EMBASSY BISHKEK RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS

S E C R E T BISHKEK 000293

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ACTION OF OIG
DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX BILL HAUGH
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN DAVID GEHRENBECK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2033
TAGS: AMGT ASEC ASIG AISG
SUBJECT: EMBASSY BISHKEK RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS
LISTED IN OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A, FEBRUARY 2008

REF: A. MCCORMICK/AMBASSADOR YOVANOVITCH E-MAIL DATED
FEBRUARY 29 2008

B. OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A FEBRUARY 2008

Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger for Reasons 1.4(g)

Here follows Embassy Bishkek responses to the formal and
informal recommendations listed in OIG report number
ISP-S-08-14A.


1. (C/NF) Recommendation 1: Embassy Bishkek should continue
to coordinate with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations to ensure near term installation of locally
fabricated mantraps for the vehicle entrances to the embassy
compound.
(Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post has contracted via RPSO Frankfurt with a
German Architectural and Engineering firm to provide 100%
design and construction documents for the Mantrap project. To
date, Post and OBO have received the 35% design submittal for
review and have returned comments. Although most recently
some contractual problems have slowed the design effort, Post
is confident these issues will be resolved quickly and 100%
design documents can be delivered by 30 April. After
receiving the final construction documents and OBO Building
Permit, Post will proceed to the contracting and construction
phase.


2. (C/NF) Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek,
should replace the damaged forced-entry/ballistic-resistant
window on the compound access control guard booth servicing
the employee parking lot. (Action: OBO, in coordination with
Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post identified the proper replacement glass and
ordered the glass directly from Norshield in coordination
with OBO/PE/CC/SPE via purchases order SKG-100-08-M-0057. The
order for the replacement glass was placed on 01/17/08. On
03/05/08, Post learned that the window reached our dispatch
agent in New Jersey. Post anticipates the window will arrive
06/08. Once the replacement glass is received, Post will
coordinate with Larry Best and Koburn Stoll from
OBO/PE/CC/SPE to request an FE/BR door and window team for
installation.


3. (SBU) Recommendation 3: Embassy Bishkek should implement
flexible work hours for embassy personnel and encourage
employees to vary their arrival and departure times. (Action:
Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs in part.

Response: Post is not prepared to implement flexible working
hours Embassy wide, but prefers a stepped approach to arrival
times by section to help alleviate vehicles waiting outside
of the compound to be screened, which is a the security
concern that prompted this recommendation. Post has analyzed
the congestion problems and contends that the congestion is
primarily focused at Post 26 (vehicle CAC) from between 0800
to 0830 while vehicles are waiting for security screening.
Post Management has instructed the Facilities Maintenance
Section to alter their working hours so that this section
would start work at 0800 vice 0830. The Facilities
Maintenance Section is by far the largest section that
reports directly to the Embassy every morning and modifying
their arrival time by 30 minutes should eliminate waiting
lines for security screening while still maintaining positive
management controls over staff. In addition, the RSO
regularly advises all American Staff to vary their routes and
times to and from work.


4. (C/NF) Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations should assess the integrity of all
affected chancery windows and advise the embassy of any
needed work to bring the windows into compliance with
security standards. (Action: OBO)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Yvonne Manderville from OBO/PE/DE/SEB visited Post
in March 2008. Manderville stated that adhesive properties of
the gasket material have failed and caused the gasket to

separate from the window pane which has resulted in the
degradation of the ballistic properties of the window
assemblies. Manderville recommended that Post petition for
inclusion in the FEBR window and door replacement program.
Post is drafting a cable to OBO and DS requesting a formal
condition survey of all FE/BR windows and doors. In this
cable Post will also petition for inclusion in the Life Cycle
Replacement program. Request will be submitted by May 1, 2008.


5. (S/NF) Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should
conduct a complete TEMPEST review of all permanent and
temporary classified processing areas at post and provide
detailed instructions regarding countermeasures that should
be employed to mitigate any proven TEMPEST noncompliance or
threat. (Action: DS in coordination with Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post will review and implement the recommendations
from the May 2007 Technical Security Assessment. Post has
contacted Lee Mason and Mark Steakley from DS/ST/CMP/ECB to
request and schedule a TEMPEST review. Mason and Steakley
were contacted in mid March and Post is waiting follow-up and
confirmation.


6. (SBU) Recommendation 6: Embassy Bishkek should establish
a viable alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post does not concur.

Response: The current alternate command center represents the
best option presently available to Embassy Bishkek. The
alternate command center is located south of Bishkek not far
from the Kyrgyz Presidential mansion and the Diplomatic
village. While the road infrastructure could be improved, the
location is not remote. In addition, the location is well
suited for a helicopter landing zone. There is a large field
approximately 600 meters wide and 2 kilometers in length that
could accommodate several transport helicopters in the event
of an evacuation. The alternate command center has a HF radio
base station that when last tested in December 2007 had
excellent link quality between Embassy Dushanbe (82%) and
Embassy Tashkent (91%). The alternate command center has two
computer workstations with dial-up internet access, a
photocopier, and a fax. There are two landlines, one IVG line
and two satellite phones. The alternate command center can be
placed into operation within 30 minutes as demonstrated in a
test in December 2007. Furthermore, the location has been
fully stocked with medical supplies, emergency rations and
water. Embassy Bishkek could not find any blast protection
requirements in the applicable Alternate Command Center
references in 12 FAH-1 H-261c and 12 FAH 1, Appendix 3. As
the Post housing pool evolves, Post will continue to seek a
better Alternate Command Center, but the current location is
the best option at the present time.


7. (SBU) Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should
evaluate post's current safe haven and initiate a physical
security upgrade project to bring the safe haven into
conformance with current requirements. (Action: OBO, in
coordination with Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post's safe haven area is too small to protect all
employees assigned to Embassy Bishkek. Until the annex is
built, Post initiated coordination with Yvonne Manderville
OBO/PE/DE/SEB and Dale Amdahl DS/PCB/PSD to identify and
implement viable alternatives such as constructing safe areas
in the warehouse, facilities maintenance building and health
unit/caf. Post's floor warden training addresses refuge
locations within the Chancery.


8. (SBU) Recommendation 8: Embassy Bishkek should develop
and implement a formal agreement with Manas Air Base for the
evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff
members. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The Embassy has explored the recommendation. In
doing so we have learned that a formal agreement between
Embassy Bishkek and Manas Coalition Airbase for the
evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff
members and selected foreign nationals, is not necessary to
ensure Noncombatant Evacuation Operations are accomplished,

and the base is not authorized by USCENTCOM to conclude such
an agreement. There are mechanisms in place for the efficient
and proper coordination and planning for this contingency
which should be followed to ensure forces and assets are
available during emergency situations. Embassy Bishkek has
therefore coordinated with USCENTCOM to ensure contingency
planning options are in-place, to include evacuation of
Embassy personnel, and fully coordinated with other affected
agencies (USTRANSCOM, DOS, and JCS) IAW applicable
directives.


9. (SBU) Recommendation 9: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination
with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should conduct a
security assessment to determine whether static residential
guards are required in addition to the centralized alarm
monitoring system and mobile patrol. (Action: Embassy
Bishkek, in coordination with DS)

Management decision: Post concurs, with comment.

Response: Post will conduct, in coordination with the Bureau
of Diplomatic security an assessment outlined in 12 FAH-6
H-521.1. Post is confident the assessment will reaffirm that
the residential security program is necessary for the safety
and security of personnel assigned to Embassy Bishkek.
Targeted date for completion is 30 June 2008.

The greatest threat against Americans in Bishkek is crime. In
February 1994 Embassy Bishkek instructed the Local Guard
Commander to implement a night residential security program.
In October 2002, the RSO identified a local alarm company
that had the technical capability to install and monitor
alarms and panic buttons at Embassy residences. However, in
January 2008 the new Minister of Internal Affairs announced
that MVD would no longer provide a quick reaction force to
respond to alarms. In addition, RSO Bishkek is only
authorized one, 24 hour mobile patrol. This means that
response time to residences in the event of an emergency is
too slow. Although the distance between the southernmost and
northernmost residence is only 8 miles, the infrastructure
and traffic can delay response time by more than 30 minutes.
In addition, Mobile Patrol can only check each residence two
or three times in a 12 hour shift. This situation is
untenable.

Since 2006, residential LGF have detected and deterred 4
instances of attempted vandalism to Embassy employee vehicles
at their residences. LGF residential guards have deterred
assault and when tasked provided temporary 24 hour
residential security for American Officers who the RSO had
reason to believe were being threatened by host nation
intelligence and or organized crime. Finally, residential
security guards were able to monitor and report regarding an
incident in which a vehicle belonging to the son-in-law of
the former deputy chief of the Kyrgyz Intelligence service
was deliberately torched within 30 feet of an apartment
building which, at the time, housed four Embassy employees
and their families. Since the Embassy began using the alarm
company, the Police have not had to respond to incidents at
residences during the night when the guards were present. The
alarms have only been needed during the day when the guards
are not present. The statistic speaks for itself. The
residential guards are a definite deterrent against acts of
violence and vandalism against American Officers. Embassy
Bishkek, if required to choose between residential alarms and
residential guards, would choose to maintain the residential
guards, as a more viable means of protecting the lives of the
American officers and their dependents.


10. (C/NF) Recommendation 10: Embassy Bishkek should
install shatter-resistant window film on all windows that the
regional security officer considers vulnerable at the chief
of mission residence. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section has scheduled
a survey of the CMR to identify all windows that are not
currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post
currently has film on hand and will contract with a local
contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is
May 31, 2008.


11. (SBU) Recommendation 11: Embassy Bishkek should install
grilles on all accessible windows in the chief of mission
residence safe area and fit one window grille with an
interior emergency release device for emergency egress.
(Action: Embassy Bishkek)


Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post has
scheduled a review and update of the existing physical
security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential
security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12
FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review
will be corrected to conform to the standards. Targeted date
of completion is July 31, 2008.


12. (U) Recommendation 12: Embassy Bishkek should pursue
and secure a formal agreement with Manas Air force Base,
including reimbursement, for investigative support provided
by the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post FMO has contacted Manas Air Base Chief
Financial Officer regarding this recomendation and has
requested a meeting to explore the concept of reimbursement
for investigative services provided by the Embassy on behalf
of Manas Air Base. Post RSO and FMO are working closley to
accurately identify and quantify associated cost related to
investigations. Once Post's analysis is complete the FMO will
coordinate with Manas Air Base Chief Finance Officer to
establish a formal agreement that outlines workload counts
and a reimbursement plan for investigations completed by RSO
Foreign Service National Investigators on behalf of Manas Air
Base.


13. (C/NF) Recommendation 13: Embassy Bishkek, in
coordination with the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings
Operations and Diplomatic Security, should modify the
facility manager's existing office space to bring it into
compliance with current physical security protection
standards. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO
and DS)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Although Post concurs with this recommendation, a
short term solution is unlikely. The existing Facilities
Managers Office is a loft in the Maintenance Shop Building.
This building is a pre-engineered building (Butler Building)
and is physically unable to handle the load that would be
applied to the structure by the addition of making this area
compliant with current physical security protection
standards. Post has been actively pursuing with OBO a new
office annex (NOX),which is a long term solution to
holistically address all of our space and space related
security concerns. Post is currently on the "Top 80 List" for
2011 and a back-up for 2010. However, Embassy Bishkek
Facilities Maintenance Officer and the Regional Security
Officer will prepare a waiver and exception package for
DS/PSD/PCB review and approval. Targeted date for submission
of the waiver and exception request to DS/PSD/PCB is June

2008.


14. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 1: The inner CAC
building (post two) lacks any form of protective window
treatment on its windows. Occupants are susceptible to flying
glass if a bomb attack occurred on the east side of the
compound. Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant
window film on all post two windows that the regional
security officer deems vulnerable to blast.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section will conduct
a survey of Post 2 and identify all windows that are not
currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post
currently has film on hand and will contract with a local
contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is
May 31, 2008.


15. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 2: The presence of a
concrete barrier adjacent to the east side vehicular CAC, a
large boulder adjacent to the northwest corner of the
compound wall, and a stoplight fixture adjacent to the
service CAC provide footholds that an intruder could use to
scale the compound wall. Embassy Bishkek should remove or
relocate the concrete barrier, boulder, and stoplight that
are adjacent to the embassy compound fence.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: In March Post relocated the concrete barriers and

large boulders so that they are at least 2.75 meters from the
compound wall and can no longer be used as a foothold. The
location of the stoplight fixture will be relocated during
the construction of the mantrap for that CAC later this year.


16. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 3: The rear hardline
door leading to the temporary trailers is not covered by an
exterior camera. The Marine at Post One cannot positively
determine who he is letting into the chancery. Without
a camera, he could either allow an intruder to enter or deny
entry to a trusted employee in an emergency. Embassy Bishkek
should install a camera to cover this area.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this
recommendation; ESO will relocate camera #28 so that it
provides video coverage of this entrance to the Chancery.
Additional materials required for this project are on-hand
and this project has been added to the active work list as a
priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th


17. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 4: The emergency plan for
Embassy Bishkek has not been entered into the crisis and
emergency planning application. Embassy Bishkek should direct
section heads to input the missing data before February 2008.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: In February Post completed the unclassified portion
of the EAP and entered it into the crisis and emergency
planning application. Post is waiting for DS/IP/SPC/EP to
advise that the software glitch has been fixed to allow Post
to publish the classified sections as well.


18. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 5: The emergency
notification system does not cover the embassy's built-in
conference room or the workspace just outside the two CAA
temporary office trailers. Embassy Bishkek should install
speaker systems at these two locations.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this
recommendation; additional speakers and other materials
required for this project are on-hand and this project has
been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted
completion date is June 30th.


19. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 6: The physical security
exceptions for three locations within the compound are not
valid. Embassy Bishkek should update the existing physical
security exceptions for the medical unit, cafeteria, and CAA
office trailers.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The waiver for exceptions to physical security
standards for the CAA office trailer is valid. However, the
Health Unit/Caf waiver is no longer valid. As a result of
post growth, the Health Unit and Cafeteria are now staffed by
employees more than 4 hours per day. Embassy Bishkek will
resubmit a waiver and exception packet for the health
unit/cafeteria. Targeted submission date is 30 June.


20. (U) Informal Recommendation 7: Several apartment
stairwells do not have lighting at night. Embassy Bishkek
should explore gaining landlord agreement to install motion
activated lights in stairwells and issue flashlights to
employees in the interim.

Management decision: Post does not concur.

Response: Post has conducted an informal survey of all direct
hire American staff who receive Embassy provide housing and
other than individual incidents of actual light bulbs being
burned out, all stairwells have adequate lighting installed.
In addition to this, every Friday, the Facilities Maintenance
Section Electricians in conjunction with the Local Guard
Force make inspections of existing security lighting. Lights
are tested in guard booths and stairwells and any maintenance
work orders that have been submitted citing security lighting
issues are repaired at this time.


21. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 8: The grilles on the
CMR rear doors do not have latches and cannot be secured from
inside the residence. Embassy Bishkek should secure these
grilles.


Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post will review
and update the existing physical security assessment of the
CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12
FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any
deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected
to conform to the standards. Expected completion date is 1
May 2008.


22. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 9: The passive infrared
sensor in the living room of the CMR on the rear of the
building is inoperative. Embassy Bishkek should repair this
infrared sensor.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The local security company that installs and
maintains all of our residential alarm systems visited the
CMR on March 19, 2008. The entire alarm system was inspected
and tested. It was found that some faulty wiring was causing
the infrared sensor from operating properly, wiring was
repaired and a complete operational test was conducted with
satisfactory results.


YOVANOVITCH