Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BISHKEK530
2008-05-23 11:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

A RAMP TOO FAR? KYRGYZ OFFER SOME INSIGHTS INTO

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR KG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000530 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: A RAMP TOO FAR? KYRGYZ OFFER SOME INSIGHTS INTO
DECISION TO TURN DOWN U.S. PROPOSAL

REF: BISHKEK 499

BISHKEK 00000530 001.4 OF 003


Classified By: Charge Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000530

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: A RAMP TOO FAR? KYRGYZ OFFER SOME INSIGHTS INTO
DECISION TO TURN DOWN U.S. PROPOSAL

REF: BISHKEK 499

BISHKEK 00000530 001.4 OF 003


Classified By: Charge Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In a May 23 meeting, Kyrgyz Security
Council Deputy Secretary informed Charge that the Kyrgyz
decision to disapprove the U.S. proposal to invest $30
million to construct a strategic parking ramp at Manas
Airport for use by coalition forces was final, and the
decision had been taken by the full cabinet. The Kyrgyz
specifically claimed that FM Karabayev and Defense Minister
Isakov, both of whom had denied knowledge of the decision to
the Ambassador, were full participants in the decision.
Security Council officials cited three main reasons for
rejecting the proposal: the December 2006 shooting incident
in which a Kyrgyz truck driver was killed by a U.S. security
forces airman; concerns about environmental damage caused by
the base; and concerns over "dual ownership" of the ramp.
They declined to elaborate further, but stressed that
Kyrgyzstan continues to support the base and seeks to
continue bilateral security cooperation with the United
States. They urged the U.S. to consider identifying an
alternative use of the funding for the ramp -- for example to
support law enforcement, communications, the medical sector
or other infrastructure projects -- and pledged to work with
us on such an alternative project. Charge explained the
surprise and disappointment of the U.S. with the decision,
which he noted was difficult to understand given the many
significant economic benefits of the project to Kyrgyzstan
precisely at a time when it desperately needs to stimulate
the economy and create jobs. End Summary.

Security Council Offers Meeting on Ramp
--------------


2. (C) On May 23, Charge and Army Attache met with NSC
Deputy Secretary Bakirov, NSC Advisor LTG (Ret.) Mamyrkulov,
and NSC staffer Kurmanbekov, at Bakirov's request, to "share
ideas and discuss" the Kyrgyz response to the U.S. proposal
to invest $30 million to construct a strategic parking ramp.
(Note. On May 13, the NSC informed the Embassy by phone of

the government's decision against the project; on May 21 the
Embassy received formal notification of the decision under
cover of a diplomatic note. See Reftel for details. End
Note.)

Can U.S. Redirect Funds to Another Project?
--------------


3. (C) Bakirov opened the meeting by stressing that the
decision conveyed to the Embassy that the proposed project
would be "inexpedient" was a collective decision taken by 23
members of the Kyrgyz Government based on full interagency
discussion of the issue. He said Kyrgyz authorities would
now suggest that the U.S. consider a "new" program, like
projects currently underway under IMET, FMF and EXBS
programs. Bakirov suggested allocating the money proposed
for the strategic ramp for "a different purpose," such as
"law enforcement, infrastructure, or communications."

U.S. Surprise, Disappointment with Decision
--------------


4. (C) Charge thanked Bakirov for his clarification, but
conveyed the surprise and disappointment of the U.S. with
this decision. He noted that the ramp proposal was conceived
as a non-controversial economic investment project that would
benefit the Kyrgyz side as well as coalition operations. Our
understanding from Kyrgyz interlocutors involved in the
interagency deliberations on the project was that, while some
government entities had raised objections, several key
ministries supported the project, including MFA and MOD, who
anticipated a positive decision. The U.S. was further

BISHKEK 00000530 002.2 OF 003


puzzled when, in subsequent meetings, FM Karabayev and MinDef
Isakov told the Ambassador they were unaware of a decision on
the matter and both also seemed only vaguely aware of the
economic magnitude of the project.


5. (C) The Charge explained that we were concerned that the
decision may have been made without full appreciation of the
economic and strategic benefits of the proposal. He
explained that the project in no way implied the U.S. was
seeking a permanent base; the terms of the bilateral
agreement, which allows either side to terminate the
understanding, would remain unchanged. Second, it did not
represent an expansion of the base -- the ramp would be used
to relocate existing coalition aircraft from the center of
the airport to a more remote and secure site at the northern
edge of the airport. In so doing, it would relieve traffic
congestion between coalition and civilian aircraft, enhancing
the safe operations of both. In addition, by freeing up the
space currently occupied by coalition aircraft, the project
would remove the need for aircraft to taxi up the take-off
runway. This would also significantly enhance airport
operations and allow for increased traffic. Economically,
the U.S. estimates that $15-20 million would be contracted
through local Kyrgyz firms, significantly boosting the
economy and adding significant numbers of new jobs in the
area. Finally, once the mission of the base was complete,
the ramp would remain as a major economic asset for the
airport, and a strategic asset for the country.

Security Council Outlines Decision Process
--------------


6. (C) Security Council Advisor Mamyrkulov then attempted
to explain in detail the bureaucratic process leading up to
the decision. He said that former First Deputy Minister of
Defense Oruzbayev chaired two interagency meetings of the
intergovernmental commission that oversees base issues, where
all aspects of the proposal were discussed. Following this,
the NSC chaired two interagency meetings. At these meetings,
ministries took positions for and against the proposal.
Mamyrkulov confirmed that MOD and MFA supported the ramp,
citing the economic benefits involved. "Three to four
agencies" raised objections, which Mamyrkulov said centered
on three issues: the December 2006 shooting incident in
which a U.S. airman killed a Kyrgyz truck driver;
environmental concerns; and coalition (vice airport) control
of the ramp. Mamyrkulov said the interagency group sent
forward a recommendation to the government. He claimed the
government, under PM Chudinov, deliberated and decided the
issue. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense
participated in this process. Once the decision was taken,
the Prime Minister tasked the NSC to transmit the decision to
the U.S.

Scant Details on How Decision Reached
--------------


7. (C) The Charge responded that while this information was
helpful, it did not explain how the government concluded that
the concerns raised outweighed the substantial economic
benefits of the project. If they could elaborate on the
concerns, perhaps we could find ways to address them.
Bakirov and Mamyrkulov replied that they had provided a
detailed review of the process, were not part of the
government led by PM Chudinov, and had nothing further to
offer. Bakirov noted that there were never any guarantees
that the decision would be positive, and urged the U.S. to
move beyond this issue and not politicize it. They said that
Kyrgyzstan supports the global war on terrorism and was
prepared to continue the cooperation we have established.


8. (C) Comment. Bakirov and his staff were clearly
uncomfortable during the meeting, and Bakirov especially

BISHKEK 00000530 003.2 OF 003


seemed displeased with being tapped to explain the bad news.
Mamyrkulov's outline of the process glossed over how the
actual decision was made, and did not resolve the
contradiction that both FM Karabayev and DefMin Isakov seemed
genuinely ill-informed about the matter or even the fact that
a decision had been made. The NSC may not actually have the
inside details of the decision; in any event they were
clearly not comfortable going beyond their brief in a group
meeting. There was no hint of outside considerations -- e.g.
Russia -- as an additional factor, but the lack of
transparency in the decision, the reluctance to explain how
it was reached, and earlier indications that the GKNB opposed
the project all point in that direction. Although Bakirov
presented the decision as final, we will continue to seek
clarification of the process.
LITZENBERGER