Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS1641
2008-10-24 09:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

A/S FRIED MEETING WITH EU DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERT

Tags:  PREL MARR EUN PHUM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001641 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR EUN PHUM
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED MEETING WITH EU DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERT
COOPER

Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS Christopher Davis, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001641

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR EUN PHUM
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED MEETING WITH EU DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERT
COOPER

Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS Christopher Davis, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY: A/S Fried used his October 22 meeting
with EU Director General Robert Cooper to press for the EU to
keep pressure on the Russians to comply with their
obligations under the cease fire. While Cooper indicated
that he believed the EU would unfreeze its discussions with
the Russians on the partnership agreement, he left no doubt
that the EU would continue to push for full Russian
compliance with the cease fire. On Kosovo, Fried urged the
EU to be clear to Belgrade and Moscow that EULEX would fully
deploy whether or not they agreed. He noted the importance
of the precedent set by U.S. participation in the EU's crisis
management mission. Cooper suggested that the best way
forward in Bosnia was to end the Office of the High
Representative and combine the various EU operations into a
consolidated mission, using this as pretext to launch a
process of constitutional revision. He urged the US to
participate in the new EU Bosnia mission. Fried suggested a
joint U.S.-EU trip to the region.
END SUMMARY

--------------
GEORGIA
--------------


2. (C) A/S Fried expressed dismay over assertions of Russian
compliance with the cease-fire made by French NATO Perm Rep
Pascale Andreani at a dinner he and EU Director General
Robert Cooper had attended the previous evening. Fried
wondered why Andreani had felt compelled to make such an
assertion, noting that the comments were at odds with the
view of the French FM and plain reality. Cooper assured him
that her comments did not reflect a broader EU view. Fried
noted that Andreani's comments had come as a surprise, as the
U.S. has strongly appreciated Sarkozy's work on Georgia.
Cooper agreed with Fried that the US-EU "diplomatic tag team"
effort had been an effective approach. Georgia would be on
the EU's agenda in each meeting with Russia, even -- to the
chagrin of Russia -- the upcoming ASEM Summit.


3. (C) Fried noted the precariousness of the situation in
Georgia. With South Ossetian gangs raiding farms of newly-
returned Georgians, the return of Georgian police to the

adjacent areas could bring clashes with South Ossetian
militia. In Akhalgori, Georgian villages under Russian
occupation were only 400 meters from Georgian checkpoint,
well within small arms range. Council Secretariat Policy
Unit Director Helga Schmid indicated that obtaining access to
all areas for the EU Monitoring Mission was a key EU
priority. Cooper opined that Akhalgori might be a special
case, however, as the Russians said that it was a remote area
that contained fewer than fifty Georgians. Fried was quick
to correct this misapprehension, noting that he had recently
been within seven kilometers of Akhalgori and could have
walked there on a paved road. Fried agreed with Cooper that
Russia was unlikely to pull back and noted that Russia did
not welcome international community discovery of ethnically
cleared areas and razed villages.


4. (C) Helga Schmid commented that Russian troops largely
appear to be behaving acceptably, with South Ossetian
irregulars the main problem. Fried added that the Russians
were nevertheless responsible for the areas of Georgia they
now control. She said the Russians attempt to convince the
EU that they have no control over these militias. Schmid
characterized FM Sergey Lavrov as complicating things, while
DFM Karazin was "forthcoming." She disclosed that she had a
weekly meeting with Russian EU Ambassador Chizov, with
Georgia on the agenda. Schmid noted that Ossetian unruliness
had also been observed in the diplomatic sphere, with Abkhaz
representatives overheard insulting Russians in Geneva.
Fried noted that Secretary Rice had warned the Russians that
they were creating a monster, prompting Cooper to wryly
comment that "only a superpower can understand how difficult
clients can be."


5. (C) Fried said it was important get the EUMM and OSCE
observers into all areas and to force the Russians to take
responsibility for what had taken place. The EUMM might not
be able to prevent incidents, but must quickly fix
responsibility. Schmid agreed and said that HoM Haber called
Brussels directly upon learning of incidents. Fried noted

BRUSSELS 00001641 002 OF 003


that on his visit to the EUMM field office he had found it to
be well organized, with efficient French and Polish staff
playing key roles, but just getting started on the ground.
Cooper wondered whether the Russian interlocutors were
equally well organized, acknowledging visits to the EUMM by
drunken Russian soldiers.


6. (C) In this strange and explosive situation, U.S. public
statements of support for Georgia's leaders were being
complemented by frank private prescriptions, explained Fried.
The U.S. message to Georgian leaders was that there must be
no violent actions or pursuit of confrontation, and that
Georgia must pursue reforms and democracy. He described the
Governor of Gori District's approach to the way forward for
Georgia, emphasizing building the economy to attract the
Ossetians and Abkhaz. Cooper and Schmid voiced their
approval, noting that this had been the EU message to
Georgia.


7. (C) Cooper said that the EU would work, with Pierre Morel
in the lead, to stabilize the situation through the Geneva
process. Schmid commented that the EU approach was hampered
by Russia "trying to bilateralize the issues." For example,
FM Lavrov had written to Kouchner about issues that should be
addressed in Geneva. The Geneva process might need to be
shored up if it was to remain viable. The Russians had said
that December 31st would be its last day, she said, because
they hope to limit dealings with the Czech EU Presidency.
She had vainly attempted to convince them that Morel was in
charge of the Geneva process, not the EU Presidency. Cooper
concluded that "Geneva may not exist by December 31."


8. (C) Fried noted that Russia would continue to try and
divide us. It was therefore vital that our statements and
actions be consistent. Cooper acknowledged that EU
statements indicating that progress on EU-Russia relations
would be put on hold until the Russian forces returned to
pre-8/7 positions did not reflect actual EU intentions.
Schmid said the key EU-Russia objectives were a new EU-Russia
Agreement (formerly known as the Partnership and Cooperation
agreement) and an Energy Charter. Schmid openly conceded
that the EU was the demandeur on these issues and had little
leverage over the Russians, saying that "Chizov laughs at
us." Cooper said that the decision to re-engage on these
issues had not been formally taken, "but you see the
direction" of the EU's approach to relations with Russia.
Fried recommended that the EU ensure that it had a positive
agenda with the Russians that would include help for Georgia
and Ukraine. Cooper agreed, adding that the EU would also
focus on Belarus and Moldova.


9. (C) Financial tools needed to be calibrated, said Fried,
by using mechanisms like measures targeted at businesses
profiting from the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
perhaps drawing from the Moldovan model. Cooper noted the
value of this approach and said that EU consideration of
these sorts of tools would soon commence, after a European
Commission audit. Ambassador Silverberg raised the need to
also ensure that the European Commission funds not end up
supporting the South Ossetian separatist regime. Cooper
agreed and said that Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner had
already provided assurances that would not happen. Schmid
said that in order to assert Georgia's territorial integrity,
it was "territorially correct" to extend assistance to all
citizens of Georgia wherever they live, but as a practical
matter it would be impossible to direct funds to the
breakaway regions because of the limitations on access and
monitoring. Fried asked whether we should develop a
non-recognition policy similar to the approach the U.S. had
employed toward the Baltic States. Cooper noted this point
with interest, describing it as that it provided a useful
model that the EU should now consider.

--------------
KOSOVO
--------------


10. (C) EU Council Secretariat Balkans Director Stefan Lehne
was optimistic about prospects for progress on EULEX
deployment. During his recent visit to Belgrade, Tadic had
been "forthcoming" about the need to cooperate in EULEX
deployment. The next UNMIK report would include a paragraph
on EULEX. The EU's plan is to pursue a PRST lifting from the
language in the SYG's reconfiguration plan, which says that

BRUSSELS 00001641 003 OF 003


"EULEX will work within the status-neutral framework of the
UN." A/S Fried said he would consult with Department
lawyers.


11. (C) Lehne voiced concerned, however, over communication
between the UN's David Harland and Belgrade undermining the
EU's efforts. Ambassador Silverberg asked whether the French
Presidency had raised this point with LeRoy. Cooper agreed
that some of the UN's moves were a problem.


12. (C) Lehne would return to Belgrade for talks on Friday
with the EULEX paragraph to be sent to the UN report on
Monday for UNSC discussion on November 4. Fried queried why
the EU was confident that Moscow would not be unhelpful, as
had previously been the Russian reflex on Kosovo. Lehne
responded that Lavrov had told the Serbs that he wouldnot be
"more Serb than Belgrade." Fried commeted that it would be
important for Lehne to specify in Belgrade that the EU would
go ahead its plans for EULEX if Russia blocked progress at
the UN. Belgrade should be mindful that its European future
was at stake. Lehne said that the Serbs had "inflicted the
ICJ resolution" and would therefore accept EULEX in order to
unfreeze the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the
EU.


13. (C) Fried noted that the US would shortly sign a
participation agreement formalizing U.S. participation in
EULEX. This would be the first U.S. participation in an
ESDP operation. Fried said that this "irreversible
precedent" would establish a new foundation for US-EU
relations.

--------------
BOSNIA
--------------


14. (C) In Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative was
dead or dying due to Russia's position, said Cooper. Using
the Bonn powers was now extremely difficult, as Dodik was
aware how to take advantage of divisions within the
international community. Cooper opined that continuing OHR
without the Bonn powers was not satisfactory. He said that
it seemed necessary to substitute the EU "power of attraction
for international community's power of coercion." He
suggested that the separate EU institutions in Bosnia --
military mission, EU Special Representative, European
Commission delegation -- might be brought together to unite
political and program tools, keeping vestigial Bonn powers.
He invited US participation in this EU organization,
describing it as "absolutely vital".


15. (C) Fried noted that the deeper problem was Dodik's
separatism, the deterioration of Bonn powers and weakening of
OHR. He wondered how to apply pressure and provide Bosnians
a credible roadmap. Cooper responded that the solution was
to reform the Bosnian Constitution, but in a manner
compatible with what the EU requires. If the European
Union's separate roles in Bosnia were combined, he said,
there would be a technical pretext to make the needed
changes. Cooper said that the issue would not be ready for
decision until the spring. To prepare the way and help shape
more constructive behavior from Dodik and Ciladzic, Kouchner
would be traveling to Bosnia and Solana was being encouraged
to go as well. Fried suggested that a joint US-EU trip might
be useful.


16. (U) Assistant Secretary Fried cleared this cable.
.