Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BOGOTA590
2008-02-14 18:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

POLO REMAINS DIVIDED - WEAKENING PROSPECTS FOR 2010

Tags:  PGOV PINR PHUM PTER CO VZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000590 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PTER CO VZ
SUBJECT: POLO REMAINS DIVIDED - WEAKENING PROSPECTS FOR 2010

REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 11404 B. BOGOTA 376

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000590

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PTER CO VZ
SUBJECT: POLO REMAINS DIVIDED - WEAKENING PROSPECTS FOR 2010

REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 11404 B. BOGOTA 376

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The leftist Polo Democratico Alternativo
Party (Polo)'s poor performance in last October's local
elections--as well as its ambiguous stance toward the
FARC--have exacerbated tensions between its pragmatic, social
democratic wing and unreconstructed, orthodox communist
elements. Polo leaders consistently denounce political
violence, but their reluctance to criticize the FARC has
undermined their efforts to expand the Party's base.
Pragmatists hope a Polo Congress in 2008 to choose new
leaders will strengthen their position, but ideological
purists retain significant influence. If the pragmatists do
not prevail, moderate, presidential hopefuls such as former
Bogota Mayor Lucho Garzon will likely abandon the party. End
Summary.

POOR RESULT IN OCTOBER ELECTIONS
--------------


2. (C) Polo Secretary General Daniel Garcia Pena told us that
despite its victory in Bogota's mayoral race, the Polo fared
poorly overall in the October local elections. The Party
fell well short of its goal of 500 municipal council
seats--winning only 378--and also missed its target of 30
state legislator races--garnering only 14. The Polo remains a
largely Bogota-based party that lacks a national network.
Garcia Pena blamed the poor results on the Party's failure to
build cross-party alliances with other opposition groups.
Polo hardliners' insistence on ideological purity prevented
the party from backing winning left-of-center mayoral
candidates in Medellin and Cali. Instead, the party ran its
own candidates--both of whom lost badly. Garcia Pena said the
sectarian approach favored by the Polo's 1960s style
unreconstructed produced defeat after defeat--depriving the
Polo of the funding and patronage needed to build a national
structure.

INTERNAL DIVISIONS
--------------


3. (C) The Polo's internal divisions reflect its polyglot
origins. The Party was cobbled together from a grouping of

smaller leftist parties in 2002-3, and reflects wide spectrum
of political views, including old-style communists, 21st
Century Socialists, and social democrats (ref A). Former
Bogota Mayor and well-known moderate "Lucho" Garzon divides
the Party into "reformers and revolutionaries." Garcia Pena
told us in December that hardline leftists largely control
the party machinery. Pragmatists, such as Garzon, hope to
use a Party Congress--which under the Polo's rules should be
held before November 2008--to take control of key Party
positions. He cautioned, however, that the traditional
leftists recognize the danger and are trying to delay the
Congress until 2009.


4. (C) Maoist Senator Jorge Robledo told us only Polo
President Carlos Gaviria, who supports the traditional left,
represents Polo ideals and policies. Moderates should leave
the party if they do not support the Polo's principles or
policies. Gaviria told us the party has delayed a full party
Congress until November 2008 at the earliest (or as late as
February 2009),which will maintain the leftists' control of
key party leadership positions.

POLITICAL (LACK OF) FOCUS
--------------


5. (C) The Polo's ideological and tactical divisions are
reflected in the Party's vague platform, especially on
security. Garcia Pena told us the Polo's existing security
policy could be summarized as, "hoping that the FARC decides
to engage in peace talks someday," but added that the party
needs to develop a policy to protect Colombians from illegal
armed groups as well. Gaviria admitted to us that the Polo
lacked a viable security policy, stating that internal splits
and a consensus-based decision-making process delay
consideration of new security policies. Garcia Pena stressed
the need for Polo to formulate a more substantive platform,
with a focus on peace and a humanitarian accord,
para-political prosecutions, and anti-free trade.

POLO ON THE FARC
--------------


6. (C) The Polo's ideological confusion is painfully apparent
in its ongoing struggle over whether to treat the FARC as a
terrorist group. Garcia Pena explained that while "all of
Polo rejects the FARC," the Party does not support a military
solution to Colombia's conflict. Robledo said the Polo
rejects the FARC's tactics, but will not denounce them as a
terrorist group and cut off chances for dialogue. The Polo's
policy -- denouncing the FARC's tactics and atrocities, but
not the group itself -- is becoming untenable. In the
February 4 march against the FARC, in which millions of
Colombian took to the streets, Polo's leadership voted not to
participate (ref B). Still, key Polo leaders such as Bogota
Mayor Moreno, Senator Petro, Narino Governor Antonio Navarro
Wolff, and former Mayor Garzon publicly marched. Polo
leaders understand President Uribe and their opponents will
continue to use the FARC as a wedge issue against the party,
but have been unable to fashion a party-wide response.

POLO ON CHAVEZ
--------------


7. (C) The Polo's relations with Venezuelan President Chavez
"Bolivarian" movement is another challenge. There is no
official Polo position on Chavez, and the Party has not
supported Chavez' proposals to give the FARC belligerent
status or to remove the group from international terrorism
lists. Gaviria told us he and party leadership rejected
offers from Chavez in November, and Venezuelan Foreign
Minister Nicolas Maduro in January, to establish closer ties
to Chavez' New Socialist Party. Still, he confirmed that
approximately twenty percent of the party supports
Chavista-style "21st Century Socialism." Gaviria told us he
suspected that Chavez' party funded some Polo candidates in
the October elections, mainly on Colombia's north coast.

RELATIONS WITH THE USG
--------------


8. (C) Gaviria, Garcia Pena and other party leaders--all of
whom maintain cordial relations with the Embassy--say they
want to build a new relationship with the USG based on
substance. Still, the Polo remains opposed to key elements
of USG policy (aerial eradication, the free trade agreement,
and U.S. military assistance). Moreover, the Polo rejects
support provided by the International Republican Institute
(IRI) on political platform development, and only tacitly
accepts technical assistance provided by the National
Democratic Institute (NDI). Garcia Pena told us the Polo
plans to set up a public policy institute this year. We have
offered to cooperate with the institute once it is
established, but Garcia Pena has yet to respond.

2010 POLO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
--------------


9. (C) The Polo's evolution will impact the 2010 presidential
race, as well as its future as a viable alternative to
center-right government. The Party's left-wing favors a
Gaviria candidacy, who ran in 2006 and received 2.6 million
votes, but Gaviria has told us he will not run again. Former
Bogota Mayor and party moderate Lucho Garzon has publicly
stated his intent to be the Polo's candidate, but added that
he would abandon the party and create a "Party of the Street"
if it fails to moderate its policies. Senator Petro--an
acknowledged "chavista" who has recently been moderating his
views--is also preparing a possible presidential run.
Brownfield