Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS1493
2008-09-24 15:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

FRIENDS OF BELARUS ASSESS POLICY IN LIGHT OF NEW

Tags:  PREL PGOV ETTC CVIS EUN BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0703
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1493 2681555
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241555Z SEP 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 001493 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS NSC FOR STERLING AND WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC CVIS EUN BO
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF BELARUS ASSESS POLICY IN LIGHT OF NEW
REALITIES

Classified By: USEU Polmincouns Christopher Davis for reasons 1.5 (d) a
nd (e)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 001493

SIPDIS

STATE PASS NSC FOR STERLING AND WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC CVIS EUN BO
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF BELARUS ASSESS POLICY IN LIGHT OF NEW
REALITIES

Classified By: USEU Polmincouns Christopher Davis for reasons 1.5 (d) a
nd (e)


1. (C) On September 15, EUR DAS David Merkel and U.S. Charge
d'Affaires to Belarus Jonathan Moore participated in a
Friends of Belarus meeting convened at the Lithuanian
Permanent Mission to the EU, in Brussels. Other participants
included EU Political Directors and other senior officials
from Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Sweden, France, the UK,
Germany, Slovenia, the Commission (DDG Kovanda) and Council
Secretariat (Policy Director Schmid). The meeting, held on
the margin of the monthly EU Foreign Ministers meeting
(GAERC),was the first time the group was able to
collectively assess relations with Belarus in the wake of the
conflict in Georgia. EU and U.S. officials generally agreed
that new geostrategic realities were driving Belarus to try
to re-balance its relationship with Russia and attempt a
rapprochement with the West. This was evidenced by
Belarusian President Lukashenko's delaying tactics on whether
to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Merkel noted that the U.S. and EU co
uld use the issue as a lever on the regime in Minsk, and not
the other way around.


2. (C) European Friends, EU institutions and the United
States concurred that it would be useful to intensify
encouraging signals to Minsk prior to the election, but
balked at a Lithuanian-Polish proposal (later floated at the
GAERC) to hold a formal Foreign Ministers Troika meeting with
Minsk or remove any EU sanctions in advance of the
Parliamentary elections on September 28. For its part, the
European Commission was currently pursuing technical
expert-level talks with Belarus and would make future offers
for more robust cooperation contingent on the outcome of the
Parliamentary elections, and in areas where it already had a
standing mandate from the EU Member States.


3. (C) German MFA CIS Regional Policy Director Hans-Dieter
Lucas said prominent opposition figure Alexandr Kazulin
expected the upcoming elections would be "worse than in
2004." Nonetheless, EU and U.S. diplomats agreed that it was
important to encourage the Belarusian political opposition to
participate in the elections rather than boycott them. The
UK rep wondered aloud whether Friends shared a common
definition of "success" in the conduct of the elections. The
Czech Poldir cautioned Friends to avoid over-focusing on the
technicalities of the elections, and instead look at the
"broader picture of relations between Minsk and Moscow,"
which were Lukashenko's "main game." While partners widely
acknowledged that elections were unlikely to meet
internationally recognized standards, Merkel urged EU Friends
to match a realistic assessment of the elections with a
strongfinal push to encourage improvements and supportthe
OSCE mission.


4. (C) EUR DAS Merkelreviewed U.S. trade-related sanctions
relief o date (related to prisoner releases) and previewed
possible next steps with regard to our visa ban. At the same
time, Merkel pointed out tht because FM Martynov had
explicitly linked the GOB's diplomatic attack on the U.S.
Embassy in Minsk to U.S. sanctions, Washington had no choice
but to link removal of U.S. sanctions to improvements in the
diplomatic relationship as well as to overall human rights
and democracy objectives there.


5. (U) DAS Merkel and Charge Moore did not have the
opportunity to clear this message.
MURRAY
.