POLO SENATOR PETRO ON CHAVEZ, AN URIBE THIRD TERM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001418

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER VZ CO
SUBJECT: POLO SENATOR PETRO ON CHAVEZ, AN URIBE THIRD TERM,
AND POLO POLITICS

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Polo Party Senator Gustavo Petro speculated that
Venezuelan President Chavez -- fearing what might be in the
Raul Reyes' computers -- appears to be rethinking his
involvement in humanitarian negotiations or unilateral
liberation of FARC-held hostages. Petro claimed President
Uribe will delay his decision on whether to try for a third
term until after the U.S. presidential elections in November,
adding that the Polo would find it impossible to defeat
either Uribe or an Urbista candidate in Colombia's 2010
presidential race. Petro said the internal battle between
the Polo's pragmatists and communists for control of the
party continues, but he noted that the communists have the
edge. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Opposition Polo Democratico Senator Gustavo Petro told
us April 14, that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez appears to
be rethinking his involvement in humanitarian negotiations or
unilateral liberation of FARC-held hostages in the wake of
the March 1 GOC operation against Secretariat member Raul
Reyes in Ecuador. Chavez did not anticipate the GOC strike
in Ecuador, fears what might be in the Reyes' computers, and
understands that this limits his scope for international
action on behalf of the FARC. Petro outlined his belief that
Uribe authorized the raid in part to reduce the FARC's and
Chavez' international political space.


3. (C) Petro said Chavez committed multiple political
mistakes during his involvement as facilitator of a
humanitarian exchange--in large part because he relied
exclusively on Senator Piedad Cordoba and the FARC for advice
on Colombian politics. Chavez did not consult with his
Ambassador in Bogota, Pavel Rondon, and ignored the Cubans.
Petro said the FARC vetoed any consultations between Chavez
and the Polo. He speculated that further progress on a
humanitarian accord is frozen absent pressure or a gesture,
such as transfers by the USG of convicted FARC criminals
"Simon Trinidad" and "Sonia" from U.S. prisons to a third
country.


4. (C) Petro speculated that President Uribe remains
undecided on whether he will seek a constitutional amendment
that would allow him to run for a third term. Uribe will not
make a final decision until after the U.S. elections in
November, since he does not want to be left isolated. Petro
said that if Uribe runs again, he would easily win
reelection. It would be impossible for any Polo candidate to
defeat Uribe or any "Uribista" candidate in the 2010
presidential elections, because the continued existence of
the FARC makes voters reluctant to entrust the presidency to
a left-wing party. He said the only opportunity for the Polo
to defeat an Uribista candidate would be as part of a broader
coalition with the Liberal Party or with an independent
candidate such as former Medellin Mayor Sergio Fajardo.
Petro dismissed Polo President Carlos Gaviria's prospects,
noting that he is an academic, not a politician.


5. (C) Petro voiced frustration over the continuing internal
battle for control of the Polo between more pragmatic,
moderate leftist elements and its sectarian, orthodox
communist wing. The communist elements -- led by the
Independent Revolutionary Workers Movement (MOIR),Colombian
Communist Party, and the Federation of Colombian Teachers
(FECODE) -- largely control the party machinery and use this
power to shape Polo policies and candidates. He said
former-Bogota Mayor Lucho Garzon hopes to wrest control from
communists during the August election of regional Polo
officials and delegates to the National Party Congress.
Petro predicted this effort would fail, noting that internal
Polo elections are dominated by party militants. He added
that current Bogota Mayor Samuel Moreno is using patronage to
build his influence within the party, but suggested Moreno
would also side with the communists. Petro supports the

moderate elements.


6. (C) Petro said Polo leaders believe Plan Colombia has
failed to reduce Colombia's narcotrafficking problem. The
party remains critical of U.S. military aid as well as the
aerial spray program. He claimed the emphasis on
counternarcotics and military action merely worsens
conditions in the rural areas, ensuring a steady flow of new
recruits for the FARC and other illegal armed groups. Petro
said the USG should shift its assistance from security aid to
agrarian reform. This could support a GOC policy based on
military pressure, social reform, and a willingness to
explore peace talks with the FARC and ELN. Petro conceded
that many of his Polo colleagues do not accept the need for a
military component, seeing negotiations as the only solution
to Colombia's conflict, but said a growing number of Polo
members now recognize the military must play a role.

BROWNFIELD