QUAD POLDIRS ON GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001120

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS KINR EAID ECON EUN GO XH
SUBJECT: QUAD POLDIRS ON GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA

REF: TBILISI 1258

Classified By: USEU Political Counselor Christopher R. Davis, for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) SUMMARY: At a July 22 meeting in Brussels, Political
Directors of Quad countries (Germany, U.S., UK, and France)
agreed to pursue a three-phase plan as outlined in the
Germany "Friends" paper to bring the parties to the Abhkazia
conflict to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The Quad, in
this formation also known as the "Western Friends of
Georgia," pledged to launch negotiations in Berlin in the
last week of July over a two to three day period. The Quad
further agreed to consider in such discussion various ways to
reach agreement on a phase one package including a Georgian
non-use of force pledge and balanced security arrangements,
e.g., a freeze of the status quo, the principle of IDP
returns and possible pull back of forces, including a joint
Abkhaz/Georgian police force with international oversight.
In response to a UK request, the U.S. supported the
possibility of EU observation of the Berlin talks. In
addition, the Quad planned for a Georgia ministerial meeting
at the UN General Assembly High Level segment in
September. They also explored ways to increase the
diplomatic costs to Russia of its continued obstructionism
and develop possible incentives for the Abkhaz to negotiate a
settlement. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) On July 22, on the margins of the EU monthly foreign
ministers meeting in Brussels, German Political Director
Volker Stanzel convened a 90 minute meeting of the Western
Friends of Georgia political directors, including for the UK,
PolDir Sir Mark Lyall Grant; for France MFA DirGen for
Eastern Europe Roland Galharague and Deputy Director
Alexandre Vulic. EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried was
joined by EUR DAS Matthew Bryza represented the United
States.

3.(C) Stanzel opened the meeting with a read-out of German
Foreign Minister Steinmeier's recent trip to Georgia and
Russia. Stanzel said that talks with the Georgians, Abkhaz
and Russians served to highlight three problems already
foreseen by the Quad: how to persuade Georgia to give a
non-use of force (NUF) pledge; how to persuade the Abkhaz to
enter into a process with an intended outcome (i.e.,
reintegration) to which they did not now agree how to work
around the Russians who wanted toprevent the Abkhaz from
negotiating? Steinmeier reportedly concluded that the
process was "not fully back to square one, but close to it."
Steinmeier had not obtained an endorsement by any party of
the three phase plan, but did acknowledge effort to get to
that point by the three parties to the conflict.

4.(C) On next steps, Germany obtained the Quad's support to
convene negotiations in the middle of next week in Berlin,
based on a three-phase plan outlined in the German-drafted
"Friends of Georgia" paper, but with details of each phase to
be negotiated. Stanzel agreed with UK and U.S. emphasis on
the need for flexibility in the negotiations to ensure the
right combination of elements in each phase. A/S Fried
stressed the importance of emphasizing phase one and
discussing security arrangements. The Georgians were willing
to offer a NUF but only as part of a package. With this in
mind, the USG was currently looking at configuration of phase
one with a view toward addressing policing problems in both
the Gali district and the Kodori Gorge. The Quad agreed to
include in such discussion a joint Abkhaz/Georgian police
force with international oversight.

5.(C) The Germans proposed that the talks could begin at the
expert level, then work up to Political Directors over two to
three days. Stanzel explained that this format could allow
experts to have the opportunity to meet informally and
explore possibilities for aspects of a settlement package
before requiring formally staking out positions. To make it
more difficult for the Russians and Abkhaz to refuse to
attend the event, Steinmeier intended to personally issue the
invitations and open the first session. Fried pledged to
attend, but expressed concern that the Russians would be
obstructionist in the early sessions if they knew in advance
that the level would escalate to Political Directors. He
urged a rapid escalation to the Political Directors, without
making it contingent upon progress at the lower level. In
response to a UK query, A/S Fried supported the inclusion of
EU observers to the process. DAS Bryza added that the Western
Friends could use EU help in developing and implementing
quick impact CBMs, such as in the health and humanitarian
areas, could be useful. Stanzel noted that the Russians
would have to agree to any such EU role in the talks.

6.(C) The French added that a late summer lull in Euro
Atlantic diplomacy toward Georgia (i.e., between the Berlin
meeting and the UNGA) could be dangerous. They urged Western

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Friends to ensure the continuity of the burgeoning political
process A/S Fried and DAS Bryza also warned that Russian
attempts to resurrect an inflammatory resolution on Georgia
in the UNSC could also damage prospects for the talks. In
any case, the UK and U.S. delegations suggested that we
consider joint U.S.-EU demarches rather than isolated
interventions.

7.(C) The Quad briefly discussed ways in which Transatlantic
partners could try to exert leverage on the Russians and
Abkhaz, particularly in the event that Russia continued be
obstructionist and provocative. A/S Fried reported that the
USG was making quiet efforts to reach out to the Abkhaz as
well as to explore how to pressure Russia if its firms
violated Georgia's sovereignty in Abhkazia. He urged
European partners to consider similar measures toward the
Russians, as well as a ban on facilitating visa issuance to
Abkhaz attempting to travel to Europe on Russian passports.

8.(U) Assistant Secretary Fried has cleared this message.
CHASE
.