Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BERLIN906
2008-07-10 10:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

JUNE 30 GROUP OF FRIENDS MEETING: AD REF AGREEMENT

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3642
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0906/01 1921024
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101024Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1623
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000906 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG
SUBJECT: JUNE 30 GROUP OF FRIENDS MEETING: AD REF AGREEMENT
ON THREE-PHASE PLAN FOR RESOLVING ABKHAZIA CONFLICT

REF: BERLIN 811

Classified By: DCM JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000906

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG
SUBJECT: JUNE 30 GROUP OF FRIENDS MEETING: AD REF AGREEMENT
ON THREE-PHASE PLAN FOR RESOLVING ABKHAZIA CONFLICT

REF: BERLIN 811

Classified By: DCM JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a June 30 meeting in Berlin, the
Friends of the Secretary General on Georgia agreed ad ref to
a three-phase approach for the settlement of the conflict in
Abkhazia. The resulting document is far less detailed and
prescriptive than the original German draft, proposed on June
12, especially for phases 2 (confidence building) and 3
(political settlement). In an unprecedented demonstration of
interest, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier dropped by the
meeting to urge the participants to show that the Group of
Friends is up to the challenge of helping the Georgians and
Abkhaz get out of their "escalation spiral," and to express
the German Government's full political support for the
Friends' effort. The German chair pressed for concurrence
from capitals with the ad ref text as soon as possible so
that the approach can be formally presented to and adopted by
the Georgians and Abkhaz before the summer break. The
Russian representative downplayed the need to act urgently
and indicated that Moscow may not be prepared to give its
blessing until after a planned meeting between Medvedev and
Saakashvili in September. The German chair countered that
the Group of Friends was "down to its last bullet" and had to
show that it was still relevant in helping to resolve the
Abkhazia conflict. He warned that if the Friends did not
act, "other formats" -- such as the New Group of Friends,
which does not include Russia -- would come to the fore. END
SUMMARY.

Participants
--------------


2. (C) Germany hosted a meeting of the Friends of the
Secretary General on Georgia in Berlin June 30, chaired by
German Special Envoy for Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central
Asia Hans-Dieter Lucas. France was represented by Deputy
Director of the MFA Political Affairs and Security
Directorate Veronique Bujon-Barre; the UK, by Special

Representative for the South Caucasus Sir Brian Fall; Russia,
by Director of the MFA Fourth Department of CIS States Andrey
Kelin; and the U.S., by EUR DAS Matt Bryza. Also attending
was UN SRSG Jean Arnault.

Ad Ref Agreement on German Non-Paper
--------------


3. (C) The June 30 meeting was devoted to a line-by-line
review of a revised version of the German non-paper tabled at
the June 12 Friends meeting (reftel),which outlines a
three-phase approach for the peaceful settlement of the
conflict in Abkhazia. Although Kelin (Russia) claimed to
have instructions on only phase 1 on the non-paper, the
German chair (Lucas) prevailed upon him to allow the group to
review and reach ad ref agreement on the entire document.


4. (C) While the amended non-paper retains the basic
three-phase structure (phase 1: guaranteeing security and the
return of Georgian IDPs, phase 2: confidence building, phase
3: political status),it was significantly shortened during
extensive editing. The ad ref document is far less detailed
and prescriptive than the original German draft, especially
for phases 2 and 3. The core element of the non-paper is the
exchange of declarations on the non-use of force and IDP
returns and the establishment of a framework for direct
high-level dialogue between Georgia and the Abkhaz. SRSG
Arnault expressed confidence that both parties would see the
document as suiting their purposes. The Abkhaz should like
it because it deals with security and practical cooperation
first, which they favor, while deferring status. The
Georgians should like it because it begins with the return of
IDPs and slowly, but surely, leads to status.

Personal Appeal by FM Steinmeier
--------------


5. (C) In an unprecedented demonstration of interest in this
process, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier dropped by at the
beginning of the meeting to urge the participants to show
that the Group of Friends is up to the challenge of helping
the Georgians and Abkhaz get out of the "escalation spiral"
in which they find themselves. He noted that it had taken
joint high-level efforts just a few weeks before to head off
a threatened declaration by Georgia to demand the withdrawal
of CIS peacekeepers. Stressing that the deadlock between the
parties had been allowed to drag on dangerously long,
Steinmeier called on the Friends to agree and present their
common approach to the Georgians and Abkhaz before the summer
break. Steinmeier expressed the German Government's full
political support for the UN Friends' effort to launch a new
mediation process for the Abkhazian conflict.

BERLIN 00000906 002 OF 002



Next Steps
--------------


6. (C) At the conclusion of the negotiating session, Lucas
encouraged all the Friends to seek concurrence from capitals
with the ad ref text as soon as possible. He was prepared to
call another Friends meeting at short notice if necessary to
finalize the paper, but was hopeful that this could be done
by e-mail. He said that once all the Friends were on board,
the next step would be for SRSG Arnault and German Ambassador
to Georgia Patricia Flor to brief the two parties on the
document and secure their agreement. Finally, there would be
a Friends meeting with the Georgians and the Abkhaz to
formally adopt the approach laid out in the paper, hopefully
before the summer break. Fall (UK) stressed that it was
important to get agreement of the parties on the document
before the final meeting so that the meeting focused on
implementation rather than on drafting. SRSG Arnault
underscored that in planning next steps, it was important to
keep in mind that only President Saakashvili himself could
agree to the paper on Georgia's behalf.

Germany Pushes Russia for Quick Agreement
--------------


7. (C) Kelin (Russia) emphasized that he had instructions
only for phase 1 of the document and that he still needed
Moscow's views on phases 2 and 3. He thought there was a
good chance that there would be no movement on this score
from the Kremlin until after a planned meeting between
Medvedev and Saakashvili in early September. In reaction to
Lucas's entreaties that time was of the essence, Kelin
expressed the view that media reports about problems on the
ground in Abkhazia were exaggerated and that the situation
was not as urgent as commonly believed. Lucas countered that
the Group of Friends was "down to its last bullet" and had to
show that it was still relevant in helping to resolve the
Abkhazia conflict. He said that the Friends had received a
"clear signal" from the Abkhaz that they were on board with
the proposed approach. Therefore, there was no reason for
delay. He noted that if the Friends did not act, "other
formats" -- which do not include Russia -- would come to the
fore (a clear reference to the ministerial meeting of the
"New Friends of Georgia" on June 25 in Warsaw). While SRSG
Arnault downplayed this possibility, noting that these other
formats would never find favor with the Abkhaz, he agreed
that delay threatened to "deepen the crisis."

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Germany is clearly feeling pressure to produce as
coordinator for the Group of Friends (especially given the
efforts of the "New Friends") and seems prepared to press the
Russians at a high level to achieve a quick turnaround on the
ad ref text. The active involvement of both Chancellor
Merkel and FM Steinmeier is a very positive sign that the
Germans are truly committed to achieving a breakthrough after
years of deadlock. The Germans also seem to have come around
to the U.S. view that the most important thing is to get
direct, high-level dialogue between the parties under way as
soon as possible and not to be too prescriptive about how
this is done or what subjects are discussed.
TIMKEN JR