GOS KOSOVO RHETORIC: MORE SOUND THAN FURY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000083

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV YU KO LO
SUBJECT: GOS KOSOVO RHETORIC: MORE SOUND THAN FURY

REF: A) BRATISLAVA 1 B) BRATISLAVA 60 C) STATE 18130

Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary and comment. Although the general reaction
among most Slovak politicians, media and the public to
Kosovo's declaration of independence has been relatively
restrained, top officials from governing coalition parties,
including the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Caplovic,
and Jan Slota have made publicly critical comments. Slota,
the boorish leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS) claimed
that the U.S. seeks to destabilize the EU through its Kosovo
policy and that recognition could lead to a "third World
War." Ambassador Obsitnik and A/DCM reached out on February
22 to officials in the offices of the PM and the President,
and to a leading SMER MP, to express concern about Slota's
statements and to urge that PM Fico distance himself from
such inflammatory rhetoric. (Note: Post's efforts to contact
the SNS spokesman were unsuccessful.)


2. (C) Summary Cont. In a February 24 appearance on Slovak
television, PM Fico condemned the attacks in Belgrade against
the U.S. and other embassies, but, asked to comment on
Slota's provocative statements, said only that he would have
chosen different words. The Prime Minister stated that
Kosovo's declaration of independence violated international
law and set a dangerous precedent, adding that Slovakia
"might never" recognize Kosovo. While we do not believe that
Fico's troubling and, at times, provocative rhetoric signals
a material shift in the GOS position, it could complicate an
eventual course correction. Ambassador Obsitnik will meet
with FM Kubis on February 26 to seek clarification, as well
as to underscore U.S. disappointment regarding PM Fico's own
comments and his failure to repudiate Slota. We also are
seeking to reschedule the Ambassador's one-on-one meeting
with the Prime Minister (canceled due to the PM's recent
illness) as soon as possible. End summary and comment.


After MFA's Relative Nuance, a Predictably Negative Chorus
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) On February 17 the MFA issued a statement noting
that "for the time being" Slovakia will not recognize Kosovo
"on the basis of this declaration..." but will "closely
follow the development of the situation in Kosovo and the
region, as well as the steps of the international community.
Only after evaluating the situation will Slovakia decide on
further steps." In a subsequent press conference, Foreign
Minister Kubis studiously avoided going beyond the parameters
of the statement when reporters pressed for clarification
regarding if, when, or on what basis Slovakia might decide to
recognize Kosovo. In a joint press conference on February 20
with visiting Russian Deputy Prime Minister Naryskin, PM Fico
took a less nuanced stance, calling Kosovo's unilateral
declaration of independence a mistake. Fico said that
Slovakia would not recognize Kosovo until there is a change
in its status that accords with international law. Fico said
the UN Security Council should adopt a solution and the EU
should continue to work towards a common position.


4. (SBU) Also on February 20, Deputy PM Dusan Caplovic stated
that he "would never vote for Kosovo's independence," adding
that "we know very well from whence drugs, white meat
(trafficked persons) and weapons flow into Europe." On
February 21, SNS leader Jan Slota said "the Kosovo problem is
really a precedence of the sort that could lead to a third
World War... We're not talking about democracy, we're not
talking about law...This is simply the Munich Dictate, which
can now be called the Washington Dictate." Slota added that
the U.S. also supports Kosovo's independence because it has a
secret prison there, similar to Guantanamo, and to further

SIPDIS
its missile defense plans.


5. (C) Ambassador Obsitnik, who was on travel in eastern
Slovakia, and A/DCM contacted government officials and
politicians on February 22 to express extreme disappointment
with Jan Slota's statements and to urge that the Prime
Minister disassociate himself from such rhetoric. Smer MP
and head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Boris Zala,
inititally sought to minimize the import of Slota's comments,
but appeared to accept the Ambassador's argument that
statements by Slota reflect badly on the government. He

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expressed a willingness to speak to the Prime Minister about
this issue. President Gasparovic's diplomatic advisor, Jan
Foltin, told A/DCM that Gasparovic had canceled plans for a
joint television appearance with the Prime Minister to
discuss Kosovo, in order to signal his "more reserved"
position on the issue. A/DCM urged Foltin to convey to the
President our concerns about the tenor of the rhetoric,
particularly in light of the previous day's violence in
Belgrade.


Fico on Recognition: Maybe Never
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6. (SBU) During his February 24 appearance on news program,
PM Fico's comments were not inconsistent with previous public
remarks he has made on Kosovo. During a December 4 visit to
Brussels, for instance, Fico stated that "we want to be very
cooperative when it comes to this issue, but I can hardly see
us recognizing a Kosovo that had declared itself unilaterally
independent." The interview was, however, the most
wide-ranging Fico has given on Kosovo and the conclusions and
connections he drew -- or declined to draw -- were troubling.
Fico characterized Kosovo's declaration and subsequent
recognition by some states as a dangerous precedent in
violation of international law.

7.(SBU) The Prime Minister made an analogy between the
actions of the Kosovar Albanians to a hypothetical call by
Slovakia's Hungarian minority for independence and used a
reported statement by the Chairman of the Hungarian
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, Zsolt Nemeth, to
bolster his example. Fico quoted Nemeth as saying that
"social and territorial autonomy is the best way of solving
ethnic issues in Central Europe. The fact that the autonomy
of Kosovo has been supported by the international community,
is good news for minorities in the region." When the reporter
pushed back on the merits of a comparison between Kosovo and
Slovakia, Fico replied that he merely wanted viewers to
understand the situation.


8. (SBU) Fico said that it was unfortunate that the EU was
once again divided over a question of international law, as
had been the case with respect to the Iraq war. Asked to
respond to Russian Ambassador Rogozin's comments about use of
force in Kosovo, Fico said that he did not believe such a
thing would happen in Europe, adding: "I am not here to
evaluate either the U.S. or the Russians, but I want to say
that someone has created this situation...So, it should not
have happened (Kosovo secession),and then we would not have
here these tough statements." Fico noted that despite
Slovakia's membership in the EU and NATO, it did not intend
to pursue a foreign policy that was oriented only toward the
U.S. Asked whether his remarks were at odds with the
February 17 MFA statement noting that Slovakia would
re-evaluate the situation in Kosovo in 120 days, Fico said
categorically "no," explaining that what Kubis was referring
to "was the period in which international organizations would
be transferring certain responsibilities to local bodies."


9. (C) Comment and conclusion: During a February 19 courtesy
call on Pavol Demes, Director of the German Marshall
Foundation's local office, the Ambassador asked how the GOS
might justify an eventual decision to recognize Kosovar
independence. Demes replied "Slavic meta-physics," and
predicted that in 3-5 months the government would announce
that it had concluded that it was in the best interests of
the EU, Serbia, and Slovakia that Kosovo's independence be
recognized. This is, in effect, the scenario that FM Kubis
has sketched to USG officials on multiple occasions, though
he has been careful to state that he would need to convince a
reluctant PM Fico. Although PM Fico's rhetoric could make a
course correction more difficult, Post still considers Slovak
recognition to be the likely, eventual outcome as if other EU
holdouts move in that direction and the situation on the
ground stabilizes. According to UK DCM, with whom A/DCM met
on February 25, this assessment is shared also by the UK
Embassy here. Given Fico's foreign policy orientation,
however, it appears that key EU member states may be in the
best position to convince Fico that it is in his interest
that Slovakia recognize Kosovo. End Comment.

OBSITNIK