FM DE GUCHT ENCOUNTERS RESOLUTE FM LAVROV IN MOSCOW

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STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/CARC AND EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PREL BE GG RU
SUBJECT: FM DE GUCHT ENCOUNTERS RESOLUTE FM LAVROV IN MOSCOW

Classified By: DCM Wayne Bush, reason 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Russian FM Lavrov told Belgian FM De Gucht
September 3 that OSCE monitors would not be acceptable in
South Ossetia, unless South Ossetian de facto president
Kokoity approves them, nor would Russian troops be withdrawn
from South Ossetia and Abkhazia because those troops are
there at the request of what Russia now recognizes as
independent countries. Monitors in other parts of Georgia
and in a buffer zone around South Ossetia and Abkhazia would
be acceptable, although Lavrov was focused on deployment of
police along the buffer zone to, in essence, secure what
would effectively become the "border" with Georgia. Belgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials gave a readout of
Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht's September 3 meeting with
Russian FM Lavrov in Moscow, describing Lavrov as resolute in
his defense of Russia's actions in Georgia and in defense of
South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. The officials said
Lavrov was contemptuous of Georgian President Saakashvili.
Lavrov made it clear the IDP problem will have to be resolved
with due regard for South Ossetia's putative independence and
that it will take time to solve. He made no commitment on
further troop withdrawals from other parts of Georgia, other
than that they will occur. Lavrov also was willing to accept
OSCE monitors on Georgian home territory but consistent with
Russia's recognition of
independence, said South Ossetian de facto president Kokoity
would have the last word on monitors within South
Ossetia. In sum, the Belgians found that the Russians hold
views diametrically opposed to the Europeans' on Georgia's
territorial integrity, on IDP's and on Saakashvili's
legitimacy. The GOB believes that Russia's wider aim in the
Georgia conflict is to split the Europeans, but also think
that Russia's actions have actually pushed tem closer
together. De Gucht holds a specialconcern about Europe's
energy security as it elates to access to the Caucasus and
Central sia and introduced a paragraph calling for special
attention to the issue in the communique from the September 1
European Council extraordinary meeting. Georgian Prime
Minister Gurgenidze made a favorable impression when he met
with Belgian and EU officials on September 2, when he
outlined reconstruction needs and pushed for support of an
IMF program for Georgia. Regarding Georgia's NATO
aspirations, De Gucht's Chef de Cabinet allowed that Russia's
new assertiveness may be turning opinion among NATO members,
including Belgium, in favor of granting Georgia a membership
action plan. End Summary.

LAVROV: "DEAL WITH KOKOITY"
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2. (C) In separate meetings with Walter Stevens, FM De
Gucht's Chef de Cabinet, and Willy De Buck, the MFA's
Director for Central and Eastern Europe, DCM and Poloff
received a readout of FM De Gucht's September 3 meeting in
Moscow with Russian FM Lavrov. De Gucht's visit was his own
and did not take place at the behest of the European Union,
although De Buck said that his minister's message to Lavrov
was coordinated with EU Foreign Minister Solana. However, as
it turned out, Lavrov was not in a mood to listen to De
Gucht. Stevens described Lavrov's attitude as "combative"
and added that the Russian FM was well-prepared. He warned
that French President Sarkozy and EU Commission President
Barosso will not have an easy time moving the Russians during
their upcoming meetings in Moscow.


3. (C) He spoke about Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia
only in terms of the breakaway regions' independence. For
example, Lavrov pointedly rejected De Gucht's
characterization of the Georgians displaced from South
Ossetia as "internally displaced persons", insisting on
calling them international "refugees." De Buck went so far
as to say that Lavrov gave the impression that ethnic
cleansing of Georgians from South Ossetia was in fact a
Russian aim in the conflict and that the GOR wants to
stabilize the situation around that reality.


4. (C) Lavrov's principal focus was on the perceived need to
secure South Ossetia and Abkhazia from potential Georgian
aggression. Stevens said that Lavrov had no problem with the
presence of international police or monitors in the territory
of Georgia proper or in the buffer zones the Russians have
established on the Georgian side of the de facto borders.
However, as de Buck put it, Lavrov's attitude with regard to
a presence in South Ossetia, including a buffer zone on that
side of the line, was "talk to Kokoity." Stevens said that
he encountered in Lavrov an absolute resistance to any
international presence in South Ossetia itself, except
perhaps for the eight OSCE monitors who operated in
Tskhinvali before the conflict broke out. The Russians
supported their stance by saying they and the Ossetians do

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not want to take responsibility for outsiders' security and
do not want to weaken the region's claim to independence.
They seem to be fine with having international police or
monitors take responsibility for patrolling the buffer zone
in Georgia for the benefit of South Ossetia, Stevens said.
Also, Lavrov showed no willingness to withdraw Russia's
troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, arguing they are
there at the request of their governments. Stevens said that
in justifying his position, Lavrov made much of alleged
differences in the text of the six-point agreement, for
example, arguing that the agreement talked about
international security "for" South Ossetia, not "in" South
Ossetia and allowed for more than one "mechanism." Lavrov
told De Gucht that the Russians will pull out of Poti, but he
offered no timetable for a withdrawal.


5. (C) In his conversation with De Gucht, when Saakashvili's
name was mentioned, Lavrov referred to him as "a sick man",
possibly on drugs, and "politically dead." For his part, De
Buck was understanding of the pressure under which
Saakashvili is operating, but he sees some of it originating
from within Saakashvili and not only from Russia. He said
that Belgium sees a need going forward to discuss human
rights issues frankly with the GOG. As an example of
behavior which detracts from Georgia's case as a candidate
for NATO and the European Union, he cited the repeated
refusal of the Georgian parliament to discuss the Sozar
Subari's ombudsman report on violations of human rights in
the election periods of 2008.

RUSSIA'S AIM: SPLIT THE EUROPEANS
--------------


6. (C) De Buck said that it was clear to the Belgians that
Russia's wider aim in the Georgian conflict is to divide
Europe and weaken the Trans-Atlantic alliance. "Georgia is
the test case," he said. In fact, Russia's action has had
the opposite effect it intended. The Europeans are closer
than they have ever been, De Gucht concluded. Stevens'
opinion is that the Russians are trying to put themselves
"back on the map with forces." He was surprised by Lavrov's
indifference to possible difficulties in international
organizations like the WTO. In that regard, Lavrov told him
that Russia intends to retract privileges already granted,
for example in opening the banking sector, despite likely
negative impact on investors. De Gucht told Lavrov that he
had already met one Belgian investor who had canceled his
nearly completed investment because of doubts about the
direction of Russia's business climate. cornerstone

PRIORITIES: ENERGY SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION
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7. (C) One special concern of Belgium and De Gucht is
Europe's energy security. De Buck and Stevens noted that it
was the Belgians who inserted a paragraph in the September 1
conclusions by the presidency of the extraordinary European
Council that invites the Council and the Commission to
examine initiatives to diversify sources and routes of
Europe's energy supply. De Gucht is actively promoting the
pressing need for Europe to deal with Russia as a single
"cartel" of consumers. De Buck said he thinks that much
progress on the European approach to Georgia and Russia can
be made at the informal Gymnich discussions taking place
September 5-6 in Avignon, France. He continued that Belgium
sees the first priority in the Georgian case as humanitarian
aid and recovery assistance. The next priority is
reconstruction and rebuilding assistance from the EU, but De
Gucht doesn't want the EU to "bite off more than it can
chew." Finally, he sees the need to elaborate of an entirely
new negotiation process for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.


8. (C) Georgian Prime Minister met with Belgian and EU
officials in Brussels on September 2 to outline Georgia's
needs for assistance. De Buck said that Gurgenidze's
presentation was particularly well-organized and that Belgian
officials were impressed with him. He said that Gurgenidze
had focused on securing Belgian support for an IMF program
for Georgia and that Gurgenidze did not discuss his ideas for
a "Phoenix Fund", which would concentrate foreign donations
for Georgia's reconstruction into one mechanism for
distribution. Stevens said that "the money will flow in"
from international donors to Georgia and perhaps in a few
years the South Ossetians and Abkhazians, reliant on Russia
for assistance, will regret that they are not with Georgia.

NATO MAP: MAYBE A NEW VIEW
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9. (C) Stevens, the more senior official, said that the
events in Georgia had caused many of his European colleagues

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to think more carefully about what Russia's intentions may be
in Ukraine. As a result, Georgia's and Ukraine's chances for
a NATO membership action plan in December may be better than
they were before the Russians struck. De Buck was more
cautious, saying that Georgia's IPAP commitments have not yet
been fulfilled and there is work to do on human rights,
economic and military matters before Georgia is ready.
.