Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS1680
2008-10-30 17:58:00
SECRET
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

BELGIAN GOVERNMENT INCHES TOWARD ACTION ON CRISIS

Tags:  PGOV PREL BE RW CG EU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9359
OO RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBS #1680/01 3041758
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301758Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8176
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0391
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0474
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001680 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AF/C CHRISTOPHER LAMORA, EUR/WE KATE SHARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BE RW CG EU
SUBJECT: BELGIAN GOVERNMENT INCHES TOWARD ACTION ON CRISIS
IN THE CONGO

Classified By: Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs Richard Eas
on for reason 1.4 (B) and (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001680

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AF/C CHRISTOPHER LAMORA, EUR/WE KATE SHARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BE RW CG EU
SUBJECT: BELGIAN GOVERNMENT INCHES TOWARD ACTION ON CRISIS
IN THE CONGO

Classified By: Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs Richard Eas
on for reason 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. Summary: (C) The situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (Congo) is currently the number one real-time
foreign policy concern for the Belgian Government and one of
the top stories in the Belgian press (French and Flemish).
The GoB issued statements October 30 calling for an immediate
cease fire in Eastern Congo and announcing that Belgium would
send C-130 transports to evacuate Belgian nationals. The
Belgian response to the humanitarian crisis in Eastern Congo
has evolved from diplomacy alone; last week, FM DeGucht told
Parliament". . . an EU military mission would be
counterproductive in Congo." Now, our MFA contacts confirm
that Belgium supports a European force with a clearly defined
mission, a strengthening of MONUC's mandate in the UNSC, and
a renewed diplomatic offensive in Kigali and Kinshasa. The
evolution in Belgian policy was spurred by the humanitarian
crisis of civilian refugees uprooted by Nkunda's recent
offensive in the Goma area. NGO pressure to react to the
fighting was buoyed by heavy coverage in the Belgian media.
Launching a European mission to support MONUC in the Eastern
Congo will be challenging both in European and Belgian
domestic terms. On the European side, several European
countries are consulting with each other to determine what
the others intend to do. A European agreement is not a
foregone conclusion, and multiple procedural questions need
answered. For Belgium, a parliamentary vote to participate
is expected to pass after heated argument, overriding the
prohibition on sending troops to former Belgian colonies in
Africa that has been followed since the end of the Rwandan
genocide.


2. (S) On the diplomatic front, MFA contacts told PolOff on
October 30 that FM DeGucht has confirmed he will meet Rwanda
President Kagame Friday evening or Saturday morning. Belgium
believes that Kagame has very strong leverage over Nkunda and
could help stop the current crisis; they hope the United
States and the U.K. will also use their leverage with Kagame

to end the violence. Our MFA contacts would like to know if
Secretary Rice has talked to Kagame. In the long run, they
insist that Kabila remains the key to the situation in
Eastern Congo, and feel that FM DeGucht's frequent criticism
of Kabila and U.S. policy in the Congo was on the mark. End
Summary.


Belgium and the Congo
--------------


3. (SBU) The Congo is among the most important bilateral
relationships for Belgium, stemming from its long and fraught
colonial history. A significant portion of Belgium's foreign
assistance budget is slated for the Congo, but these funds
have been frozen due to the diplomatic row that followed FM
DeGucht's frank criticism last year of Congo's leader,
Laurent Kabila, on human rights and corruption. Kabila
responded by closing Belgium's consulates in Lubumbashi and
Bukavu.


4. (C) During an October 23 meeting with visiting U.S. Envoy
for the Great Lakes Region, Joyce Leader, MFA contacts stated
that Belgium supported a diplomatic solution to the current
violence in the Kivus. They placed the blame for the
intensified conflict on a lack of political will between
Congo's President Laurent Kabila and Rwanda's President
Joseph Kagame. They suggested that a further clarification
and strengthening of MONUC's mandate was all that should be
done to reduce violence in the Eastern Congo. Finally, our
interlocutors said Belgium was resistant to calls for
deploying an EU force in Congo, though public pressure for
action was growing. They noted that other EU members states
were receiving similar pressure, and the GOB was concerned
that more impressionable member states like the Netherlands
and Sweden might push for imprudent action.

Public Pressure
--------------


5. (C) International NGOs conducted a strong pressure
campaign to urge GOB action on humanitarian issues in the
Congo last week. Our MFA contacts received representatives
of both Oxfam and Amnesty International October 23, who
highlighted the sexual violence against women perpetrated by
the various armed groups in eastern Congo. At a DCM hosted
lunch for Envoy Leader, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Committee Hilda Vautmans noted that multiple NGO groups

BRUSSELS 00001680 002 OF 003


pressed for immediate action to end the sexual violence in
eastern Congo at her October 22 hearing on the Congo. She
expressed deep concern with the violence, especially that
directed towards women, but noted that the current budget
environment made it very difficult for Belgium to take
further action. Professor Jean-Claude Willame, one of
Belgium's foremost Congo experts, and a member of Amnesty's
board, responded that the NGO community was pushing for
military action now, arguing that only military force could
end the most serious violence. He suggested that an EU quick
response force would be a perfect solution to augment MONUC
and take action, where the current MONUC soldiers have failed
to protect civilians.


6. (SBU) Coverage of the humanitarian crisis, particularly
the tens of thousands of civilians forced to flee by Nkunda's
offensive in the Goma area, has prominently featured in all
major news media. MFA contacts noted that reports are being
carried in both French and Flemish press, while Africa
reporting had traditionally been the province of the
French-language papers.

Belgium's Moves Towards Action
--------------


7. (C) Our MFA contacts suggested that the NGO pressure, the
well-publicized humanitarian dimension, as well as the
resignation of the Spanish MONUC commander over the weekend,
convinced the GoB that diplomatic action was not sufficient.
According to MFA contacts, FM DeGucht began calling his
European counterparts to gauge their intentions. They said
the French seemed the most sympathetic, and the French
Presidency would naturally take the lead in pushing for any
European action. DeGucht requested a meeting of the core
Cabinet, which was held October 30.

The GoB made the following decisions:

-- Belgium would be ready to join a European force if a
decision to deploy a battle group were taken.

-- The Foreign Ministry would push for a stronger MONUC
mandate in the UNSC.

-- Diplomatic initiatives would be launched in Kigali and
Kinshasa. (Note: DeGucht has already confirmed he will meet
Kagame this weekend. The first contacts have already been
made with the Congolese Foreign Minister to arrange a
meeting. End Note)

-- Belgium's two C-130's in Kinshasa will soon be made ready
to deploy for humanitarian assistance.

This evolving policy is significantly more activist than the
GOB's position of last week. During his October 22 address
to Parliament, DeGucht stated, "An additional European
military effort would be counterproductive, and President
Kabila accepting European troops was unlikely."


8. (S) MFA contacts cautioned that the suggested European
force would take time to muster. They said the member states
inclined towards action were all watching each other to see
what the others would do, in a slowly shrinking circle that
would hopefully result in a consensus. They noted that the
French Presidency and EU FM Solana had just held a press
conference, proposing a very "cautious mission" that would
deploy an EU battle group for a short time to solve the
current humanitarian crisis. Its mandate would be to support
MONUC, secure the airport and immediate surroundings and
relaunch the Goma process. The MFA said in confidence that
not all of the countries making up the Eurocorps battle group
may support a mission -- Belgium (yes),Sweden (probably),
the Netherlands (probably),Germany (unclear but SPD likely
to oppose),Spain (unknown),and Luxembourg (unknown). Even
if all contributor countries agreed, an agreement by all 27
member countries may be necessary before the force could be
deployed.


9. (C) Belgium's participation in a "peacemaking" force in
Africa would depart from its post-Rwanda policy that Belgian
troops cannot be deployed in former colonies. The MFA is
currently researching whether this "Rwanda Commission"
restriction is applicable to all missions or only U.N.
missions. Our MFA contacts said a parliamentary vote would
probably be necessary before action could be taken. They
brushed aside PolOff's suggestion that such a vote might be
difficult for political, historical and community

BRUSSELS 00001680 003 OF 003


(French-Flemish) reasons. They noted that the left wing NGO
community crying the loudest for action would likely bring
the French Socialist Party (PS) along and that the
French-speaking community and press was traditionally quite
activist in Africa issues. They added that the Flemish press
and parties had traditionally been the most critical of
Belgian involvement in Africa, but that Flemish media was
giving the events in Congo as much story time and page-space
as the French-speaking media. Furthermore, the Flemish PM,
FM and DefMin were all supportive of joining an E.U. force.
In sum, our contacts believe that if a vote came to
Parliament, appropriately worded, the measure would pass.

Congo Policy and Questions
--------------


10. (C) Our interlocutors underscored that any EU mission and
the current outreach to Kagame to reign in Nkunda was a short
term effort to end the current crisis. Long term, the major
problem was Kabila. Their message to the United States was:
be less lenient to Kabila! They admitted they have been in
damage control mode since their consulates were closed by
Kabila in April, but maintain their criticism has been
accurate all along. Kabila's democratic credentials do not
make him beyond reproach. Belgium had warned Kabila he would
lose an eastern offensive, and apparently he has. The
weapons that Kabila receives are used to loot, pillage, kill
civilians, or are sold. His army is as FM DeGucht said in an
interview in the Flemish paper De Standaard, " . . . an
unregulated gang that burns, rapes, and pillages. . . with no
control."


11. (S) Our contacts said that FM DeGucht called Secretary
Rice October 29. FM DeGucht understood that she would call
President Kagame. They would like to know if the call was
made. Please confirm if possible.


12. (S) For AF/C: Belgian reports indicate that a former
candidate for President of Congo, Oscar Kashala, with close
ties to the United States, was back in Rwanda and in
communication with Nkunda's CNDP. Our MFA contacts suggested
that he could give the CNDP a political face and help them
develop a platform. It would change the game if the CNDP
became politically active. Embassy would appreciate knowing
whether AF/C has information about Kashala that may be useful
to Belgium.


13. (C) CNDP: Our MFA contacts said Nkunda is sick. They
believe he has diabetes and a serious sexually transmitted
disease. They have confirmed he gets helicopter lifts to
Rwanda for treatment. There are several persons in Belgium
who claim to represent the CNDP, but it is difficult to
determine who truly speaks for Nkunda and get beyond the
propaganda. The Belgians have received rumors of infighting,
though the CNDP seems stronger than ever. The CNDP has been
able to strengthen itself and can now attack from
strongholds. Its recent psychological warfare efforts seemed
remarkable when 20-30 soldiers were able to use noises or
bluster to scare off two to three thousand troops.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) The Belgian government is working with the EU to send
an Eurocorps battle group to Congo. Whether they are
successful or not would seem to depend on other member states
and the ability of other Europeans to agree that the
humanitarian crisis in the Congo warrants an EU deployment.
The problems further demonstrate the difficulty the EU has in
taking action during a fast-moving crisis. Domestically,
what is striking is that the Flemish-led government is
pushing so hard to solve the current humanitarian crisis in
Congo, when Africa policy was traditionally the province of
Francophone politicians. Sending troops to Africa would also
require Belgium to break with its prohibition on deploying
troops in former colonies, though our MFA contacts believe
there would be little effective parliamentary opposition.
Belgium clearly remains concerned about events in its ormer
colony, and is working hard to make diplomacy work in Africa,
and to build up support among Allies and in the EU. It is
making a valorous attempt to lead without leading.
.