Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRATISLAVA507
2008-11-04 16:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN TENSIONS RISK DAMAGING

Tags:  PREL PHUM LO HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2056
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSR/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG 0003
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0464
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000507 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM LO HU
SUBJECT: SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN TENSIONS RISK DAMAGING
MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS WITHIN SLOVAKIA

REF: A) BRATISLAVA 316 B) BRATISLAVA 290

BRATISLAVA 00000507 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000507

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM LO HU
SUBJECT: SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN TENSIONS RISK DAMAGING
MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS WITHIN SLOVAKIA

REF: A) BRATISLAVA 316 B) BRATISLAVA 290

BRATISLAVA 00000507 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Introduction and Summary: Only two months after Prime
Ministers Fico and Gyurscany dined together in Brussels,
Slovak-Hungarian relations have reached a new low in the
post-Meciar period. Actions by Slovak riot police against
unruly Hungarian fans at a November 1 soccer match and
subsequent protests in front of the Slovak Embassy in
Budapest have further inflamed tensions, which had spiked
over issues related mainly to the Hungarian minority in
Slovakia. Almost as if scripted, the key protagonists have
played their role to a tee: Jan Slota spewing crude,
xenophobic insults; Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) leader
Pal Csaky provoking the entire Slovak political spectrum by
raising "taboos" such as the Benes Decrees and autonomy;
Hungarian extremists mounting protests in front of the Slovak
Embassy in Budapest; GOH officials publicly questioning the
status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia; and PM Fico and
Parliamentary leader Paska sternly warning against Hungarian
interference in Slovakia's domestic affairs.


2. (C) The November 1 incident, which appears to have been
instigated by Hungarian extremists (from Hungary),has led to
polemics on both sides of the border. Although Foreign
Ministers Kubis and Goncz plan to hold bilateral
consultations in Budapest on December 15, we are concerned
that with the approach of a long Slovak election season and
uncertainties caused by the global financial crisis, both
governments must act more decisively to lower tensions and
rein in extremism. If not, the unhealthy (and too familiar)
dynamic described above could intensify with unforeseen, and
potentially violent, consequences. At greatest risk is the
relatively good, if historically-loaded, relationship between
the Slovaks and the ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia.
End Introduction and Summary.

Csaky's "Provocations"
--------------


3. (C) In September, SMK participated in a meeting of the
Forum of Hungarian MPs of the Carpathian Basin in Budapest --

an entity that since last March appears to be an
institutional part of the Hungarian Parliament. This meeting
led to calls by the Slovak National Party (SNS) for a special
parliamentary session at which SMK would be questioned about
its "traitorous" activities and alleged fealty to Hungarian
Parliamentary Speaker Szili. Although Slovak Parliament
Speaker Paska declined to convene such a session, he
introduced a resolution on October 31 condemning SMK's
participation in the Forum and accusing the Hungarian
Parliament of infringing on Slovak sovereignty. The
resolution was approved during a vitriolic parliamentary
session on November 4.


4. (C) Csaky's subsequent meeting with an ethnic Hungarian
Romanian MEP, Laszlo Tokes (the leader of the Carpathian
Basin Autonomy Forum),made headlines and provoked sharp
criticism from across the political spectrum -- not to
mention from the SMK's former chairman, Bela Bugar. Under a
banner reading "Csaky breaks the taboo," the daily SME
reported that Csaky, during his meeting with Tokes, discussed
ideas for cultural and educational autonomy and a Hungarian
"mini-parliament" that would oversee decision-making on these
issues. Prime Minister Fico and FM Kubis sharply criticized
Csaky, which led, in part, to Hungarian FM Goncz's
convocation of the Slovak Ambassador on October 2.


5. (C) As Csaky noted in an October 7 interview in the daily
SME, such forms of self-government are features (if not
particularly effective ones) of life for the small Slovak
minority in Hungary. He also clarified that SMK does not
espouse regional autonomy, but rather greater decision-making
authority over key issues affecting the Hungarian minority,
i.e., education and culture. As both ethnic Hungarian and
Slovak scholars point out, Europe offers several successful
models for progressive majority-minority relations, e.g., in
South Tyrol and Finland. But the use of the word "autonomy"
really does appear to be a taboo in Slovakia; even the most
moderate of Slovak MPs characterized Csaky's words as "not
very friendly to Slovakia."


6. (C) Zoltan Bara, international relations chairman of SMK,
told Poloffs on October 9 that it was unfortunate that Csaky
had used the word autonomy, but dismissed the furor as a
"pseudo issue." Bara also confirmed that SMK had decided not
to join Tokes' "autonomy forum." When asked what SMK could

BRATISLAVA 00000507 002.2 OF 004


do to lower tensions, Bara stated that party leaders needed
to repeat continually that the Hungarians do not seek
territorial autonomy, nor do they view Kosovo as a precedent.
Bara spoke candidly about the pride he feels in the
significant successes that Slovakia has achieved. Hungary's
economic and political doldrums form quite a stark contrast,
he added. But Bara made clear, as have several other ethnic
Hungarian interlocutors (from different economic strata and
regions of Slovakia),that the effects of SNS's hostile words
and policies, e.g., deleting Hungarian place names from new
schoolbooks, are increasingly felt among the minority
population. The fact that senior GOS officials rarely
directly condemn Slota's anti-Hungarian remarks is worse,
according to Bara.

War of Words Heats Up
--------------


7. (C) In response to Csaky's actions and criticism from the
GOH, the Slovak Foreign Ministry circulated a non-paper on
Slovak-Hungarian relations to NATO and EU Missions in
Bratislava on October 10 (emailed to EUR/CE). It states that
"since the declaration of Kosovo's independence, there have
evidently been intensified efforts by the political
representatives of Hungarian minorities in states neighboring
Hungary, including Slovakia, to open the issue of the
creation of ethnically autonomous areas on the territories of
these countries. The attitudes of several political actors
in Hungary contribute to the growth of this trend." The
non-paper also condemns the Hungarian Parliament's support
for the Forum of Hungarian MPs in the Carpathian Basin and
the decision of the forum to "establish a lobbying office in
Brussels, whose main goal is the promotion of the idea of
autonomy."


8. (C) The interministerial rhetoric has heated up further in
recent days: after FM Goncz publicly accused the Slovak
Government of allowing hatred of foreigners to develop in
Slovakia, a reportedly furious FM Kubis immediately ordered
his staff to draft a stern response rejecting Goncz's
assertions. The October 23 statement read, in part: Goncz's
statement is "just another manifestation of Budapest's
long-term policy aimed at discrediting the Slovak Republic
and its government, and activity in which Hungarian Minister
of Foreign Affairs Goncz is becoming increasingly involved,
and as such it needs to be condemned." (Comment: We have
often heard from reliable sources -- including the Minister
himself -- that Kubis does not view Goncz as a trustworthy
partner. Too many times, according to the Slovaks, Goncz has
said one thing in a meeting with Kubis or the two have agreed
on a way forward, and she has subsequently gone to the press
in a way that undercuts Kubis. End Comment.)


9. (C) Tensions spilled over at a November 1 soccer match in
the Slovak town of Dunajska Streda (ethnic Hungarians
comprise a majority of the population). According to press
reports, young Hungarian extremists organized via the
internet to cross the border and gather at the soccer match.
Hungarian law enforcement officials alerted the Slovaks, who
deployed almost 1000 Slovak police officers to the match.
(Comment: According to one Emboff, many Slovaks also knew
thanks to internet chat sites that Hungarians planned to
gather in large numbers at the match. End Comment.) There
are differing accounts of what led to the police crackdown,
which occurred 15 minutes into the game, which then resumed
without further incident. The GOH has requested an
investigation because 50 people sought medical treatment as a
result of the police action. Six were reportedly
hospitalized. The Slovak Police arrested, and shortly
thereafter released 15 Slovaks and 17 Hungarian citizens in
connection with the event. Poloff spoke on November 3 with
Dunajska Streda's mayor, who characterized the police action
as "overkill." He praised the good relations between Slovaks
and Hungarians in the town, but added that the events of
November 1 were the "worst ethnic incident" he could recall
in almost two decades. Mere hours after the stadium arrests,
in protests that were reportedly coordinated in part by the
radical Hungarian political party Jobbik, approximately 150
people burned Slovak flags in front of the Slovak Embassy in
Budapest, prompting a harsh statement of protest from the MFA
in Bratislava.

Forget Slota's Provocations...Look at GOS Policy
-------------- ---


10. (C) The current incidents are worrisome, not least
because they highlight how easily events can spin out of
control. However, they obscure what is for many ethnic

BRATISLAVA 00000507 003.2 OF 004


Hungarian politicians and intellectuals the fundamental
problem, i.e., that under the Fico government, it is not
possible for ethnic Hungarians to "take part effectively...in
decisions affecting" the minority as provided for in both the
Slovak Constitution and in the 1995 Bilateral Treaty between
Slovakia and Hungary. Recent comments by Education Minister
Mikolaj (an SNS appointee) to the effect that it would be
preferable if Hungarians refrained from using Hungarian in
public, and his steadfast refusal to withdraw textbooks for
Hungarian students that do not include in the text Hungarian
place names, as previously pledged by the GOS, undermine the
oft-repeated statement of Slovak officials that the SNS
anti-Hungarian agenda is only rhetorical and not relevant to
GOS policy.


11. (C) SMK also claims that in first four recent rounds of
EU structural fund allocations, only one Hungarian school in
Slovakia received EU monies. The MFA doesn't dispute SMK's
statistics, but denies any discriminatory practice. MFA
officials state that prior to 2006, when SMK was in
government, Hungarian schools were amply supported and thus
are generally in better condition than some Slovak schools.
During an October 21 visit to Nove Zamky, a town with a 50-50
mix of Slovaks and Hungarians, the city administrator, a
Slovak, told poloffs that the Hungarian high school was
underfunded by the regional government in comparison to its
Slovak counterpart.


12. (C) Prime Minister Fico stated decisively on October 20
that the government would not withdraw the controversial
textbooks, but then instructed his party to support an
SMK-drafted bill which would mandate that future textbooks
contain Hungarian geographic names in the text. This small
gesture helped avert protests by a coalition of Hungarian
educators, parents and politicians, but underscores an ironic
dynamic: Despite -- or, more accurately, as a result of --
concerns about the government's attitudes and policies toward
minorities, SMK is very open about its desire to be part of
the next governing coalition. This, SMK believes, is the
only way to guarantee that the rights of ethnic Hungarians
are not eroded.


13. (C) As an isolated part of a weakened opposition, the
Hungarian Coalition Party wields almost no power. It would be
inaccurate to posit that because there are 20 ethnic
Hungarian deputies in the Parliament that Hungarians have
meaningful input into national-level decision-making that
affects the Hungarian community. They simply do not, and the
textbook issue is merely an example of the minority's lack of
influence. Only when SMK garners the support of Smer, as in
the case of the October 23 vote, can it protect ethnic
Hungarian interests.


14. (C) Comment and conclusion: Despite the mutual
recriminations between Bratislava and Budapest, the most
salient question may not be the fate of Slovak-Hungarian
relations, which will likely totter along, but rather how
much damage can be done to what is a relatively good, but
historically-loaded, relationship between the Slovak majority
and the Hungarian minority. A recent poll conducted by the
Slovak Academy of Sciences indicates that approximately 70
percent of ethnic Hungarians are proud to be Slovak citizens.
This is good news. On the other hand, a poll conducted by
the Open Society Foundation indicates that an increasing
number of Slovak youth have negative perceptions of
Hungarians and even characterize them using some of the same
insulting phrases as Jan Slota. More troubling is the fact
that PM Fico and other key GOS officials refuse to condemn
strongly Slota's hate speech. In unintentionally ironic
comments on November 3, President Gasparovic stated that "any
extremism, intolerance and nationalist emotions do not belong
in sports and should be condemned by all political parties."
Yet, Gasparovic has stated that he supports the sentiments,
if not the words of Jan Slota.


15. (C) Comment cont.: Meanwhile, the political and economic
climate in Hungary appears to be fostering extremists like
the Jobbik party and the Magyar Garda. Recently, a video
posted on You Tube featured threats against Hedviga Malinova
(see septel) and Pal Csaky. During the video, when Csaky's
image appeared a voice could be heard saying "kill him, kill
him, kill him." It is not an unreasonable leap to conclude
that hate speech and xenophobic gestures -- such as the
defacing of signs and buildings in ethnic Slovak village of
Mlynky in Hungary -- could encourage fringe elements, such as
the producers of the video and the soccer hooligans. We
leave it to Embassy Budapest to comment on the Gyurscany
Government's actions and motivations, but in Slovakia, it

BRATISLAVA 00000507 004.2 OF 004


appears that PM Fico seeks to co-opt the nationalist voters
of SNS with an eye toward jettisoning SNS from the next
coalition. In the meantime, however, this approach will
cause Slovakia's international reputation to suffer, it could
provoke inter-ethnic violence, and relations between two
natural partners will continue to be strained.



OBSITNIK