Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BOGOTA310
2008-01-24 23:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES'

Tags:  ETRD PGOV PHUM PREL PTER VZ VT FR SP SZ CO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 000310 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018
TAGS: ETRD PGOV PHUM PREL PTER VZ VT FR SP SZ CO
SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES'
JANUARY 19 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 000310

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018
TAGS: ETRD PGOV PHUM PREL PTER VZ VT FR SP SZ CO
SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES'
JANUARY 19 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) President Uribe told ONDCP Director Walters and five
U.S. Congressmen in a 19 January meeting that his Democratic
Security policy enjoyed bipartisan support, noting that its
economic and social goals had predated the campaign for a
Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Uribe said the GOC had increased
resources for Colombia's Prosecutor General and proposed new
labor legislation to address U.S. concerns. He stressed that
U.S. approval of an FTA would o reduce poverty, and signal
U.S. support for Colombia in the face of increased tensions
with Venezuela, and underscoring USG-GOC shared democratic
values. On hostages, Uribe said the GOC would rely on
facilitation efforts of the Catholic Church and three
European countries -- France, Spain and Switzerland. The GOC
saw no room for further mediation efforts by Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez. Defense Minister Santos urged that
the USG and GOC negotiate implementation of cuts in Plan
Colombia funding to minimize disruption of key programs. End
Summary.



2. (U) Participants:


UNITED STATES

ONDCP Director John Walters
Ambassador William Brownfield
Representative Ander Crenshaw (R-FL)
Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA)
Representative John Mica (R-FL)
Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)
Representative Mark Souder (R-IN)
SBA Administrator Steve Preston
Staffers (2) and ONDCP officers (5)

COLOMBIA

President Alvaro Uribe
Foreign Minister Fernando Araujo
Ambassador Carolina Barco
Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos
Social Protection Minister Diego Palacio
National Planning Director Carolina Renteria
Social Action Commissioner Luis Alfonso Hoyos

Reintegration Commissioner Frank Pearl
U.S. and Canada Desk Officer Patricia Cortes
Accompanying staff and officials

--------------
DEMOCRATIC SECURITY: Broad Bipartisan Goals
--------------


3. (SBU) Uribe thanked the members of the delegation for
their interest in Colombia and for U.S. bipartisan support.
He emphasized that his Democratic Security policy had always
had a broad-based set of economic and social goals -- such as
investment to overcome poverty, promote social cohesion, and
build democratic institutions. Since 2002, the policy was
"for all Colombians -- employers, workers, politicians, trade
union leaders, and the opposition." The GOC's interest in
protecting all groups, he stressed, predated pressures
related to the FTA.

--------------
JUSTICE AND LABOR: Expansion and Reforms
--------------


4. (SBU) Uribe reviewed recent GOC measures to address
justice and labor issues. He had approved a ten percent

BOGOTA 00000310 002 OF 003


increase in the staff of the Prosecutor General, adding 2,167
prosecutors, investigators, and other personnel. On labor
issues, his administration had submitted three new bills to
Congress. The first would ensure social benefits for workers
in cooperatives, while the second bill would task the courts
to decide the legality of public sector strikes. The third
bill, heeding International Labor Organization (ILO)
guidance, would extend the period of employer-union dialogue
before strike cases would go to an arbitration tribunal.

--------------
FTA: A Political Signal Attracting Investment
--------------


5. (SBU) Representative Mica cautioned that the change in
U.S. Congressional leadership had ushered in a new era, one
of less funding and a shift in emphasis to trade and
business. Uribe concurred on the need to strengthen the
U.S.-Colombia economic relationship. He said that even if a
FTA did not increase Colombia's near-term exports to the
United States, it would attract foreign investment. Many
investors are waiting to come in, he said, and more
investment would create jobs and reduce poverty.


6. (C) Uribe said the FTA would also provide a "clear
political signal" of U.S. support in the face of Colombia's
increasingly strained relations with Venezuela. "We can't
stay in limbo," he said, "with difficulties with our
neighbors and disapproval from the United States." President
Chavez' public support of the FARC raised the prospect of
material Venezuelan assistance to the group, adding greater
urgency to the fight against terror and drugs. Uribe said
Colombia remains committed to containing Chavez' expansion in
the region, but cautioned that it needs concrete U.S. support
to do so. A combination of Plan Colombia cuts and FTA
failure would be a "disaster." Minister Santos agreed,
describing a regional contest between competing concepts of
democracy (Venezuela's statist, authoritarian model vs.
Colombia's open, liberal model). U.S. approval of the FTA
would also signal an endorsement of shared values.

--------------
HOSTAGES: Next Steps, and Non-Negotiables
--------------


7. (C) Asked about the hostages, Uribe said the three
Americans had as much importance to the GOC as the
Colombians. Both the President and the Defense Minister
would address the topic during his January 20-24 trip to
Europe. The GOC planned to proceed along three tracks:
authorizing the Catholic Church to contact the FARC to
arrange a meeting zone; allowing mediation by France, Spain,
and Switzerland in conjunction with the Catholic Church
initiative; and seeking an international medical mission to
tend to the hostages in the jungle. When asked if Uribe had
firm commitments from the Catholic Church or the three
countries on this plan, he replied "not yet." Uribe stressed
that he would not accept further mediation by Chavez, who had
emerged as complicit with the FARC. Military rescue was
still an option -- in part to show the FARC that the GOC was
not resigned. In this U.S. intelligence could help to locate
the hostages, and multilateral organizations like the
International Committee of the Red Cross might secure their
release.


8. (C) Representative Souder noted that in the U.S.
experience, concessions would only encourage more
kidnappings. He urged Uribe not to allow France to pressure
him into negotiations with the FARC on a humanitarian
exchange. Uribe replied that the GOC had already resisted
much pressure -- holding to its "non-negotiable" points of
denying the FARC's demand for a demilitarized zone and
requiring released prisoners to commit not to return to FARC
ranks. Still, with Colombian public opinion anxious about
the hostages' health, the GOC had to offer alternatives.
Uribe added that he would bear Souder's advice in mind,
balancing his remarks in Europe accordingly.

BOGOTA 00000310 003 OF 003



--------------
NATIONALIZATION: Concern for Sliding Back
--------------


9. (SBU) Walters raised the issue of pending transfers of
assets and costs from the USG to Colombia, emphasizing that
the U.S. wanted to work with Colombia to ensure a smooth
transition. He voiced concerns that existing security and
counter drug programs, especially related to air mobility,
risked an abrupt loss of capacity. Santos responded that the
U.S reductions cut deeper than expected, and came two years
earlier than planned. He urged the USG and GOC to negotiate
how to apply the cuts. Uribe said it was premature to phase
out Plan Colombia until drug production went down, and until
the GOC could maintain a high rate of investment to fight the
war alone. Walters suggested that the GOC build its figures
into a transition plan to reflect it's ability to assume Plan
Colombia costs.


10. (U) Congressional members did not clear this cable.
Brownfield