Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRASILIA851
2008-06-20 19:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

SENIOR BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT TALKS MIDDLE EAST PEACE,

Tags:  PREL MNUC IR XF ZU BR 
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INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0297
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RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2263
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000851 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ELLIOTT ABRAMS AND GARY TOMASULO; DEPARTMENT FOR
S/P, WHA, NEA, AND AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018
TAGS: PREL MNUC IR XF ZU BR
SUBJECT: SENIOR BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT TALKS MIDDLE EAST PEACE,
IRAN, ZIMBABWE

REF: A. STATE 55816

B. BRASILIA 809

C. BRASILIA 009

D. BRASILIA 064

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000851

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ELLIOTT ABRAMS AND GARY TOMASULO; DEPARTMENT FOR
S/P, WHA, NEA, AND AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018
TAGS: PREL MNUC IR XF ZU BR
SUBJECT: SENIOR BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT TALKS MIDDLE EAST PEACE,
IRAN, ZIMBABWE

REF: A. STATE 55816

B. BRASILIA 809

C. BRASILIA 009

D. BRASILIA 064

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) In an office call June 9, the Ambassador discussed
Brazil's policies in the Middle East and Africa with Ministry
of External Relations (MRE) Under Secretary for Political
Affairs (II),Ambassador Roberto Jaguaribe. Jaguaribe
described an intensifying series of reciprocal visits with
Middle Eastern countries over the next six months, including
a visit by President Lula to the region and visits to Brazil
by the king of Jordan and president of Syria. Jaguaribe
reiterated Brazil's view that all players should be engaged
in the Middle East peace process, and that Brazil's sees its
ability to talk to all parties as a "useful role." He
reiterated Brazil's view that engagement is the right
approach with Iran, expressing some frustration with the UNSC
approach to addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions while
acknowledging that Iran needed to abide by UNSC decisions.
Jaguaribe informed the Ambassador that Brazil will send
observers to the run-off elections in Zimbabwe. He indicated
that he is eager to engage the USG further in discussions on
both the Middle East and Africa. Post believes such
engagement would prove useful to U.S. interests.

--------------
Middle East: Reciprocal Visits to Intensify
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, joined by PolCouns, called on
Jaguaribe following the two meetings Brazilian Ambassador to
the United States Antonio Patriota had with NEA A/S Welch and
AF A/S Frazer. Jaguaribe was joined by MRE Middle East
Department head Ambassador Sarkis Karmirian and Levant
Division chief Minister Rodrigo do Amaral Souza. At the
outset of the meeting, Jaguaribe commented that the Iraqi
Trade Minister was in Brasilia, and would soon be followed by
the Iraqi Planning Minister. Jaguaribe confirmed reports
that the king of Jordan would be visiting this year. He
later mentioned that Syrian President Assad had also accepted

an invitation to visit Brazil for later in the year.


3. (C) Jaguaribe told the Ambassador that he was planning to
go to the Middle East in November or December, saying he had
given less attention to it than the other regions he covers
(Africa and Asia) because Brazil's special envoy for the
Middle East, Amb. Affonso Celso de Ouro-Preto, travels there
frequently. He said that it is unlikely now that FM Celso
Amorim would visit the region again "for specific bilateral
purposes," but confirmed that President Lula had tentatively
planned a trip for later in the year and that Amorim would
accompany him. According to Jaguaribe, Saudi Arabia, Israel,
the Palestinian territories, and Jordan are on the tentative
list of stops. He said additional stops were unlikely,
adding that Brazil's municipal elections in October, as well
as the IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) summit in Delhi in
October, the Africa-South America summit in Caracas in
November, and the international renewable energy summit
Brazil is hosting in November, will make for a busy second
half of the year, and the Middle East trip might be pushed
back to early 2009, when President Lula will likely travel to
Doha for the ASSA (Arab States-South America) summit.

--------------
Middle East Peace: Solution Requires Engaging "All Players"
--------------


4. (C) Jaguaribe told the Ambassador that he was "still
encouraged" regarding the Annapolis process, but that he is
hearing from regional and other key actors who are in a
"somber mood" because of a "lack of progress on issues of

BRASILIA 00000851 002.2 OF 004


importance to the Palestinians." He cited the new
construction by Israel, and the Ambassador noted that the
Secretary had spoken out strongly on that. In Jaguaribe's
view, the Palestinian Authority was counting on the peace
process to deliver and undermine Hamas. This was not
happening, and there is an "increasing perception that Abu
Mazen is losing his grip." Jaguaribe noted the "positive
development" regarding Israel's negotiations with Syria,
suggesting that this has now replaced Annapolis as the
"defining issue" moving the peace process forward. But he
suggested that achieving results from these and the other
negotiations Israel is undertaking would be difficult without
leadership of the right "stature" there.


5. (C) Jaguaribe described the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process as the "core issue" of the region, one which touches
every other issue in the Middle East. For this reason, he
suggested, a "more differentiated" approach will be necessary
than in the past. He said that Brazil does not see itself as
having a major role to play in the peace process, but the GOB
has been "called by some parties," and particularly "our
Lebanese friends," to get more involved. He said Brazil is
"available" to help, and believes it presents a "credible
face to all actors."


6. (C) Jaguaribe stressed that without all relevant players,
including Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran, there could be no
lasting solution. The Ambassador noted that we have been
clear that it is not a question of whether to talk with the
different parties, but under what conditions. He noted that
the issue of what dialogue to undertake in the Middle East is
very sensitive and now the subject of public debate in the
United States, including by our presidential candidates.
Jaguaribe indicating he was following the U.S. debate on the
issue, but reiterated that it was Brazil's view that it is
important to talk with all the players. "It is useful to
everyone," he added, "that some countries can do that." The
Ambassador asked if Brazil still hoped to hold a meeting of
Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors. Jaguaribe said
they believe it is a good idea to engage non-governmental
actors as an additional channel for opening discussion, but
indicated there are no specific plans to organize a meeting
at this point.

--------------
Iran: Brazil Favors Frank Engagement
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador raised the importance of pushing Iran
in the right direction with regard to its nuclear ambitions
and said that we hope Brazil will remain sensitive to the
signals it is sending. Jaguaribe said that Brazil's
relations with Iran were, first, based on a "significant"
trade relationship. Brazil does not have the level of trade
that Japan, Italy, Germany, and other EU countries have with
Iran, he said, nor does it buy much in the way of Iranian
imports, as EU countries do. But Brazil does sell two
billion dollars in exports to Iran per year. He said that
Petrobras is "very careful" in its dealings with Iran because
it is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Brazil is
careful to comply with UNSC resolutions, "even when we
disagree with them." Brazil understands Iran's interest in
developing "legitimate" nuclear capabilities, and shares
concerns about the "corollary" capabilities Iran may be
trying to develop. However, Brazil is concerned that the
current approach to Iran essentially "questions the NPT" by
suggesting that the safeguards in it are not sufficient.
Brazil is "a party to the NPT, but not a fan of it," he said,
and the problem with Iran has pointed to one of the
weaknesses in the NPT.


8. (C) Jaguaribe said that they had had "a very frank
discussion" with Iran recently. They told the Iranians that
Brazil's nuclear program was not an issue in South America

BRASILIA 00000851 003 OF 004


because Brazil has achieved a "level of confidence" in the
region. Iran needs to do the same before it can expect to
proceed without problems. The Iranians complained that they
had been singled out by the UNSC when "Israel has an arsenal
of bombs," and argued that these matters should be dealt with
in the IAEA, not the UNSC. According to Jaguaribe, they told
the Iranians that Brazil agrees, but that "the Security
Council decides what is a security issue and we must abide by
its decisions."


9. (C) Jaguaribe concluded that it is Brazil's view that
engagement, not isolation, is the appropriate approach to
Iran. With the exception of Israel, he said, Iran is the
"most democratic country in the Middle East"--restricted
still, of course, but better than others in the region.
Although Iranian President Ahmedinejad's rhetoric is clearly
outrageous in some cases, Brazil sees this as domestic
posturing, adding that Ahmedinejad's position is only helped
by "creating conflict." With thousands of years of history
behind them, the Iranians are very self-conscious regarding
their importance, Jaguaribe said, and it is important to pay
attention to that. The Ambassador stressed the importance of
not providing positive reinforcement to Ahmedinejad's
rhetoric and giving him the opportunity to say that he has
Brazil's support. He said that the EU has tried dialogue and
not had much success, and noted that Iran has made a
conscious decision to sacrifice full development of its oil
wealth in the interest of pursuing its nuclear ambitions.
Jaguaribe acknowledged an "enormous effort" by Iran to engage
Brazil, but said Brazil has been clear with Iran that Iran
must make a move if the current impasse is to be overcome.

--------------
Brazil Wants to Deepen Bilateral Discussion on Middle East
--------------


10. (C) In light of the meeting between Ambassador Patriota
and NEA A/S Welch, Jaguaribe said that he hoped to be able to
travel to Washington in September to continue the dialogue
with us. The Ambassador encouraged this, adding that he was
hoping that we could bring a senior-level USG official to
Brazil in the next few months to deepen the dialogue further
on Middle East issues.

--------------
Africa: Observers to Zimbabwe; Interest in Discussions
--------------


11. (C) In a similar vein, Jaguaribe said he was pleased to
hear from Ambassador Patriota that AF A/S Frazer would visit
Brazil to talk about cooperation in Africa. He informed the
Ambassador that, at South Africa's insistence, Brazil had
decided to send observers to Zimbabwe for the June 27 run-off
election as part of the SADC delegation (refs A and B). He
added that the first-round elections had been "exceptionally
good" by African standards.

--------------
Comment: More Evidence that Brazil is Stepping Out
--------------


12. (C) As with his discussion last fall with WHA A/S Shannon
(ref C),Jaguaribe showed himself to be an open and
informative interlocutor who is clearly on top of his brief.
Post will continue to engage him and his staff, and believes
that discussion between him and both NEA and AF would prove
useful to U.S. interests.


13. (C) Jaguaribe's comments confirm our impressions that
Brazil is feeling increasingly confident engaging on the
Middle East (septel) and Africa (ref D). In our view, the
sense of empowerment that Brazilians feel as a result of
being included in the Annapolis process can be used, to a
limited degree, to help keep them on track in their

BRASILIA 00000851 004 OF 004


pronouncements. It is important for the GOB to understand
clearly where our redlines lie as they increase their
engagement.


14. (C) It is also interesting that, according to Jaguaribe,
it was South Africa's approach that was decisive in obtaining
Brazil's agreement to send observers to Zimbabwe. This
suggests that approaches through Brazil's new
developing-country partners may be valuable with regard to
Brazilian participation in non-traditional areas such as
peacekeeping in Darfur.
SOBEL