Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS1377
2008-09-04 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:
A/S FRIED DISCUSSES KOSOVO WITH EU OFFCIALS
how-toVZCZCXRO5428 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHBS #1377/01 2481605 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041605Z SEP 08 FM USEU BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001377
SIPDIS
EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES KOSOVO WITH EU OFFCIALS
Classified By: USEU POLMC Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001377
SIPDIS
EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES KOSOVO WITH EU OFFCIALS
Classified By: USEU POLMC Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summar: In meetings with EU officials on Kosovo
Setember 3, Assistant Secretary Fried emphasized hat
EULEX deploy rapidly throughout Kosovo, hihlighted the
dangers of any possible deal linking EULEX deployment in
the north to an abstention on the ICJ vote, and announced
that the U.S. was ready to sign a participation agreement
(PA). Quad Political Directors discussed - without
resolution - the pros and cons of linking strategy on
Georgia with strategy on Kosovo. Concerning EU High
Representative for CFSP Solana's discussions with Serbian
President Tadic, Council Secretariat Western Balkans Unit
Director Stefan Lehne said that the thrust of these
discussions would be EULEX, not the ICJ issue. In A/S
Fried's meeting with EU Civilian Operations Commander Kees
Klompenhouwer and EULEX Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon,
Klompenhouwer reported that the EU intended to aggressively
deploy throughout Kosovo, including the north. EU Council
Director General for External Affairs Robert Cooper told
Fried he saw no indications a possible deal had been
discussed during Tadic's September 3 meetings in Brussels.
End Summary.
Quad Political Directors Discuss Strategy
--------------
2. (C) During A/S Fried's September 3 meeting with the Quad
Political Directors, the directors discussed - without
resolution - the pros and cons of linking strategy on
Georgia with strategy on Kosovo. Specifically, German
Political Director Volker Stanzel floated the idea of
abstaining on Serbia's request for an ICJ advisory opinion
request from the UN in return for Serbia agreeing to EULEX
deployment in the north. Fried said the U.S. was
skeptical, particularly if Serbia could not be held to its
end of the agreement. He said the conditions would have to
be very precise, including provisions for border and
customs controls. The UK's Political Director Lyall Grant
suggested turning the equation around and telling the Serbs
they should agree to full EULEX deployment or the EU and
U.S. will vote against the Serb ICJ request.
Lehne on Solana's Message to Tadic
--------------
3. (C) Council Secretariat Western Balkans Unit Director
Stefan Lehne told A/S Fried and Ambassador Silverberg that
the thrust of EU High Representative for CFSP Solana's
September 3 discussions with President Tadic would be
EULEX, not the ICJ issue. Interested in decoupling EULEX
deployment from the ICJ issue, Lehne reported that Solana
would make it clear to Tadic that opposing EULEX deployment
would not be consistent with Serbian EU integration
efforts. Responding to A/S Fried's concern about talk of a
possible deal on the ICJ vote, Lehne repeated that Solana
would seek to link Serbian support of EULEX deployment to
next steps on EU integration, not the ICJ issue.
4. (C) Asked if EULEX planned to deploy to the north, Lehne
said that if there was no EU consensus, "we will not go in
if firm opposition comes from Serbs and Serbia." Agreeing
with A/S Fried that not deploying to the north could lead
to catastrophic instability, Lehne said that the EU was
optimistic that
it would be able to deploy to the north by linking
deployment to the Interim Agreement. Responding to A/S
Fried's suggestion that the U.S. was prepared to sign the
U.S.-EU Participation Agreement even without resolution of
the privileges and immunities issue, Lehne said that it was
his understanding that another week would be necessary
before the agreement could be signed.
Klompenhouwer and de Kermabon on EULEX
--------------
5. (C) In A/S Fried's meeting with EU Civilian Operations
Commander Kees Klompenhouwer and EULEX Head of Mission Yves
de Kermabon, Klompenhouwer said that the EU intended to
aggressively deploy throughout Kosovo, including into the
north, but said that the EU approach would have to be
tailored to circumstances on the ground. He complained
that the EU lacked the manpower or mandate to be too
BRUSSELS 00001377 002 OF 004
forceful with the Serbs unless they could rely upon support
from NATO. De Kermabon said the EU would resume deploying
EULEX on September 22 with the goal of reaching initial
operating capability by December, which might precede
Kosovo-wide deployment. He said that reaching full
operating capability would depend upon Belgrade's
attitude. Although "we don't need Belgrade's permission,"
he said, "we must be realistic and flexible."
6. (C) De Kermabon outlined his "bottom up approach" to
winning Serbian confidence, which would stress guarantees
to minorities, ensuring freedom of movement and protection
of property. He said that this work inside Kosovo should
be complemented by "top down" pressure on Tadic. Belgrade
should be made to see that this could be a win-win
situation, De Kermabon opined. Serbia loses a million
Euros a day to smuggling; this could be recovered once a
customs-police-justice agreement was in place and EULEX was
operating throughout Kosovo. Klompenhouwer reiterated the
importance of convincing Belgrade of its interest in
tackling the organized crime that cost it millions and
embarrassed the country. He felt that technical
discussions on this subject with Serbian authorities could
help influence the climate in Kosovo and make it easier for
Belgrade to make good decisions and positive statements.
On Relations with UNMIK and TOA
--------------
7. (C) De Kermabon said that he was working with the UN to
define the executive powers that the EU would exercise
while under the authority of the UN umbrella and after the
EU has completely taken over from the UN. A joint EU-UN
working group had been established in Kosovo to produce a
shared vision for UN-EU cooperation by the end of
September. Klompenhouwer noted the need to figure out how
to effect the transition of UNMIK employees to EULEX,
especially police. Klompenhouwer said that he hoped the UN
could give more helpful messages to Belgrade; they were
signaling that there would be no EULEX role in the north
and that the border was still open to negotiation. Fried
inquired about the motivation for UNMIK's reluctance to
leave. Klompenhouwer responded that it was "organizational
inertia," as comfortable UN officials had not wanted to
lose their good jobs. They were gradually starting to
understand, he noted.
8. (C) According to Klompenhouwer "the critical moment" for
EULEX will come when police powers are transferred from
UNMIK. The EU would "assume" this authority, rather than
ask for any formal transfer of powers. The UN would not be
asked to take any decision other than reconfiguration.
This might sound unilateral, he acknowledged, but "we
cannot wait for the UN's green light." The EU would assume
this authority by deploying and operating across Kosovo.
Fried acknowledged that asking for a UN decision would
provide an opportunity to block it.
9. (C) Yves de Kermabon said that UNMIK would shrink by
seventy percent in its non-police areas by the end of
autumn, providing that EULEX had sufficient absorption
capacity. As it is critical to avoid a security gap, UNMIK
will retain police authority until the EU is ready to take
the lead. De Kermabon said by the end of the autumn, 300
police should switch to EULEX from UNMIK and there will be
four formed police units: two from UNMIK and two from
KFOR. Responsibility for police powers would switch at
this stage. If reinforcement is needed, he will ask the EU
Political and Security Committee a month before the
transfer of authority. Klompenhouwer noted, however, that
member states were "not enthusiastic" about providing these
reinforcements.
Borders and Customs
--------------
10. (C) Pressed for details by A/S Fried, de Kermabon
specified that it will be "quite impossible" for EULEX to
take responsibility for borders and customs in the north if
there is no "flexibility" from Belgrade. EULEX lacks the
force to be more aggressive. Fried responded that a
stronger approach was needed, cautioning that if the Serbs
think that they can deter the EU with intimidation, they
BRUSSELS 00001377 003 OF 004
will act. EULEX will be tested by mobs and if is not up to
the task, problems will worsen.
Constraints on EULEX Effectiveness and Assertiveness
-------------- --------------
11. (C) Klompenhouwer protested that EULEX must practice
"the art of the possible" in Kosovo. The EU does not have
military power, he said, its mission is rule of law, not
military. Fried encouraged the EU to use all available
tools, such as warning the Kosovo Serbs that troublemakers
would be arrested and face the same justice as everyone
else in Kosovo. Klompenhouwer demurred; the EU mission was
built for assistance to Kosovo, with core functions of
monitoring, mentoring and advising. Although it would have
executive powers, EULEX lacked the means to control the
situation.
12. (C) A/S Fried tallied the assets available to EULEX:
UNMIK police, EU police, Kosovo police and 18,000 NATO
troops. Klompenhouwer responded that NATO does not support
EULEX and there is no technical agreement between NATO and
the EU. Fried pointed out that practical coordination had
been adequate during the March 17 rioting. Klompenhouwer
responded by specifying that these had been NATO-UN
cooperation. NATO now denied the EU the support that it
provided to UNMIK. The EU had informal assurances of
in-extremis support only, not the normal operational
support and coordination that is needed.
13. (C) De Kermabon said that "pragmatic arrangements" for
in-extremis support mean that KFOR will intervene if called
upon, but will not assist with police operations or provide
support outside of a crisis situation. It will not, for
example, provide EULEX with back-up for crowd and riot
control operations. There were no specific arrangements in
these areas, he lamented. Fried queried whether that posed
a real problem. The EU side responded that if EULEX has to
open the border in the north the first day would be the
most difficult and NATO and the EU should work together to
ensure the situation stayed under control.
14. (C) Combating lawlessness in the north of Kosovo is
essential to the success of the EU mission, commented
Fried, and the EU must ensure that it does not signal
weakness to the Serbs. This will only invite mob
violence. He underlined that if the Kosovars see the
mission failing, it could radicalize them. De Kermabon
agreed this is a danger and that EULEX needs to act
strongly, but said that the EU would need NATO help to be
strong. Because NATO wanted to avoid KFOR becoming the de
facto first responder, NATO would not provide support to
Rule of Law functions. NATO's interpretation of "safe and
secure" was too narrow, the EU officials complained. Fried
agreed to discuss the issue with NATO's Secretary General,
whom he would shortly visit, and pressed the EU to take a
firm in its approach.
Cooper Not Aware of Any Deal with Tadic
--------------
15. (C) In his meeting with Robert Cooper, the EU Council
Director General for External Affairs, A/S Fried said EULEX
did not need Serbian permission to deploy in the north of
Kosovo. In fact, he said, some in Mitrovica might welcome
it. Instead of dealing with Belgrade's stonewalling, he
continued, Serbian thugs in the north of Kosovo should be
threatened with arrest and hard time in a Kosovo jail. On
the issue of EULEX and border control, Cooper suggested
that NATO and the UN first coordinate their roles. Fried
announced that he had the authority to sign the EULEX
Participation Agreement for the U.S.
16. (C) Cooper said that there had reportedly been no sign
of a "deal" during Tadic's meetings in Brussels on
September 3. Rather, he said, Belgrade seems "deeply
committed" to referring the question of Kosovo independence
to the ICJ. Cooper thought that "massive abstentions" were
a more likely outcome than defeat for Serbia in a General
Assembly vote, given the legacy of the Non-aligned
Movement. Nonetheless, Cooper thought it very worthwhile
to try to convince other capitals that the matter of
independence should remain a political matter, not a legal
BRUSSELS 00001377 004 OF 004
one. In any case, he added, "we've told the Serbians it is
a stupid idea."
17. (C) Assistant Secretary Fried cleared this cable.
.
SIPDIS
EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES KOSOVO WITH EU OFFCIALS
Classified By: USEU POLMC Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summar: In meetings with EU officials on Kosovo
Setember 3, Assistant Secretary Fried emphasized hat
EULEX deploy rapidly throughout Kosovo, hihlighted the
dangers of any possible deal linking EULEX deployment in
the north to an abstention on the ICJ vote, and announced
that the U.S. was ready to sign a participation agreement
(PA). Quad Political Directors discussed - without
resolution - the pros and cons of linking strategy on
Georgia with strategy on Kosovo. Concerning EU High
Representative for CFSP Solana's discussions with Serbian
President Tadic, Council Secretariat Western Balkans Unit
Director Stefan Lehne said that the thrust of these
discussions would be EULEX, not the ICJ issue. In A/S
Fried's meeting with EU Civilian Operations Commander Kees
Klompenhouwer and EULEX Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon,
Klompenhouwer reported that the EU intended to aggressively
deploy throughout Kosovo, including the north. EU Council
Director General for External Affairs Robert Cooper told
Fried he saw no indications a possible deal had been
discussed during Tadic's September 3 meetings in Brussels.
End Summary.
Quad Political Directors Discuss Strategy
--------------
2. (C) During A/S Fried's September 3 meeting with the Quad
Political Directors, the directors discussed - without
resolution - the pros and cons of linking strategy on
Georgia with strategy on Kosovo. Specifically, German
Political Director Volker Stanzel floated the idea of
abstaining on Serbia's request for an ICJ advisory opinion
request from the UN in return for Serbia agreeing to EULEX
deployment in the north. Fried said the U.S. was
skeptical, particularly if Serbia could not be held to its
end of the agreement. He said the conditions would have to
be very precise, including provisions for border and
customs controls. The UK's Political Director Lyall Grant
suggested turning the equation around and telling the Serbs
they should agree to full EULEX deployment or the EU and
U.S. will vote against the Serb ICJ request.
Lehne on Solana's Message to Tadic
--------------
3. (C) Council Secretariat Western Balkans Unit Director
Stefan Lehne told A/S Fried and Ambassador Silverberg that
the thrust of EU High Representative for CFSP Solana's
September 3 discussions with President Tadic would be
EULEX, not the ICJ issue. Interested in decoupling EULEX
deployment from the ICJ issue, Lehne reported that Solana
would make it clear to Tadic that opposing EULEX deployment
would not be consistent with Serbian EU integration
efforts. Responding to A/S Fried's concern about talk of a
possible deal on the ICJ vote, Lehne repeated that Solana
would seek to link Serbian support of EULEX deployment to
next steps on EU integration, not the ICJ issue.
4. (C) Asked if EULEX planned to deploy to the north, Lehne
said that if there was no EU consensus, "we will not go in
if firm opposition comes from Serbs and Serbia." Agreeing
with A/S Fried that not deploying to the north could lead
to catastrophic instability, Lehne said that the EU was
optimistic that
it would be able to deploy to the north by linking
deployment to the Interim Agreement. Responding to A/S
Fried's suggestion that the U.S. was prepared to sign the
U.S.-EU Participation Agreement even without resolution of
the privileges and immunities issue, Lehne said that it was
his understanding that another week would be necessary
before the agreement could be signed.
Klompenhouwer and de Kermabon on EULEX
--------------
5. (C) In A/S Fried's meeting with EU Civilian Operations
Commander Kees Klompenhouwer and EULEX Head of Mission Yves
de Kermabon, Klompenhouwer said that the EU intended to
aggressively deploy throughout Kosovo, including into the
north, but said that the EU approach would have to be
tailored to circumstances on the ground. He complained
that the EU lacked the manpower or mandate to be too
BRUSSELS 00001377 002 OF 004
forceful with the Serbs unless they could rely upon support
from NATO. De Kermabon said the EU would resume deploying
EULEX on September 22 with the goal of reaching initial
operating capability by December, which might precede
Kosovo-wide deployment. He said that reaching full
operating capability would depend upon Belgrade's
attitude. Although "we don't need Belgrade's permission,"
he said, "we must be realistic and flexible."
6. (C) De Kermabon outlined his "bottom up approach" to
winning Serbian confidence, which would stress guarantees
to minorities, ensuring freedom of movement and protection
of property. He said that this work inside Kosovo should
be complemented by "top down" pressure on Tadic. Belgrade
should be made to see that this could be a win-win
situation, De Kermabon opined. Serbia loses a million
Euros a day to smuggling; this could be recovered once a
customs-police-justice agreement was in place and EULEX was
operating throughout Kosovo. Klompenhouwer reiterated the
importance of convincing Belgrade of its interest in
tackling the organized crime that cost it millions and
embarrassed the country. He felt that technical
discussions on this subject with Serbian authorities could
help influence the climate in Kosovo and make it easier for
Belgrade to make good decisions and positive statements.
On Relations with UNMIK and TOA
--------------
7. (C) De Kermabon said that he was working with the UN to
define the executive powers that the EU would exercise
while under the authority of the UN umbrella and after the
EU has completely taken over from the UN. A joint EU-UN
working group had been established in Kosovo to produce a
shared vision for UN-EU cooperation by the end of
September. Klompenhouwer noted the need to figure out how
to effect the transition of UNMIK employees to EULEX,
especially police. Klompenhouwer said that he hoped the UN
could give more helpful messages to Belgrade; they were
signaling that there would be no EULEX role in the north
and that the border was still open to negotiation. Fried
inquired about the motivation for UNMIK's reluctance to
leave. Klompenhouwer responded that it was "organizational
inertia," as comfortable UN officials had not wanted to
lose their good jobs. They were gradually starting to
understand, he noted.
8. (C) According to Klompenhouwer "the critical moment" for
EULEX will come when police powers are transferred from
UNMIK. The EU would "assume" this authority, rather than
ask for any formal transfer of powers. The UN would not be
asked to take any decision other than reconfiguration.
This might sound unilateral, he acknowledged, but "we
cannot wait for the UN's green light." The EU would assume
this authority by deploying and operating across Kosovo.
Fried acknowledged that asking for a UN decision would
provide an opportunity to block it.
9. (C) Yves de Kermabon said that UNMIK would shrink by
seventy percent in its non-police areas by the end of
autumn, providing that EULEX had sufficient absorption
capacity. As it is critical to avoid a security gap, UNMIK
will retain police authority until the EU is ready to take
the lead. De Kermabon said by the end of the autumn, 300
police should switch to EULEX from UNMIK and there will be
four formed police units: two from UNMIK and two from
KFOR. Responsibility for police powers would switch at
this stage. If reinforcement is needed, he will ask the EU
Political and Security Committee a month before the
transfer of authority. Klompenhouwer noted, however, that
member states were "not enthusiastic" about providing these
reinforcements.
Borders and Customs
--------------
10. (C) Pressed for details by A/S Fried, de Kermabon
specified that it will be "quite impossible" for EULEX to
take responsibility for borders and customs in the north if
there is no "flexibility" from Belgrade. EULEX lacks the
force to be more aggressive. Fried responded that a
stronger approach was needed, cautioning that if the Serbs
think that they can deter the EU with intimidation, they
BRUSSELS 00001377 003 OF 004
will act. EULEX will be tested by mobs and if is not up to
the task, problems will worsen.
Constraints on EULEX Effectiveness and Assertiveness
-------------- --------------
11. (C) Klompenhouwer protested that EULEX must practice
"the art of the possible" in Kosovo. The EU does not have
military power, he said, its mission is rule of law, not
military. Fried encouraged the EU to use all available
tools, such as warning the Kosovo Serbs that troublemakers
would be arrested and face the same justice as everyone
else in Kosovo. Klompenhouwer demurred; the EU mission was
built for assistance to Kosovo, with core functions of
monitoring, mentoring and advising. Although it would have
executive powers, EULEX lacked the means to control the
situation.
12. (C) A/S Fried tallied the assets available to EULEX:
UNMIK police, EU police, Kosovo police and 18,000 NATO
troops. Klompenhouwer responded that NATO does not support
EULEX and there is no technical agreement between NATO and
the EU. Fried pointed out that practical coordination had
been adequate during the March 17 rioting. Klompenhouwer
responded by specifying that these had been NATO-UN
cooperation. NATO now denied the EU the support that it
provided to UNMIK. The EU had informal assurances of
in-extremis support only, not the normal operational
support and coordination that is needed.
13. (C) De Kermabon said that "pragmatic arrangements" for
in-extremis support mean that KFOR will intervene if called
upon, but will not assist with police operations or provide
support outside of a crisis situation. It will not, for
example, provide EULEX with back-up for crowd and riot
control operations. There were no specific arrangements in
these areas, he lamented. Fried queried whether that posed
a real problem. The EU side responded that if EULEX has to
open the border in the north the first day would be the
most difficult and NATO and the EU should work together to
ensure the situation stayed under control.
14. (C) Combating lawlessness in the north of Kosovo is
essential to the success of the EU mission, commented
Fried, and the EU must ensure that it does not signal
weakness to the Serbs. This will only invite mob
violence. He underlined that if the Kosovars see the
mission failing, it could radicalize them. De Kermabon
agreed this is a danger and that EULEX needs to act
strongly, but said that the EU would need NATO help to be
strong. Because NATO wanted to avoid KFOR becoming the de
facto first responder, NATO would not provide support to
Rule of Law functions. NATO's interpretation of "safe and
secure" was too narrow, the EU officials complained. Fried
agreed to discuss the issue with NATO's Secretary General,
whom he would shortly visit, and pressed the EU to take a
firm in its approach.
Cooper Not Aware of Any Deal with Tadic
--------------
15. (C) In his meeting with Robert Cooper, the EU Council
Director General for External Affairs, A/S Fried said EULEX
did not need Serbian permission to deploy in the north of
Kosovo. In fact, he said, some in Mitrovica might welcome
it. Instead of dealing with Belgrade's stonewalling, he
continued, Serbian thugs in the north of Kosovo should be
threatened with arrest and hard time in a Kosovo jail. On
the issue of EULEX and border control, Cooper suggested
that NATO and the UN first coordinate their roles. Fried
announced that he had the authority to sign the EULEX
Participation Agreement for the U.S.
16. (C) Cooper said that there had reportedly been no sign
of a "deal" during Tadic's meetings in Brussels on
September 3. Rather, he said, Belgrade seems "deeply
committed" to referring the question of Kosovo independence
to the ICJ. Cooper thought that "massive abstentions" were
a more likely outcome than defeat for Serbia in a General
Assembly vote, given the legacy of the Non-aligned
Movement. Nonetheless, Cooper thought it very worthwhile
to try to convince other capitals that the matter of
independence should remain a political matter, not a legal
BRUSSELS 00001377 004 OF 004
one. In any case, he added, "we've told the Serbians it is
a stupid idea."
17. (C) Assistant Secretary Fried cleared this cable.
.