Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRASILIA93
2008-01-15 18:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AMBITIONS

Tags:  NPT PARM PREL MASS MNUC 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 151856Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0861
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIOITY 
AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 
AMMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0415
AMEMBASSY ARIS PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000093 

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.5 (b) (d)

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, M, T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2018
TAGS: MASSMNUC NPT PARM PREL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AMBITIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000093

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.5 (b) (d)

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, M, T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2018
TAGS: MASSMNUC NPT PARM PREL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AMBITIONS


1. (U) This is n action request - see para 9.


2. (C) SUMMARY. Brazil's leadership, including President
Lula and Defense Minister Jobim, have expressed support for
production of a Brazilian nuclear submarine in recent months.
While serious questions exist as to the proposed vessel's
military utility and affrodability, it enjoys strong support
both for reasons of perceived national prestige and for its
pssible benefits to Brazil's nuclear power industry.
Although the submarine program may well collapse under its
cost burden and technological challenges, Brazil appears
determined to proceed with consideration of this project, as
Jobim has already gone on record saying that he expects to
proceed with support from Russia and France. U.S. opposition
at this point would likely only increase support within
Brazil for the nuclear submarine program. Brazil is a member
of the NPT and, provided it maintains a strong compliance
record, its naval propulsion program is not necessarily a
proliferaton risk. Moreover, Mission believes that U.S.
spport for Brazil's naval modernization, including submarine
technology where appropriate -- subject to regular export
control measures -- would help forge stronger connection to
the Brazilian defense industry and military. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) Brazil's nuclear submarine program, begun in the
late 1970s, has been reinvigorated by high-level support.
President Lula, an opponent of nuclear power and the military
in his union leader days, announced on July 10, 2007 that he
would seek funding to build a nuclear submarine. Defense
Minister Jobim stated in November that he was looking for a
plan to proceed with construction. These proposals are part
of a broader Brazilian effort, driven by increasing awareness
of the shortcomings of the Brazilian military, to modernize
Brazil's military forces and defense srategy. Jobim and
Long-Term Planning Minister Rberto Mangabeira Unger are
heading up a special ommission to rethink Brazil's national
defense srategy (to be reported septel),which will
presumbly set the framework for future development and
purchases of military hardware. The commission is due to
complete its work in September. Such defense restructuring
could present opportunities fo expanding U.S.-Brazilian

cooperation, and because of the high level support, an
indication that the U.S. would be prepared to work with
Brazil's submarine program as appropriate could open the door
to improved ties with the Hemisphere's second largest
military and defense industry. However, while cooperation
with Brazil's defense modernization is in U.S. interests, it
should not be limited to one area The nuclear submarine's
high costs and limited military utility may again put the
program on the rocks, making it unwise to limit cooperation
to this area.

WHY A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE?
--------------


4. (SBU) Brazil has long harbored ambitions for building
nuclear submarines. A large part of its motivation comes
from a perception that, in order to be taken seriously as a
world power, such vessels will be necessary. In July
President Lula was quoted as saying "I think we would be more
highly valued as a nation (with a nuclear submarine)." All
of the UN Security Council's permanent members operate
nuclear subs, and fellow UNSC aspirant India has leased a
Russian sub and is building its own version. More than just
keeping up with the Guptas, Brazil also sees the submarine
program as a boost to its domestic nuclear power industry.
Lula has made improved nuclear power generation a priority,
and could gain support for its funding by linking it to a
project of national prestige. The submarine project could
also allow Brazil to take advantage of the NPT provision that
exempts naval propulsion from IAEA safeguards, a potentially
important point when Brazil has disputed IAEA access to
specific areas of its nuclear facilities.


5. (SBU) There are, however, several serious obstacles to
Brazil's nuclear submarine program. The most significant is
cost. Brazilian press estimates are that building a nuclear
sub will cost over half a billion dollars (production costs
of U.S. subs are around USD 4 billion). Even if this figure
were correct, it would be a significant percentage of
Brazil's USD 13 billion defense budget. Brazil has other
urgent defense priorities, including modernization and
replacement of virtually all its aircraft and many of its
armored vehicles, not to mention its conventional naval
units. Brazil also faces important technological barriers to
producing fuel for a naval reactor, which would require a
higher level of enrichment than fuel for a civilian power
reactor. Prior submarine research has also encountered
difficulty developing of technology for a pressure hull.


6. (SBU) There is no military reason why Brazil should
deploy a nuclear sub. Traditional missions for such vessels,
long range power projection and long time on station
capability, are not part of Brazilian naval doctrine.
Defense Minister Jobim made headlines in November by
announcing that Brazil's nuclear sub would be used to protect
recent offshore oil discoveries. Even if a threat to the oil
fields existed, it could be met more effectively, and
economically, by conventional vessels. In reality, a nuclear
submarine would not improve Brazil's security apart from a
dubious boost to national machismo.


7. (C) In his November statement, Jobim said he expected to
purchase submarine technology from France, which would have
fewer restrictions. While Brazil will ultimately approach
both France and Russia, Jobim and Unger have also made clear
that they would like access to U.S. technology, which in many
areas is clearly superior. Offers to discuss access to U.S.
technology on a program personally important to Jobim can
open the door to other more practical issues. In a January
14 meeting with Ambassador Sobel, Unger mentioned the fuel
cycle, hull development, software and weaponry as areas for
possible U.S. contributions.

ELEMENTS OF A U.S. POSITION
--------------


8. (C) Brazil is currently considering a much-needed
defense modernization, a key element of which will be
augmenting Brazil's navy. Building a nuclear submarine could
undermine Brazil's overall effort by diverting resources to a
program that would not improve military effectiveness. That
said, U.S. opposition would almost certainly serve to
strengthen Brazilian resolve to press on. With Lula and
Jobim providing strong public support, it is likely that
efforts to build a Brazilian nuclear submarine will continue.
We can avoid provoking a negative reaction from the GOB on
this issue and potential defense cooperation in other areas
by maintaining our general openness to cooperating with
military modernization, including submarine technology, and
not taking a specific position at this time on Brazil's
nuclear submarine program. Nonetheless, we need to be sure
that our discussion encompasses not just submarines, but
other fields for potentially beneficial cooperation. Brazil
should also maintain its good record on proliferation issues,
including resolving its issues with the IAEA. Singing an
additional protocol with IAEA would provide a higher level of
access to Brazilian nuclear facilities and facilitate
assistance to Brazil's nuclear industry. We also need to
make clear that any exports of U.S. technology would be
subject to U.S. Arms Export Control Act restrictions,
including necessary end use and retransfer assurances. In
our discussions with the GOB, we can highlight that Brazil
will be treated equally with U.S. allies and offer to address
Brazilian concerns on this issue during our upcoming
political-military consultations. .

Comment and Action Request:


9. (C) Brazil's white whale may ultimately become stranded
on the reefs of technical challenges and cost overruns, but
continued openness to cooperation at a time when Brazil will
be making important decisions about its future security
strategy and forces can have longer term benefits to the
U.S.-Brazil relationship. The nuclear submarine program,
with its high-level backing, can provide a catalyst for a
greater U.S. role in other modernization projects. Jobim
will almost certainly raise this issue with SecDef Gates on
his visit to Washington in March. As we prepare for this
visit, mission requests Washington concurrence with this
approach and guidance on next steps for potential defense
cooperation.