Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS1541
2008-10-02 14:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

WHITHER MACEDONIA? - EU OFFICIALS PESSIMISTIC

Tags:  PREL EUN MK GR KV 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001541 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN MK GR KV
SUBJECT: WHITHER MACEDONIA? - EU OFFICIALS PESSIMISTIC
ABOUT MACEDONIAN INTEGRATION

Classified By: USEU POLMC Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001541

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN MK GR KV
SUBJECT: WHITHER MACEDONIA? - EU OFFICIALS PESSIMISTIC
ABOUT MACEDONIAN INTEGRATION

Classified By: USEU POLMC Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In meetings with new U.S. Ambassador to
Macedonia Phil Reeker September 23, a wide range of EU
officials provided a bleak assessment of Macedonia's
prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration in the near term. EU
officials attributed the current state of affairs to
continued Greek intransigence on the name issue and
"unhelpful" political developments in Macedonia. Greek
Permanent Representative Vassilis Kaskarelis blamed
Macedonian PM Gruevski for the impasse, suggesting that
having upgraded the name issue internationally for domestic
purposes, no Greek government could compromise on the issue.
Echoing Ambassador Reeker's concerns that lack of forward
momentum could contribute to renewed inter-ethnic problems in
Macedonia, EU officials suggested that the U.S. could help
unblock the current impasse by working with Macedonia's
government to favor some compromise. End Summary.
Greek Perm Rep View

2. (C) Enroute to Skopje, Ambassador Phil Reeker stopped in
Brussels September 23 to meet with EU officials involved with
Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. Providing
Ambassador Reeker with a very blunt and to-the-point
assessment of the current situation, Greek Permanent
Representative (and former Greek deputy negotiator on the
name issue) Vassilis Kaskarelis said that he saw "no way out
of the current situation." Kaskarelis blamed Macedonian PM
Gruevski for the current impasse, suggesting that Gruevski
had "played the name card in order to overcome domestic
problems and marginalize political opponents." Adding that
Gruevski lacked experience, Kaskarelis said that it was
important to "pass the message to them that if they do not
approach the whole situation more realistically, they will
have big problems." Elaborating on the problems Macedonia
might face, Kaskarelis said that the European Commission
would most likely issue a negative report later this fall and
suggested that political reforms in Macedonia would suffer as
Gruevski was "absorbed with the target of getting rid of
everybody."

3. (C) Continuing his criticisms, Kaskarelis said that, while

the European public was "fed up" with enlargement, the Skopje
government mistakenly still believed it was the focus of
European interest and that certain EU member states could
"make the Greek problem go away." Kaskarelis said he
believed Skopje's upgrading the name issue internationally
had been a big mistake. He criticized the U.S. handling of
the issue over the past year, suggesting we had left Gruevski
with the impression that we would be able to help solve the
name issue. While acknowledging that he thought the name
problem was "stupid" and that Greece could have solved it 15
years ago, Kaskarelis said Skopje's actions created an uproar
in Greece, with the government "forced to react." He said he
believed "no government can give the green light to Macedonia
over this." The issue also influenced Greece's position on
Macedonian NATO entry. While leaving open the possibility of
a double name (note ) presumably meaning that Macedonia
would use its constitutional name internally and a
mutually-agreed name everywhere else) and implying there may
be flexibility on the identity issue (Kaskarelis saying
"Macedonski" could work),he was extremely pessimistic,
saying he saw no way for the name issue to be resolved.
Other European Views

4. (C) According to MEP Doris Pack, chairwoman of the
European Parliament's delegation for relations with
South-East Europe, the political situation in Macedonia
remains very fragile, with inter-ethnic relations tense
despite greater ethnic minority representation in the
Macedonian government. Pack said that PM Gruevski lacked
experience and "does not listen," and that NGOs are telling
her that he had "no plan, just tactics." While acknowledging
that these attributes and actions, including Gruevski's
recent letter writing campaign to European leaders, were
unhelpful, Pack argued that Macedonia's biggest problem was
neighboring Greece. Critical that "we are all taken hostage
by a member state," Pack nonetheless shared Kaskarelis' view
that no Greek government could bend on the name issue since
"this had brought down previous Greek governments."
Suggesting that Gruevski had "a false sense of reality," Pack
said that he was mistaken in expecting that other member
states would be able to bring about a change in Greek views.

5. (C) European Commission Enlargement Directorate FYROM Head
of Unit Paola Pampaloni said that Macedonia's problems were

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primarily political in nature, and that Macedonia is making
steady progress in the areas of legislative and economic
reforms. Surprised that Gruevski had not learned any lessons
from Bucharest, Pampaloni said that despite having a dominant
political majority, Gruevski seemed less inclined to
compromise on the name issue than ever before. In her view,
Gruevski still believes that the U.S. and other EU member
states will be able to solve the name problem for Macedonia.
In addition to this false estimation, Pampaloni believes
Gruevski has "damaged his position among member states" by
writing letters and negotiating through the press.
Concerning the Commission's upcoming report on Macedonia to
be released November 5, Pampaloni said that accession
negotiations could not begin until "progress was made in
political dialogue, per the Copenhagen Criteria." Looking
forward, signs were not encouraging to Pampaloni. Gruevski's
actions - ranging from showing no flexibility on the name
issue to calls for an early election - leave the impression
among many member states that his only priorities were his
own political standing and domestic objectives, not EU
integration. Saying that "compromise is not in his
vocabulary," Pampaloni suggested that only figures such as
outgoing UNGA President Srgjan Kerim or former Interior
Minister Boskoski reportedly had any influence over Gruevski.

6. (C) Council Secretariat Director for Balkan and Central
European Affairs Stefan Lehne's assessment of the situation
was similarly grim, with Lehne suggesting that "the UN and
the U.S. are the only game in town to solve the name issue."
Concerned that Europe's influence suffered in the region as a
result of this standoff, Lehne said about Gruevski, "We have
a local politician who is not a committed European and will
probably face another Bucharest if he pushes for a date."
While encouraged by greater minority participation in
government, to include the coalition Gruevski had formed with
ethnic Albanian parties, Lehne expressed concern that if
ethnic Albanians see Gruevski abandoning the EU/NATO
accession track, Gruevski's "lack of vision" could lead to
problems during the upcoming municipal elections and in other
areas. Concerning the name issue, Lehne said that while
Gruevski realizes he needs to go ninety percent of the way,
Gruevski is not convinced the Greeks will go the other ten,
an approach suggesting Gruevski lacked confidence. Citing
border demarcation with Kosovo as an example, Lehne said he
did not believe Gruevski would move forward until"demarcation
was totally a done deal ) signed, stamped, delivered."
Lehne said the EU had communicated to Gruevski that if the
name issue could be solved, much goodwill would be created,
possibly allowing the EU to "cut some corners," keeping
Macedonia on its path towards full Euro-Atlantic integration.

7. (C) UK Permanent Representative Tim Barrow said "the more
I speak with the Greeks, the more I am aware they are not
moving." Barrow said that the name issue was "hard wired"
into Greek politics as governments could fall on the issue.
Adding that Macedonia's recent posturing on the issue had not
helped, Barrow suggested that Skopje needed to "make its case
better, recognizing who had the stronger hand."
Characterizing U.S. engagement on the issue as both "positive
and critical," Barrow said that it was important that the
U.S. and UK be in line to seize the moment when it comes up.
Saying that it was his impression that many in Athens want to
solve the name issue, Barrow also suggested that the
Macedonians change the terms of debate. Barrow said it was
his hope to reinvigorate PSC trips to the region as they
increased knowledge and, most importantly, enthusiasm about
the area.
Macedonian View

8. (C) Regarding Greece's continued efforts to frustrate
Macedonian integration ambitions, Macedonian Ambassador
Blerim Reka said this was actually part of a "larger
geostrategic plan to destroy the Adriatic Charter." Reka
said that while Macedonia had shown great flexibility on the
flag and constitution, the name issue was a Macedonian red
line because "for Macedonia the name is our identity, for
Greeks it is an issue of maintaining a coalition government."
Frustrated that Macedonia had spent 3 years as an EU
candidate country but still did not have a date for
negotiations, Reka said Macedonia's immediate priorities were
to obtain a date for negotiations to begin and a visa free
travel regime with the EU. Reka suggested that if these
goals were not achieved, pessimism among ordinary Macedonians
about the benefits of further integration would rise.
Calling for the EU and NATO to "show flexibility," Reka said

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that 2009 would be a decisive year to "show Macedonians the
benefits of Euro-Atlantic integration." While acknowledging
that Macedonia most likely would not receive a date when the
Commission released its report in November, Reka repeatedly
stressed the importance of NATO integration, saying "NATO
provides a guarantee; the EU path will take time."
Comment

9. (C) These meetings show clearly that the Macedonian
government, and Prime Minister Gruevski in particular, need
to change course in dealing with Greece and in managing
Macedonia's internal affairs, in order to regain the high
ground. If it proves to be impossible for any Greek
government to accept a reasonable solution on the name
dispute, then Macedonia needs to have established a
constructive position and record that will enable the U.S.
and other proponents of stability in the Balkans to explore
new avenues toward the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration.
(U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Reeker.
.