INDIA-IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT: SWISS HAVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 000352

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA (T.KOCA),SCA/RA (J.MCCLELLAN),AND EUR/CE
(J.HIRONIMUS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018
TAGS: PARM ETTC PREL IN SZ
SUBJECT: INDIA-IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT: SWISS HAVE
TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, AND WOULD WELCOME BRIEFING BY INDIA

REF: STATE 74896

Classified By: Poloff Chris Buck; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel message July 14 to Jean-Daniel
Praz, Acting Director of the MFA's Arms Control and
Disarmament Section, and MFA POC for IAEA issues. In a
follow-up meeting on July 21, Praz said that the Swiss
government had not yet reached a decision with regard to the
position it will take on the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement,
but would discuss the matter further early the week of July

28. He remarked that the GOS has "technical questions"
related to the preamble of the agreement, specifically with
regard to the references to "fuel assurances" and to
"corrective measures."


2. (C) With regard to fuel assurances, Praz questioned how
the IAEA could make such a commitment, since no such
mechanisms currently exist and, in any case, presumably would
require the assistance of IAEA member states. As to
"corrective measures," Praz commented that the GOS was not
fully satisfied with the Indian government's explanation thus
far. Poloff reiterated reftel points regarding our view of
the status and substance of the preambular language of the
agreement. Praz maintained that the GOS nonetheless would be
interested in receiving more details.


3. (C) Praz said that the GOS also was curious as to how/when
the GOI would identify facilities to be placed under
safeguards, and whether facilities/materials would be fully
or, in some cases, only partially under safeguards. With
regard to the "fully vs. partially" question, Praz said that
several paragraphs of the agreement prompted this question.
He said that the GOS had been disappointed that the Indian
government had canceled plans last week to provide a
technical briefing to IAEA delegations, and expressed the
hope that India would re-consider. Praz added that
Switzerland would prefer to ask such technical questions in
the context of such a briefing, rather than during the August
1 Board meeting.


4. (C) Though unable to comment definitively on the GOS
position on the safeguards agreement, Praz acknowledged that
Switzerland has no concerns with regard to India and
"(horizontal) proliferation." He indicated that the Swiss
decision most likely would be based on a general assessment
of the importance of the initiative to Swiss-Indian and
Swiss-U.S. relations. In any case, while the GOS position on
the safeguards agreement would be formulated at the
inter-agency "office" level, Praz said that any NSG exception
on behalf of India would require a decision to be taken at
the level of the Swiss Federal Council (Executive Cabinet).
In this context he said that, if the safeguards agreement is
approved by the IAEA Board, the GOS will be very interested
in having more details soon on how the USG would intend to
proceed in the NSG. (Note: The Federal Council currently is
on summer recess, with the first regular meeting scheduled
for August 20. End Note)
CONEWAY