Michel said that all EU members supported a
legally binding ATT, which would secure respect for basic
rules on the trade in armaments. EU peacekeepers in Africa
had witnessed the destabilizing effect of arms trafficking
and consider this a very important issue. The purpose of the
treaty would be to establish the highest common standards on
the import and export of conventional weapons. The EU
welcomed the report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE) and the UNGA First Committee resolution supporting an
ATT and was disappointed that the U.S. had voted no on the
latter.


36. (U) After emphasizing that any agreement touching on
internal controls on arms was sensitive, McNerney made clear
that the U.S. shared the goals of many supporters of an ATT
and had high standards of its own. However, it had problems
with the UN resolution, which went beyond the consensus
conclusions of the GGE.


37. (SBU) Following some further discussion on the UN
resolution, Strub said that one key reason for an ATT was to
show countries in the Third World that the developed world
took their interests seriously. If not, we had a difficult
time getting their support on WMD issues.


38. (C) In the most active discussion of the consultations,
McNerney pressed the EU side to enunciate what problem the
ATT was intended to fix. It was difficult to imagine, for
example, that an ATT could stop countries like China from
selling arms to Sudan. The EU side replied that the purpose
was to establish basic rules on a multilateral basis, which
you could refer to in calling countries to account, not to
establish precise criteria stating which countries could be
the recipients of armaments.

Cluster Munitions


39. (C) Jiri Svoboda from the Czech MFA led off by praising
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) forum as
an important one in which military and humanitarian concerns
were both considered. Turning to the Dublin meeting on
cluster munitions, he noted that all EU members had attended
either as participants or observers, and he made clear that
the EU sees the CCW and Oslo/Dublin processes as mutually
reinforcing. Thus, any CCW protocol on cluster munitions had

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to be in accord with the convention agreed in Dublin. In
response, the U.S. side pointed out that the Oslo convention
preserved those cluster munitions its parties needed through
use of definitions, which complicated efforts to make the two
instruments compatible. Simon-Michel made clear that France,
for one, was committed under the Oslo convention to destroy
95 per cent of its stockpile. McNerney stressed the U.S.'s
commitment to the success of the CCW negotiations.

Any Other Business: Zangger Committee, Libya, and the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism


40. (SBU) Klucky, who is Chairman of the Zangger Committee,
raised the issue of the participation of Kazakhstan and
Belarus in the Committee. The Russians had told him they
would raise the issue and also said they would agree to
membership of all applicants in all regimes. Klucky wondered
if the U.S. position had changed and asked that the U.S. take
another look at the issue. McNerney told him not to expect
any shift on Belarus in any case.


41. (SBU) Klucky then turned to Libya, which had said it
would comply with MTCR, Australia Group, and Zangger
Committee controls. He wondered if it could serve as an
example to the Arabs in the NPT process. What would the U.S.
think about asking Libya to co-sponsor the EU paper on export
controls? McNerney said U.S.-Libyan cooperation in that
field had been slow, but she promised that the U.S. would
review the question of co-sponsorship and get back to the
Czechs.


42. (SBU) McNerney then raised the Global Initiative, noting
that Spain had done a great job hosting the political-level
meeting last Spring. She called attention to the exercise
planning meeting to be held on November 13-14 and noted that
the GI-sponsored exercises were an important element in
capacity building. She encouraged all EU states to
participate. She also noted that the EU could help in
encouraging participation beyond the West - perhaps in Asia.
While Simon-Michel said France participated actively, Klucky
pointed out that a shortage of personnel made it difficult
for the Czech Republic to participate as actively as they
would like.

Next Meeting


43. (U) Klucky proposed March 24, 2009 for the next round of
consultations to focus in particular on the 2009 NPT PrepCom.
McNerney said we could agree in principle, but with the
understanding that personnel from the new Administration
would have the final word.


44. (U) This cable has been cleared by Acting A/S McNerney.

SILVERBERG


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