Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRATISLAVA549
2008-11-21 15:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS: LOTS OF MEETINGS,

Tags:  PREL PHUM LO HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHSL #0549/01 3261545
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211545Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2145
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000549 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM LO HU
SUBJECT: SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS: LOTS OF MEETINGS,
LITTLE CONSENSUS

REF: A) BRATISLAVA 516 AND PREVIOUS B) BUDAPEST 1102

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Keith Eddins for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000549

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM LO HU
SUBJECT: SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS: LOTS OF MEETINGS,
LITTLE CONSENSUS

REF: A) BRATISLAVA 516 AND PREVIOUS B) BUDAPEST 1102

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Keith Eddins for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary. Charge and Pol/Econ Chief met on November 19
with the special advisor to Prime Minister Fico and Foreign
Minister Kubis for Slovak-Hungarian relations, former Foreign
Minister Pavol Hamzik. Hamzik stated that nationalist leader
Jan Slota is "damaging Slovak foreign policy and Slovakia's
reputation," but reserved his harshest criticism for Pal
Csaky and other ethnic Hungarians who form a sort of "fifth
column." A letter from Hungarian PM Gyurscany outlining six
steps to reduce bilateral tensions has been received here
with resentment, according to Hamzik. None of Gyurcsany's
recommendations will be agreed by the Slovak side, nor does
it appear that the PM Fico will authorize an investigation
into the police action at the Dunajska Streda soccer match.


2. (C) Comment: It's a positive signal that the two Prime
Ministers finally met. A raft of upcoming high-level
meetings between Slovak and Hungarian officials is also
encouraging, as are the GOS's recent pledges to support
economic development in the southern border region. However,
like our colleagues at Embassy Budapest, we doubt that the
fundamental causes of the problems, e.g., Jan Slota, will be
addressed adequately. And, the fact that so many of the
GOH's recent requests will be rebuffed could set relations
back further. End comment and summary.


3. (C) FM Kubis's senior advisor, Pavol Hamzik, laid blame on
a wide range of actors for the current state of
Hungarian-Slovak relations: Slovak National Party (SNS)
Chairman Jan Slota; Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) members
Pal Csaky and Miklos Duray; Fidesz and its "revisionist"
sentiment; and PM Gyurscany, for his seeming inability to
clamp down on Hungarian radicals and hooligans and for his
interference in Slovak domestic affairs, i.e., treatment of
minorities.


4. (C) Regarding Slota, Hamzik told us that PM Fico had
spoken to him and that he expected Slota would be quiet, but
only for awhile. As many other informed Slovak interlocutors
have said, the current coalition works well for PM Fico, and

it is highly unlikely that Fico will jettison Slota, even
when (not if) he acts up again. As for 2010, Hamzik
dismissed the notion that Smer would invite SMK into the
government, given current relations. Hamzik reserved his
harshest rhetoric for SMK Chair Pal Csaky. Hamzik
characterized Csaky as a "radical" who feels more at home in
Budapest than in Bratislava. He and his colleagues form a
"fifth column" in Slovakia and their membership in the
Hungarian MPs of the Carpathian Basin Forum is a disloyal act.


5. (C) Although it was Post's impression that PM Gyurcsany
had presented his six-point" proposal for reducing tensions
to PM Fico at their Komarno meeting, Hamzik stated
unequivocally that Gyurscany had not raised the points (e.g.
calls for creating a ombudsman for minority rights in
Slovakia or allowing minority students to use textbooks
published in the other country) in the meeting, but in a
subsequent letter. Hamzik bristled at language such as this:
"My government will prepare and submit relevant draft bills
within 30 days. You are kindly requested to ensure that the
Government of Slovakia proceeds in a similar manner." He
noted sarcastically that Hungary has more than one ombudsman
who deals with minority issues, yet it has virtually "no
minorities." He said that the majority of Slovaks had been
assimilated and that there are very few Slovak schools in
Hungary. It was thus hypocritical of the Hungarians to make
demands on the Slovaks, and in any case, treatment of
minorities in Slovakia is "above standard."


6. (C) Hamzik unreservedly described the police intervention
at the Dunajska Streda soccer match as "good," saying it was
important to send a strong signal to "extremists." As we met
with Hamzik in Bratislava, the Slovak government held a
session in Komarno. After the meeting, Fico reiterated his
view that the Slovak police intervention was lawful and
appropriate and that the government does not intend to
investigate the matter further. PM Fico also said that
although he didn't agree with the SMK's proposal for
Hungarian textbooks, the time was ripe for a solution to the
issue in Parliament.


7. (C) Despite Fico's stance on Dunajska Streda and his all
but certain rejection of PM Gyurcsany's six requests, he is

nevertheless moving on multiple fronts to calm the situation.
The government session in Komarno and his pledges to support
construction of highways and other critical infrastructure
(schools, sewage treatment plants, industrial parks) in
southern Slovakia are an example. In the meantime, the
government has moved with lightning speed -- to the dismay of
NGOs and other critics -- to adopt stricter laws on extremism
(see Bratislava Highlights),per the Prime Ministers' joint
statement. (Comment: DCM will meet with Pal Csaky on
November 24. Although we cannot be certain, we can't help
but wonder whether Csaky's positive statements in the wake of
the PM's meeting, and the promises made by PM Fico to aid
SMK's stronghold, don't signal another behind-the-scenes deal
between Fico and SMK, which desires strongly to enter the
next government. Another possibility is that Csaky, the
locus of so much criticism from Slovak politicians and from
some in his own party, will lose his job so that SMK doesn't
lose it chance to govern again. End comment.)


8. (C) Finally, according to Hamzik, Fico has told Jan Slota
to keep quiet. If the November 21 issue of the daily Sme is
any indication, Slota's quiescence will be short-lived.
Following a meeting with the Prime Minister, Slota
contradicted Fico's account of their conversation and then
told reporters that his statements were not the cause of
worsening bilateral relations: "only a blind and deaf person
cannot see that these are just excuses. That someone said
about somebody else that her hair is not combed and that this
will result in WW III practically...is absolutely
ridiculous."


9. (C) Comment and conclusion: Looking at the two Prime
Ministers, it's clear Fico is playing from a position of
relative strength: he remains broadly popular at home, he
dominates his coalition, and his country's economy is not on
the brink. And yet, Hamzik (who was hand-picked by Fico to
deal with the Hungarian issue) articulated once again the
fundamental insecurity (cloaked in bluster) that
characterizes the Slovak position. Although he repeatedly
stated that Slovakia is "not afraid," he made clear how
uneasy the Slovaks are about even the mention of cultural or
educational autonomy for Hungarians and by SMK's
participation in the Carpathian Forum. "We're not stupid, he
said, we know how it started in Yugoslavia." This mixture of
insecurity and pride and nationalism is unlikely to foster a
very flexible or open stance on the part of the Slovaks. And
PM Fico's decision to keep Slota in the coalition creates the
clear impression that Fico believes he benefits from Slota's
anti-Hungarian rhetoric. Thus, while Post believes the recent
high-level contacts are positive, we make no predictions that
tensions won't spike again given the failure to address its
root causes.


10. (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy
Budapest.
EDDINS