Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS1663
2008-10-28 16:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO EU ON GEORGIA, ENERGY

Tags:  PREL ECON ENRG EFIN MARR RU GG EUN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6915
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1663/01 3021643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281643Z OCT 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001663 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: PREL ECON ENRG EFIN MARR RU GG EUN
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO EU ON GEORGIA, ENERGY
SECURITY, FINANCIAL CRISIS

Classified By: USEU Polmincouns Chris Davis, for reasons 1.5 (d) and (e
)

SUMMARY
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001663

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: PREL ECON ENRG EFIN MARR RU GG EUN
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO EU ON GEORGIA, ENERGY
SECURITY, FINANCIAL CRISIS

Classified By: USEU Polmincouns Chris Davis, for reasons 1.5 (d) and (e
)

SUMMARY
--------------
1.(C) On October 24, during an introductory meeting,
Ambassador Silverberg and Vladimir Chizov, Russian Ambassador
to the EU, discussed Georgia, the international financial
crisis, energy issues, piracy, and EU-Russia relations,
including preparations for their November summit in Nice.
Chizov was courteous, but peppered his avuncular-style
presentation with digs at the United States, Georgia, and the
EU. The Ambassador pressed for humanitarian and monitors
access to occupied parts of Georgia. She also probed Russian
thinking on French proposals for the G-20 summit, and on the
Commission's "third package" of energy unbundling proposals.
END SUMMARY

GEORGIA
--------------
2.(C) Chizov reiterated Russian complaints that Georgian
forces had not moved back to pre- August 7 positions and that
Georgian special forces "spetznaz" were making forays into
the buffer zone being monitored by the EUMM. Russia expected
the EU "who had volunteered for this task" to pay more
attention; Lavrov had "no choice" but to go public. Chizov
was careful to praise the French Presidency for its "good
office" role to promote the cease-fire including, he claimed,
"to ultimately take responsibility for the security" of the
zones adjacent to SO and ABK.

3.(C) Chizov alleged that some EU capitals were not/not
sending "the right signals" to Georgia and "must prevent
revanchism" from Georgia. He warned that assistance from
"the outside world" to Georgia must not feed its expectations
that it can launch a revanchist attack on SO/AB. Given
Chizov's expression of Russian confidence in the EU's good
will, Amb. Silverberg questioned Russia's refusal to agree to
allow access by impartial third party observers (including
the EUMM and OSCE) throughout all of Georgia including SO/AB,
in order to investigate claims of cease-fire violations and

atrocities. Chizov tried to deflect the point by accusing
the EU of handling the access requests incorrectly by failing
to address them to the "governments of those independent
countries" and by asserting that the Medvedev-Sarkozy
cease-fire implementation plan only "spoke to deployment in
zones adjacent to SO/AB." He further asserted that the
separatist forces "were not doing anything beyond their own
borders." Amb. Silverberg pressed the point further noting
that if their were no independent monitors on the ground,
there was no way to determine the facts of the situation.
She expressed USG intentions to pursue the matter further.
Turning to the humanitarian situation, Silverberg said there
was no excuse to deny access to humanitarian organizations
either. Chizov denied this, claiming that they could transit
through North Ossetia as the ICRC and ECHO had done.

NICE SUMMIT
--------------
4.(C) Asked whether Russia expected access and assistance
issues to come up at the EU-Russia summit in Nice on November
14, Chizov opined that the discussion should be "more
strategic and focused on global issues such as the financial
crisis" than on "local issues," especially since the summit
would take place on the eve of the G-20 summit in Washington.
Russia hoped to continue the discussion of economic issues
that began at the June summit in Khanty Mansiisk as well as
discuss European security architecture in which he claimed
the EU was "very interested."

FINANCIAL CRISIS
--------------
5.(C) Silverberg reviewed initial U.S. thoughts on French
proposals on the financial crisis, highlighting the need for
a balance between actions to address long and short-term
problems. The French idea of using their sovereign wealth
fund to create an obstacle to foreign investment could be
seen as protectionist. Chizov said he heard that French
ideas were not yet crystallized on IFI involvement. He
thought the French would have more to say on their proposals
at the EU-Russia Ministerial in St. Petersburg on October 28.


SOMALIA AND PIRACY
--------------
6.(C) In response to Amb. Silverberg's question, Chizov
confirmed that one Russian naval ship (NFI) had arrived in
the Gulf of Aden yesterday and that Russia was now finalizing
and agreement with the Government of Somalia "such as it is"
for cooperative status on piracy. Attempting to draw a
response from the Ambassador, he said he heard that NATO was
considering a presence in the Gulf and that this could set up

BRUSSELS 00001663 002 OF 002


a situation of "competition" with the ESDP mission being
prepared. He thought the Malaysians were there as well.
Finally, he highlighted his understanding of the EU's "legal
problems" with handling captured pirates, joking that "they
don't have a Guantanamo like you do." He expressed pessimism
that littoral states in the region would be willing to accept
and prosecute nationals captured by third country patrols.

ENERGY SECURITY
--------------
7.(C) Asked for his view on the EU's third package of energy
unbundling proposals, Chizov suggested that the document was
"evolving," had been "watered down" and was perhaps "more
pragmatic." He took pains to paint a scenario of differences
among meber states on the text as well as between Europan
business and bureaucratic institutions. e claimed Russia
would not "overdramatize" its concerns, but that it was
annoyed by the dsparity between Piebalg's private assurances
hat it was a non-discriminatory move and Barros's public
roll-out, in which he referred to he so-called "Gazprom
clause." Pressed for vews, Chizov admitted that Russia was
pinning its hopes on safety clauses in the proposal which he
believed would protect existing investments or those
negotiated under a multilateral or bilateral framework.

8.(C) Treating the Ambassador to a lengthy discourse on the
European energy market and "investors' needs," Chizov
repeated the Russian slogan around Brussels that South Stream
had the gas, Nabucco did not, and the United States had to
have Iranian gas to make the latter work. He "advised" the
U.S. to make up its mind about Iran. Silverberg rejoined
that it was actually Iran's decision (whether to re-join the
international community) and not ours. More broadly, Amb.
Silverberg pressed the importance of opening Russia's energy
sector to upstream investment. In response to Chizov's claim
that Europe had had no problem building pipelines with Russia
during the height of the Cold War, she noted that Europe had
been too complacent about collectively protecting its
interest in energy security.
SILVERBERG
.