Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS1569
2008-10-09 12:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

EULEX KOSOVO: PROGRESS ON DEPLOYMENT BUT POLITICAL

Tags:  PREL EUN UNMIK KV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHBS #1569/01 2831204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091204Z OCT 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFITT/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001569 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, INL/CIV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN UNMIK KV
SUBJECT: EULEX KOSOVO: PROGRESS ON DEPLOYMENT BUT POLITICAL
ISSUES REMAIN

REF: BRUSSELS 1486

Classified By: Ambassador Kristen Silverberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001569

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, INL/CIV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN UNMIK KV
SUBJECT: EULEX KOSOVO: PROGRESS ON DEPLOYMENT BUT POLITICAL
ISSUES REMAIN

REF: BRUSSELS 1486

Classified By: Ambassador Kristen Silverberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the Ambassador October 7,
EULEX Kosovo Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon reported that
deployment was in full swing, with approximately 450
personnel on the ground. De Kermabon said that EULEX would
reach an "initial operating capability" - capable of assuming
the mission - by the beginning of December. He added that
EULEX would reach a "final capability" - to include
deployment to the north - two to three months later. De
Kermabon said the two most significant factors affecting
operations were logistics and the political environment, with
UNMIK slow to transfer assets and Belgrade still not having
given EULEX a green light to deploy to the north. He
reported that coordination efforts with KFOR were "very
good," with EULEX and KFOR each working to transform unsigned
technical agreements into operational guidance. De Kermabon
anticipates no trouble from the Turks, the Turkish Ambassador
to NATO reportedly telling him that he saw "no problems to a
pragmatic approach." End Summary.

EULEX Deployment Ongoing
--------------


2. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador October 7 to discuss the
status of EULEX deployment, EULEX Kosovo Head of Mission
(HOM) Yves de Kermabon reported that deployment was in full
swing, adding proudly "there is rhythm." He said that
deployment was happening in waves of approximately 100
personnel per week, a total of 450 personnel now on the
ground. De Kermabon reported that his only concern was
dropouts, an issue he attributed to the earlier postponement
in deployment. To address this, de Kermabon said that he had
asked PSC ambassadors October 7 to ensure that their
respective personnel were available to deploy at the assigned
times.


3. (C) De Kermabon said that barring any political or
logistic holdups, EULEX would reach an "initial operating
capability" - meaning it could assume the mission from UNMIK
- by the beginning of December. While cautioning that EULEX
may not be deployed everywhere or at full staffing by the
time it reached an "initial capability," de Kermabon said

EULEX would nonetheless be able to carry out its mandate. He
explained that EULEX would not reach a "final capability"
until 2-3 months later, once it had reached full operational
capability - to include deployment in the north.

Concerns - Logistics and Belgrade
--------------


4. (C) While characterizing the overall handover from UNMIK
to EULEX as "OK," de Kermabon said "due to personnel
resistance, there are difficulties." Elaborating on this, de
Kermabon suggested that UNMIK personnel on the ground were
hesitant to give up their positions and resources despite
guidance from New York. De Kermabon said that he would
maintain pressure on UNMIK by keeping EULEX to its deployment
plan and meeting with the new head of DPKO in New York "in
the coming days."


5. (C) De Kermabon said that the political situation was
another constraining factor, explaining that EULEX needed a
green light from Belgrade in order to deploy to the north.
In response to Ambassador Silverberg's comment that this was
unlikely, especially if the Serbs note EU hesitation, going
in by force, de Kermabon said, "was not an option." He said
that he was relying on member states to pressure Belgrade to
accept EULEX, suggesting that it was his view that Serbian FM
Jeremic was calling the shots in Belgrade. De Kermabon said
it was his feeling that Serbian President Tadic was prepared
to give EULEX the green light, but that Jeremic was blocking
that for internal political purposes. He said that it was
important for member states to tell Jeremic to "stop." De
Kermabon said that it was also important to stop UNMIK's
negotiations with Belgrade, a task he said Council
Secretariat Balkans Director Stefan Lehne was being
dispatched to Belgrade to do in the coming week.


6. (C) When Ambassador Silverberg noted that a delay in

BRUSSELS 00001569 002 OF 003


deploying to the north would reinforce a sense of partition,
and perhaps make it even harder for Serbia to quietly
acquiesce, de Kermabon added that it was "important to seize
the initiative," de Kermabon suggested that EULEX be firm
with Belgrade on the issue of deployment to the north, and
ask Belgrade only for its input on how best to do so, not
whether EULEX can do so. De Kermabon suggested that this
"tactic" was similar to EULEX's approach to UNMIK, arriving
in force to ask UNMIK only how they would like to conduct the
handover, not whether. For this "bottom up" approach to be
successful, de Kermabon repeated that "top down" action was
necessary on the political side. De Kermabon said that while
Serbia had been able to play upon divisions within the 27 EU
member states to postpone EULEX deployment, Serbs - to
include Bogdanovic - realize that it is inevitable and are
ready to work together with EULEX once Jeremic gives the
green light.

Cooperation with KFOR
--------------


7. (C) De Kermabon characterized cooperation with KFOR as
"very good." He said that EULEX and KFOR were working
together to find "a pragmatic solution in the field."
COMKFOR General Guy and de Kermabon had agreed to transform
the unsigned EULEX-KFOR technical agreements into "practical
guidance." De Kermabon said that he and Guy had agreed to
establish a working group, joint training exercises, and
regularly scheduled COMKFOR-EULEX HOM meetings. De Kermabon
said that he had briefed DSACEUR McColl on these efforts and
that McColl had endorsed them. De Kermabon reported that he
was in the process of developing the field guidance with his
staff and that it would be reviewed by the member states in
the CPCC before being exchanged with KFOR. De Kermabon said
that he anticipated no difficulties with Turkey, sharing that
the Turkish Ambassador to NATO had told him that he saw "no
problems to a pragmatic approach."


8. (C) De Kermabon said that EULEX will work to coordinate
its response with the local police and KFOR, with local
police, EULEX, and then KFOR responding to situations in that
order. He stressed that joint command and control training
was key to preparedness as language and different equipment
could pose challenges. De Kermabon said EULEX sought to
reestablish the so-called "blue box" and "green box" approach
he had instituted as COMKFOR: local police operating inside a
"blue box" while military personnel allowed them freedom of
movement by providing a wider cordon or "green box." He
reported that the KFOR Chief of Staff General Berger was
interested in working together with EULEX on this strategy,
and added that he would "follow this carefully."

Other Issues
--------------


9. (C) De Kermabon reported that negotiations with the UN on
the issue of privileges and immunities (P/Is) were ongoing.
He was concerned that this could affect the participation of
certain member states, most notably Romania, an important
contributor to the mission. Concerning the "UN Umbrella" and
how he understood this to affect his operations, de Kermabon
suggested that this might not be a major issue. EULEX would
only have to provide a bi-yearly update report to the UN as
KFOR does. Nonetheless, de Kermabon said that this would
have to be handled sensitively as some member states might
object to the notion of "reporting" to the UN, let alone de
Kermabon's presence in New York to deliver such a report.
With regard to contingency planning efforts, de Kermabon said
he had made a formal request to PSC Ambassadors for
reinforcements in case of provocations early on in the
mission (reftel). He said that he envisioned this force as a
mobile force, able to quickly respond to any serious
incidents.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) While we are encouraged by the renewed deployment of
EULEX personnel, EULEX's continued insistence on a Serbian
green light is troubling. De Kermabon's report of improved
coordination with KFOR is especially welcome news. That
said, while coordination between EULEX and KFOR at higher
levels is reportedly good, our working level EU contacts

BRUSSELS 00001569 003 OF 003


still privately express doubts that EULEX will enjoy the same
level of support that UNMIK did. It is essential that we
work to dispel this notion, reassuring our European partners
that they have the support of KFOR so they will not have a
pretext not to deploy to the north.
.