A/S FRIED AND ROBERT COOPER DISCUSS KOSOVO,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001774

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KK GG BK EUN
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED AND ROBERT COOPER DISCUSS KOSOVO,
GEORGIA, BOSINA

Classified By: USEU POL M-C Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 b. and d.


1. (C)SUMMARY: In successive meetings at the European Union
on November 20, EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and
Ambassador Kristen Silverberg obtained consent from the
French Presidency and Robert Cooper of the EU Council
Secretariat that the UNSYG Statement on Kosovo should include
both the six-point plan agreed to by Serbia and Kosovo's
four-point statement, so as to allow unobstructed deployment
of EULEX in Kosovo. On Georgia, A/S Fried gave an cautiously
positive assessment of the businesslike talks held in Geneva
the day before. On Bosnia, Fried and Cooper shared their
pessimism about the quality of leadership there.
Nonetheless, Cooper was hopeful for tangible movement on the
Peace Implementation Council's 5-plus-2 goals and conditions
within the next three months to allow for a review of the OHR
and EUFOR profiles. END SUMMARY.

KOSOVO: TOWARD EULEX DEPLOYMENT


2. (C) A/S Dan Fried and Robert Cooper began by discussing
how best to obtain Kosovar and Serbian acquiescence to EULEX
deployment, given word that the UN Secretary General's report
on Kosovo was again being edited by David Harland. A/S Fried
related how -- in a fortuitous discussion just minutes before
with French MFA counselor Eric Chevalier, ICR Peter Feith,
and Solana Deputy Cabinet Director Patrice Bergamini -- Feith
had proposed two annexes to the UNSYG report, one the Serbian
six-point plan and the other the Kosovar four-point
statement. Cooper thought this "a clever piece of
bureaucracy," though he did not think it mattered whether the
two were appended to, or integrated within, the report.
Cooper added that HR Solana would call Tadic later that same
day to say there was a deal. Haste was important, said
Cooper, since the relevant Security Council meeting would be
on November 26.


3. (C) Ambassador Silverberg, who had been on the phone with
USUN Amb. De Carlo and in a follow-up discussion with Eric
Chevalier, reported that Chevalier had reached UN DPKO Alain
LeRoy, convincing him to re-take control of the UNSYG report.
LeRoy reportedly stated he wanted to integrate the six-point
plan and four-point statement into the text of the report,
rather than append them. Amb. Silverberg cautioned that a
contemplated PRST should be considered optional, since
insisting on a PRST could provide an opening for Russia to
balk, despite assurances from Serbia that Russia would
follow. A/S Fried said it was important for the Serbs and
Kosovars to hear from the EU directly its determination to
deploy EULEX on time, and Cooper assured him that has been
the EU message. Chevalier had said in the earlier meeting
with A/S Dan Fried that FonMin Kouchner would call Tadic to
reinforce that message.

GEORGIA: POSITIVE GENEVA TALKS


4. (C) Robert Cooper asked about the November 19 meeting in
Geneva, and A/S Fried responded that the results exceeded his
expectations. Aided by Pierre Morel's thorough diplomacy, he
said, the atmosphere was businesslike. Fried said his message
to the Georgians is that they be realistic about the
prospects against an early recovery of the breakaway
provinces. Cooper encouraged that message, observing that
every time the Georgians resort to force, "they lose ground."
A/S Fried added that the Georgians said they would not
object to Americans going eventually to Tskhinvali, provided
they were given advance notice.


5. (C) A/S Dan Fried and Robert Cooper both wondered if the
Russian MFA would assert itself more on the Georgia
portfolio, heretofore controlled by the
Putin-military-security apparatus. Fried noted that Deputy
FM Karasin was evidently operating in Geneva on limited
instructions, since he stopped the IDP working group from
progressing farther than it did. Still, Dan Fried gave
Karasin credit for the South Ossetians' relatively good
behavior. Cooper said it was important to continue working,
particularly on a mechanism for dispute settlements, before
the next Geneva session on December 18. A/S Fried said UN
envoy Verbeke would have the pen on that item.

BOSNIA: DOUBTS ABOUT LEADERSHIP


6. (C) Robert Cooper said he had never seen the Bosnians so
quarrelsome and so "absolutely useless." A/S Fried
characterized his meeting earlier the same day with BiH
President Haris Silajdzic as surreal, saying that Silajdzic's
talk of "Hitler" (a reference to the Republika Srpska),
"ghettos" (a reference to the conditions of the Bosniaks
today),and turning Bosnia into a mini-Iran was inflammatory
nonsense. Fried said it is evident that Silajdzic's plan is
to make things worse in hopes of some kind of general

BRUSSELS 00001774 002 OF 002


reassessment ("the worst, the better"). Cooper said
Silajdzic was marginalizing himself. On his meeting with
Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik, Dan Fried said he told him
talk of secession was unacceptable. His joint meeting with
Bosnian Deputy Speaker Sulejman Tihic and HDZ Party President
Dragan Covic, Fried said, was more encouraging, and that his
message to them was that the radical tide would pass and
their time would come; Europe awaits. (See septel on
meetings with Bosnians.)


7. (C) On next steps, Cooper said that there would be
transition regarding OHR and EUFOR, and he hoped for some
kind of tangible progress on 5-plus-2 in the next three
months (Comment: before the next PIC meeting). Brcko, he
said, was key.


8. (U) Assistant Secretary Fried cleared this cable.
SILVERBERG
.