MARCH 7 UPDATE ON COLOMBIA'S DISPUTE WITH ECUADOR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 000919

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL PTER VZ SP FR SZ EC CO
SUBJECT: MARCH 7 UPDATE ON COLOMBIA'S DISPUTE WITH ECUADOR,
VENEZUELA--AND NICARAGUA

REF: A. BOGOTA 903

B. BOGOTA 533

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The flow of goods and people into Venezuela along the
Colombian border was further restricted on March 7, but
passage of food and perishables continued. The
Colombia-Ecuador border remained open. The Ambassador
reiterated to Acting Foreign Minister Mejia and Defense
Minister Santos the USG's willingness to help the GOC at the
OAS and elsewhere. Mejia and Santos confirmed the GOC was
satisfied with USG support, and requested a low-key, USG
public approach for now. Mejia requested USG help to squash
a French proposal to create a "group of friends" on the
hostage issue. Santos said he did not expect a GOV attack,
but asked us to consider our response in the event of a quick
GOV strike. Santos also said the military likely killed FARC
Secretariat member Ivan Rios. The Rio Group meeting ended

SIPDIS
with commitments from Uribe, Chavez, Correa, and Ortega to
solve their differences through dialogue. Ortega said he
would renew diplomatic ties with Colombia; Uribe said he
would not take Chavez to the International Criminal Court.
END SUMMARY.


BORDERS: MORE GOV RESTRICTIONS IN PLACE, ECUADOR OPEN
-------------- --------------


2. (U) The Colombian border with Venezuela remained only
partially open on March 7, with more restrictions on goods
and people. Most food and medicine continued to enter, but
all goods were stopped at the remote Puerto Carreno (Vichada)
border crossing. Other goods, mainly construction materials,
remained restricted at all points of entry. The flow of
people was mixed: Cucuta remained open, but Cesar and Arauca
were stalled over visa/permit delays. The border with Ecuador
remained open, but the flow of goods and people was
reportedly half of normal levels.


GOC PLEASED WITH USG SUPPORT AND COOPERATION
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador called Acting Foreign Minister Adriana
Mejia to reiterate--as previously conveyed to President Uribe
and Foreign Minister Araujo--our willingness to help the GOC
at the OAS and elsewhere. Mejia told the Ambassador the GOC
was satisfied with the current level of USG support. She
added that it would be best if USG support remained low key,
since highly visible backing could cause tactical problems
for the GOC. Mejia said she would let us know if that
changed.


4. (C) Mejia said there were two areas where we could be
supportive:

--First, Mejia told us there were rumors Ecuador might push a
resolution at the UN Security Council. The GOC considers the
OAS the proper forum to discuss the current crisis. Mejia
asked that we help the GOC block any resolution if Ecuador
took this route. The Ambassador told Mejia he had not
received instructions, but was almost certain that this would
be the USG's approach. The Ambassador assured Mejia he would
pass her concern to Washington.

--Second, Mejia told us the Colombian Mission in Brussels
reported that France was circulating a non-paper to other EU
and some Latin American missions in Brussels proposing the
creation of a "Group of Friends" in exchange for a FARC
commitment to free its "civilian" hostages. The group could
then help achieve an exchange of the remaining hostages, as
well as support a final peace process with the FARC. Mejia
said the GOC opposed this initiative because it believed the
Catholic Church and the French, Spanish and Swiss represented
the best chance to address the hostage issue. The Ambassador
assured her we would consult with our mission in Brussels to
see what we could do to help.

BOGOTA 00000919 002 OF 002




CONSIDERING CONTINGENCIES
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5. (C) Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos told the
Ambassador March 7 that he was content with U.S. intelligence
sharing on Venezuela and Ecuador. He considered a planned
GOV or GOE military confrontation at the border unlikely.
His concern was that Chavez was acting irrationally, perhaps
because he felt responsible for the phone call that led to
Raul Reyes' death. Santos said the most likely confrontation
scenario would be Chavez ordering a quick strike in Colombia
before the GOC could react. He asked what the USG would do
in such a case. The Ambassador told Santos we agreed that
any planned confrontation at the border was extremely
unlikely.


6. (C) Santos also told us FARC Secretariat member Manuel
Jesus Munoz Ortiz (aka Ivan Rios) may have died in combat
with the military in northwest Colombia on March 7. The
military was trying to get forensic confirmation from a
severed hand. Santos said the FARC unit led by Rios was
surrounded and lower level fighters wanted to surrender.
Rios refused; his men then killed him and handed themselves
in.


7. (C) Santos added that he would likely travel to Washington
on March 9 to meet with Congress and make a national
security-based pitch for the U.S. Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement. He added that the GOC was considering the timing
on how to proceed on a Cooperative Security Location (CSL) at
Palenquero (reftel B). Moving ahead now would send a clear
military message to Chavez, but would also allow others in
the region to criticize Colombia for its excessive closeness
to the USG. Santos said the GOC would have to consider the
details of any OAS or other proposal to exchange military
liaison officers with Ecuador. He noted that the GOC would
not release additional materials from the Reyes computers
through press conferences by National Police director Oscar
Naranjo.


GOC FIGHTS BACK IN THE Dominican Republic
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8. (U) President Uribe used the March 7 Rio Group meeting in
Santo Domingo to make the GOC case that continual FARC
attacks against Colombia from Ecuador justified the March 1
attack against the FARC in Ecuador. The meeting ended with
Uribe, Chavez, Correa, and Ortega agreeing to solve their
differences through political dialogue. Ortega said he would
re-establish diplomatic relations with Colombia; Uribe said
the GOC would not take Chavez to the International Criminal
Court.
Brownfield