Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRATISLAVA487
2008-10-24 13:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

MOVING SLOVAKIA CLOSER TO "YES" ON KOSOVO

Tags:  PREL LO KVIR 
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DE RUEHSL #0487/01 2981359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241359Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2033
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000487 

SIPDIS

FOR EUR -- STUART JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: PREL LO KVIR
SUBJECT: MOVING SLOVAKIA CLOSER TO "YES" ON KOSOVO

Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000487

SIPDIS

FOR EUR -- STUART JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: PREL LO KVIR
SUBJECT: MOVING SLOVAKIA CLOSER TO "YES" ON KOSOVO

Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Although the Government of Slovakia shows no signs of
softening its opposition to Kosovo's independence, per my
recent consultations with you and Assistant Secretary Fried,
I plan to use recent key recognitions, i.e., by Montenegro,
Portugal and Macedonia, to press the Slovaks toward a more
flexible stance. Prime Minister Fico frequently
characterizes Kosovo's declaration of independence as a
violation of international law. All Slovak political parties,
except the Hungarian Coalition Party, have rejected Kosovo's
independence and made clear their opposition to Slovak
recognition. Numerous factors inform the Slovak position:
close ties to Serbia (and Russia); concern about the
aspirations of Slovakia's large Hungarian minority; and, in
some cases, barely disguised antipathy toward Albanian
Muslims. Finally, there remains resentment toward the U.S.
for its role in the 1999 NATO intervention and an abiding
belief that it was the U.S., not the Serbians, who created
the circumstances which led to the final break-up of
Yugoslavia.


2. (C) I have concluded that Slovakia will move on Kosovo
only when Serbia, Russia, or key EU partners, e.g., Spain,
do. Clearly, EU states that have already recognized will
have the greatest leverage on their fellow EU members and on
Serbia. In the meantime, I ask for Washington's support for
a concerted effort to help shift Slovak official and public
opinion. The two key pillars of the argument would be that
Kosovo's independence is consistent with international law
and that acceptance of Kosovo's independence by all EU
members will help Serbia move forward and closer to the
European Union. We will also seek to knock down flawed
comparisons between Slovakia's ethnic Hungarians and Kosovo
Albanians.

What We Will Do
--------------

3.(C) One of the key challenges we face in Slovakia is that
both the public and elite are woefully ill-informed (and
sometimes misinformed) about the history of the Serbia-Kosovo
conflict and about the progress the Kosovars have made toward
the development of a multi-ethnic society that respects
minorities. Also, many Slovaks (including senior GOS

officials and politicians) appear to be genuinely concerned
that Kosovo could serve as a precedent for the Hungarian
minority illustrates the extent of the problem.


4. (C) Using the resources and contacts we have, Embassy
Bratislava will intensify our outreach on Kosovo, making the
case that moving forward on the basis of an independent
Kosovo is best not only for Kosovo, but also for Serbia.
Given a lack of regular personal contact with PM Fico, I will
utilize other levers of influence, e.g., close colleagues of
Fico such as Culture Minister Madaric and key "influentials,"
such as former Ambassador Kacer, to convey our messages. I
will also use the goodwill gained from President Gasparovic's
recent visit to the U.S. to press him to take a more
pragmatic stance. I hope to initiate a mini "contact group"
of diplomats in Bratislava to strategize about how to
encourage constructive Slovak policy. We will press
Hungarian politicians and intellectuals to repeat/amplify the
message that Kosovo is not a precedent for ethnic Hungarians
in Kosovo, and will host roundtables and events aimed at
strengthening Slovak-Hungarian relations. In an effort to
build broader and more accurate public understanding of the
Balkans, particularly the Serbian-Kosovo conflict, post is
considering a multi-city "film festival," which could foster
greater objectivity and understanding of the Balkan
conflicts. We would then seek to place films in schools,
libraries and offer them to Slovak TV stations.


What We Seek
--------------


5. (U) To support Post's efforts, I ask that you consider:

-- Sending respected USG and non-USG lawyers, e.g., Legal
Advisor John Bellinger, to Slovakia to speak with a range of
Slovak interlocutors on the legality of Kosovo's
independence. These discussions could also take place via
DVC, a format that could also be used for dialogue between
Balkan experts and Slovak officials, journalists and
think-tank representatives.


BRATISLAVA 00000487 002 OF 002


-- Providing more compelling written argumentation on the
legality of Kosovo for Post's use with interlocutors. I have
been impressed with the argumentation contained in an article
published by the American Society of International Law (text
emailed to EUR/CE).

-- Visits by key USG officials such as yourself to discuss
Balkan policy with GOS officials;.

-- An IV-type program for Slovaks and Kosovar Albanians,
e.g., Department would sponsor a select group of Slovaks to
travel to Kosovo, and vice versa. Such a program could be
carried out with participants from other non-recognizing EU
states.

-- Providing regular updates on positive developments in
Kosovo;


Working With the EU
--------------


6. (C) I and my staff consult with our U.S. Embassy
colleagues in other EU non-recognizing states and we
understand that different issues underpin the firm resistance
to Kosovo recognition. That said, perhaps some of the
tactics/programs/visits we are considering could be relevant
elsewhere, too. I believe that more consultation with the EU
and activism by Brussels could help move the ball forward.
Perhaps Washington and key European capitals, e.g., Paris and
Berlin, could craft a more closely-coordinated effort aimed
at securing recognition by all EU members by a date certain,
e.g., the anniversary of Kosovo's independence. I know such
results would be very tough to achieve, but I often have the
sense that the Slovaks are hearing about Kosovo from this
Embassy, but not very much from their EU colleagues either
here or in Brussels. Based on my discussions with a wide
range of Slovaks during the past 10 months, I believe that it
is essential that we intensify our efforts precisely now,
because of positive developments in Kosovo and Serbia and
because this is the period in which we, the U.S. and the EU
have maximum leverage on Serbian and Kosovar Albanian
leaders. Delays or setbacks in progress in either Belgrade
or Pristina will only harden Slovak attitudes.


7. (U) Stu, it was a pleasure to meet you and I look forward
to hearing from you. Best, Vince













OBSITNIK