EUR A/S FRIED AND AMBASSADOR ENGLISH MEETINGS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001781

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK EUN
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED AND AMBASSADOR ENGLISH MEETINGS WITH
BOSNIA LEADERS IN BRUSSELS

Classified By: USEU POL M-C Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 b. and d.


1. (C) Summary: On the heels of the November 19 Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) meeting in Brussels, A/S Dan
Fried and U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) Charles
English met successively with the following key BiH political
leaders: Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik;
Bosniak Member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic; SDA
Party President Sulejman Tihic; and HDZ Party President
Dragan Covic. A/S Fried and Ambassador English began by
warning Dodik to tread carefully with his rhetoric and to
support Tihic and Covic in constitutional reform, lest he
walk BiH into a full fledged political crisis, a message
Dodik appeared to take on. A/S Fried and Ambassador English
delivered the same message to Silajdzic, to which Silajdzic
reaffirmed that he will further radicalize his agenda and
ultimately wants the reworking of the Dayton Accords. The
meeting with Tihic and Covic was much more positive,
highlighting that the window for compromise, which had been
closed for the past two years, may be open again. However
U.S. public support for Tihic,s and Covic,s work with the
Dodik could go along way to sway Bosnian public opinion in
their favor. End Summary

Words of caution for Dodik
--------------

2. (C) A/S Fried and Ambassador English began the rounds of
meetings with Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad
Dodik, during which A/S Fried congratulated the defensive but
seemingly resigned Dodik on the November 8th signing of the
Prud Agreement (the comprehensive agreement on political and
constitutional reform between the three largest ethnic
parties),and cautioned him that flirting with secession
would continue to weaken the BiH state and cause a political
crisis which may be irreversible. Fried repeatedly pointed
out to Dodik the importance of proceeding carefully, warning
him that any miscalculated political step may trap him,
leaving him with no room to move forward. A/S Fried
continued by assuring Dodik that the U.S. does not have a
$ecret agenda, is not plotting against him, is not against
the RS and is equally as unhappy with Haris Silajdzic,s
attempts to amend the BiH constitution. Ambassador English
emphasized to Dodik that the U.S. expects him to honor the
Prud Agreement, fulfill his obligations to surrender
subpoenaed documents to the State Prosecutor and not set
conditions (such as deadline for any investigation against
the RS that might involve the documents).


3. (C) Although Dodik focused most of his response on
defending his hiring the services of a US law firm to help
the RS respond to the State Prosecutor's demand for RS
documents, and his view that international officials (in
particular the DPDHR) favor the Federation, he seemed to
receive A/S Fried,s and Ambassador English's message. He
used a detailed presentation of the RS position on reform of
Transco/Electroprenos to rebut A/S Fried,s assertions that
the RS was attempting to recover competencies transferred to
the State. Dodik emphasized throughout that he has no plans
to secede, said he will fully implement the Prud Agreement
with Tihic and Covic, understands the delicacy of the
situation and intends to help BiH work toward EU accession.
Dodik conveyed his concerns that Haris Silajdzic is opposed
to the agreement and is lobbying hard to sure its failure.
On the SIPA/documents issue, Dodik indicated that he expected
to receive a court order within the next day or two to turn
over the documents, and he indicated to A/S fried that his
Minister of Justice was meeting at this moment with the State
Prosecutor and SIPA to discuss compliance.

Silajdzic does not intend to change his tactics
-------------- --

4. (C) During a separate, nearly one hour meeting, a
strident current BiH President Haris Silajdzic told A/S Fried
and Ambassador English that he had tried patience for ten
years and was now going to be a "bad boy" in order to bring
attention to BiH. Appearing unnerved by the Prud Agreement,
Silajdzic used the complicated meeting to reaffirm his
agenda, making clear he intended to radicalize BiH politics
and block compromise. His intention, of forcing through his
maximalist agenda to abolish a "genocidal" RS and implement
what he calls the "true" Dayton agreement, is just a more
extreme version of what he has been saying for a long time.

5. (C) A/S Fried opened the meeting by telling Silajdzic
that he was worried about the direction of politics in BiH,
and warned that things could go very wrong very quickly if
they continued on the current path. He noted there would be
a new team in Washington soon, with many familiar faces who
are also worried about BiH. Fried informed Silajdzic that he
had warned Dodik we could not tolerate anti-state actions,
but added the warning held true for Silajdzic as well. When
Silajdzic angrily asked Fried what he meant, Fried pointed to
Silajdzic,s opposition to the constitutional reform, which

BRUSSELS 00001781 002 OF 003


was defeated; a weaker than desired policy reform package;
and Silajdzic,s "unacceptable" calls to abolish the RS.

6. (C) Silajdzic responded with several rounds of angry
statements that the RS of today is not what was envisioned by
Dayton, but rather an entity that is based on "genocide and
ethnic cleansing." He said the only part of the Dayton
Accords recognized by Dodik and RS was the part establishing
RS. "The rest is not important." He said he was for a
civic, democratic country, and that he knows how to make
deals and undertake reforms, but RS is "based on blood." He
likened Dodik to Hitler and said RS is the continuation of
Milosevic,s project of an ethnically cleansed state. He
referred several times to RS,s failure to allow the
comprehensive refugee return required by Dayton, saying only
8% of RS inhabitants were Bosniak, where 46% of inhabitants
in RS territory pre-war were Bosniaks. He noted that
Karadzic,s ethnic cleansing policy envisioned a reduction to
10%; the RS now had even exceeded Karadzic,s intent for
ethnic exclusivity.

7. (C) When Fried repeatedly asked Silajdzic how he hoped to
achieve his goals or make any deals with accusatory speeches,
such as those at the UN and the Council of Europe, Silajdzic
repeated and expanded his charges. He said that 13 years
after Dayton, it was obvious RS intended to "play with
Dayton." He denied having called for RS to be abolished but
said Milosevic,s project and his genocide were being
"legalized" and continued by Dodik. When A/S Fried suggested
that the way forward was to work incrementally to strengthen
the state and find a way toward the European Union, Silajdzic
said he had gotten nowhere by being nice. "I'm tired of
being good and I am going to be bad." He made repeated
threats that BiH would move toward a Muslim State "because
you are not helping us be a democratic state."

8. (C) Regarding the constitutional reform package, Silajdzic
said that those who urged him to support the constitutional
reform, including Vice President-elect Joseph Biden, did not
understand that it was "an empty, dangerous package for
Bosnia," and argued the Council of Europe had supported his
analysis, saying the reforms would give RS the power to
indefinitely block the formation of a state government. When
pressed on the percentages of Bosnians who needed to return
to RS, and on the importance of those figures, he said that
the 25% figure (as a percentage of the RS population) would
"give us the balance to make RS a part of
Bosnia-Herzegovina." He said that RS had been obstructing
progress for ten years, that "we have been very kind," and
that he would no longer take that approach. He argued over
the real numbers of Bosniaks who had returned to RS,
disputing Ambassador English,s suggestion that many more
than 8% had returned, but that many remained registered in
the Federation because of the more generous social benefits.
He said he thought 40,000 families (for a total of 100,000
people) would move back to RS if they could.

9. (C) Silajdzic further argued that international
conferences, such as the PIC in Brussels showed that the path
of moderation was not working and that Americans and
Europeans at the meeting had been "duped" by Dodik. He said
90% of the Bosniak people were against the Prud Agreement and
many will not support it. Pressed again by A/S Fried to
outline his program and his way forward, Silajdzic said he
"wants to know the end game." Fried reminded him that our
goal is to see BiH moving toward membership in the EU and
warned him that vision could fail. Silajdzic, speaking more
calmly, reiterated that he had tried, as Ambassador English
had recommended, not provoking Dodik. He acknowledged Dodik
was "not Hitler," but asserted he is trying to achieve
Milosevic,s goal of an "ethnically clean" Republika Srpska.
He said that what is developing now is not Dayton, and
asserted again that the Americans and Europeans at the
November 19 PIC meeting were "nave" and had been duped by
Dodik,s people.

10. (C) At the end of the hour long exchange Silajdzic
finally said, "I want a better deal. I want Dayton really
done or a different arrangement." He said he wanted to sit
down with the new (Obama Administration) team and figure out
how to achieve the goal. A/S Fried warned him that the
tactic of polarizing the population was dangerous, and warned
that there would likely not be a radical departure in policy
by the incoming administration.
The window for compromise once again opens
--------------

11. (C) In the final meeting, A/S Fried congratulated SDA
Party President Sulejman Tihic and HDZ Party President Dragan
Covic, and conveyed Secretary Rice,s congratulations as
well, on their November 8 Prud Agreement with Dodik. Tihic
recalled that he and his supporters were weakened in the 2006
elections and lost to the radicals because of their support
of a failed package of constitutional reforms. But now, two
years later, results of the recent elections show that the
pendulum may be swinging back, and the country seems ready
for compromise and progress on reforms, Tihic said. He noted
that public support, as evidenced by election results, is

BRUSSELS 00001781 003 OF 003


down by one-third for Dodik and two-thirds for Silajdzic
compared to 2006. He and Covic took that as a signal to
negotiate a compromise agreement with Dodik that addressed
state property, a census, Brcko and other issues.

12. (C) Now that Tihic and Covic have negotiated the
agreement with Dodik, they say they are being criticized by
radicals on all sides and the media coverage is largely
unfavorable toward them. Tihic asked for A/S Fried,s help
in painting a more positive picture of the agreement for the
media and in convincing SDP President Zlatko Lagundzija to
drop his opposition and support the agreement. He also asked
that the U.S. participate as mediators or observers when
Bosnia begins drafting constitutional reforms. Tihic is wary
of Dodik, saying Dodik has worked to undermine the
prosecutor's office and repeatedly makes public anti-Bosnian
statements. Nonetheless, Tihic believes there is no
alternative to taking a chance and working with Dodik. Covic
said that while Dodik is not reliable, he has more to lose
than gain by not respecting the agreement. Tihic said he met
with Serbian President Tadic 10 days ago and Tadic said he
would encourage Dodik privately, but not publicly, to support
the agreement because he does not want Bosnian instability to
spill over to Serbia. Tihic said he would like BiH at state
level to reach a "special relationship" with Serbia, Croatia,
and Montenegro, as a means of demonstrating to all Bosnian
ethnic groups that the country would respect their ethnic
ties.

13. (C) Covic said he was "overwhelmed and more than
satisfied" that all the political directors had supported the
agreement at the November 19th PIC. While it was clear that
Silajdzic would not participate in any future discussions,
the talks would proceed without him, Covic said. Key next
steps include restructuring authorities in the Council of
Ministers and at the Federation level, he said. His party
needs another partner to restructure the Council of Ministers
and Covic said he believes it should be the Social Democratic
Party (SPD),which could act as a "good wide receiver and
catch every ball." A/S Fried said both the U.S. and the EU
stand ready to support BiH in its efforts at reform.

14. (C) Tihic urged the international community not to
abolish the OHR prior to Bosnia,s approval of constitutional
reforms, predicting that lack of an OHR would lead Dodik and
others to block political institutions and paralyze political
progress in BiH. Ambassador English noted that the Europeans
had already rejected the idea of retaining the OHR until
constitutional reforms passed.

15. (U) A/S Fried and Ambassador English have cleared this
cable.
.