GEORGIA/RUSSIA: A/S FRIED MEETS QUAD POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001379

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG EUN
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/RUSSIA: A/S FRIED MEETS QUAD POLITICAL
DIRECTORS AND EU OFFICIALS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Christopher Davis for reaso
ns 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: A/S Fried met with political directors of the
UK, Germany and France Sept. 3 to discuss potential EU-U.S.
next steps with Russia to achieve their implementation of the
Ceasefire on Georgia. French Deputy Political Director
Veronique Bujon-Barre (Araud did not attend) said President
Sarkozy will seek from Russia when he travels to Moscow with
High Representative Solana and Commission President Barroso
Sept. 8: 1) complete withdrawal of Russian troops from
territory of Georgia proper, including checkpoints; and 2) a
commitment from Russia that an international observer mission
be permitted to monitor Abkhazia and South Ossetia. She said
Sarkozy plans to seek a deadline for Russian troop withdrawal
of Oct. 1 or deployment of the Ceasefire Point 5/2
international monitoring mechanism, whichever comes first.
A/S Fried said a deadline is useful only if the U.S. and EU
have a plan should Russia not comply. Fried outlined a list
of potential leverage points being considered by the U.S.,
but said the U.S. wants to act with the EU, not unilaterally.
He favored postponing all G-8 meetings in September, while
France, Germany and the UK argued for a G-8 ministerial
meeting in September.


2. (C) In a separate meeting with Robert Cooper, the EU
Council Director General for External and Politico-Military
Affairs, A/S Fried was joined by Ambassador Silverberg.
Cooper said recruitment for EU observers was underway;
however, they would be limited to 200. If visits soon to
Moscow -- by President Sarkozy on September 8, or followed by
the yet-to-be-named EU Special Representative -- failed to
win Russia's adherence to the six-point Ceasefire, then our
steps could include targeting Russian businesses operating in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and considering steps against
criminally-connected Russian businesses. The EU ought to
consider using its considerable regulatory authority to look
at Russian activities that, for example, violate EU monopoly
strictures. End Summary.

EU view on Russian withdrawal from Georgia
--------------


3. (C) German Political Director Volker Stanzel said he was
"disillusioned" by a letter from Russian FM Sergey Lavrov
regarding Russia's views on implementation of the six-point
Ceasefire negotiated by French President and current
President of the EU Council Nicolas Sarkozy. In particular,
he said, Russia's claims of troop withdrawal are not backed
up by reports from the field, and Russia seems to be renaming
its combat troops in South Ossetia "peacekeepers." Fried
said Lavrov's letter appears to be a Russian attempt to
"reinterpret," i.e., renege, on the six-point plan. Fried
said, and the others agreed, that the EU and U.S. must remain
firm in implementing the six-point plan, the only document
agreed to and signed by all sides. UK Political Director
Mark Lyall Grant said it appears that Russia has not agreed
to a follow-up letter sent by Sarkozy to Georgian President
Saakashvili clarifying terms of the plan. Bujon-Barre said
that is one of the issues on which Sarkozy, Solana and
Barroso will seek clarification when they travel to Moscow
and Tbilisi Sept. 8. She said the French President also will
seek a commitment from Russia that an international observer
mission will be allowed effectively to monitor Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and that Russia will completely withdraw from
Georgian territory proper, including checkpoints, by Oct. 1
or when an international observer mission deploys, whichever
comes first. The Quad Political Directors debated the merits
of negotiating such a deadline with Russia, and especially
whether they could impose some cost to Russia if the Russians
ignore the deadline. Germany's Stanzel thought it better to
avoid a deadline, while Fried argued for setting one with
(internally) agreed-upon consequences. UK Political Director
Grant noted that Russia has overplayed its hand by being the
sole country to recognize the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia and also by its "continued obsession" with
driving President Saakashvili out of office.

Potential leverage points against Russia
--------------


4. (C) A/S Fried outlined some potential leverage points on
Russia the U.S. is considering, including postponing G-8
meetings, reducing selected bilateral contacts, reconsidering
our approach to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,
taking no steps to advance Russia's WTO and OECD membership,
and implementing a host of selected visa and economic
sanctions against particular Russian firms. These steps,

BRUSSELS 00001379 002 OF 002


Fried emphasized, would require considerable thought; we were
not going to plunge into actions without thinking through the
consequences. Germany, France, and UK officials appeared
skeptical of broad economic sanctions but more open to ones
specifically targeting Russian firms operating in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Fried stressed that the U.S. is
committed to coordinating strategy with the EU. The
Europeans disagreed with the U.S. suggestion to postpone
meetings of the G-8. The UK, France, and Germany all spoke
in favor of a G-8 ministerial meeting in September. Fried
said it was very unlikely the U.S. would agree to that.
Germany's Stanzel and the UK's Grant said postponing would be
the same as expelling Russia from the G-8, but Fried said
there is no reason to equate the two. Postponing the
September Ministerial was essential; this did not mean we
were taking down the G8 altogether. He noted that isolation
will affect Russia negatively in the long run.


5. (C) Bujon-Barre said the French EU Presidency will
announce within a couple of days its choice for an EU envoy
for Russia-Georgia. The Quad agreed that the envoy would
negotiate along wQOSCE Chairman-in-Office Stubb and report
back to the Quad, which would serve as an informal steering
group.

With Cooper: Get EU eyes on the ground
--------------


6. (C) Later on September 3, A/S Fried and Amb. Silverberg
met with EU Council Director General for Politico-Military
Affairs Robert Cooper, and his Director for the Americas,
Amb. Marek Grela. All agreed on the importance of deploying
EU observers to ensure that Russian troops withdrew from
Georgia proper, Cooper adding that the EU also wanted the
return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs),
which would require Abkhazia and South Ossetia to give
certain assurances. Cooper said that there were already
about 40 EU personnel on the ground and they were recruiting
more; however, he did not think they would number in the
hundreds, "until we know what they are doing." Two hundred
was the target figure for now. A/S Fried said more is
better, and EU observers would serve as a deterrent to
further Russian mischief, giving Georgia the breathing space
to recover economically. Amb. Silverberg added that sooner
is also better than later.


7. (C) As for Russia's intentions regarding the six-point
Ceasefire, A/S Fried suggested that the first act taken by
the EU's new Special Representative for the crisis in
Georgia, once named, should be to go to Moscow, after
President Sarkozy's September 8 trip there, to get a firm
commitment on point 5 of the six-point plan regarding troop
withdrawal to status quo ante positions, and negotiate the
international mechanism to terminate the "additional security
measures" under point 5. Fried stressed that the Ceasefire
did not provide for any security zones or buffer zones.
Moreover, if Russia fails to so commit itself, then it would
be time to increase pressure, which Fried said it was
important to discuss with the EU in advance. Cooper observed
there had been no talk of "sanctions" at the EU Council
summit on September 1 because President Sarkozy had proposed
going to Moscow on September 8.


8. (C) A/S Fried's suggestion that measures be taken against
those doing business in Abkhazia and South Ossetia led to a
discussion of the possibility of looking more broadly at
targeting criminally-connected Russian firms. Half-jokingly
characterizing "organized crime as a state-owned industry" in
Russia, Cooper said it would be useful to bring together the
EU's regulators to explore such possibilities. After all, he
said, it is important to "defend the integrity of our system,
not just against Russia." Ambassador Silverberg suggested
there could also be some creative thinking in the Justice and
Home Affairs realm along these lines.


9. (C) While re-emphasizing that such measures should be
calibrated, A/S Fried pointed out that we may not have
reached the bottom. Will Russia ignore its commitments or,
worse, open new crises in Crimea or the Baltics? Cooper
immediately responded, "That would be very serious."


10. (U) A/S Fried cleared this report.
SILVERBERG
.