Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BELGRADE171
2008-02-14 06:15:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

SERBIA ON THE EVE OF KOSOVO'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2186
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000171 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV
SUBJECT: SERBIA ON THE EVE OF KOSOVO'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

REFS: A) BELGRADE 62, B) 07 BELGRADE 1733, C) BELGRADE 150

Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000171

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV
SUBJECT: SERBIA ON THE EVE OF KOSOVO'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

REFS: A) BELGRADE 62, B) 07 BELGRADE 1733, C) BELGRADE 150

Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) Serbia's leaders and activists are preparing for Kosovo's
imminent declaration of independence and the European Union's
decision to deploy a mission to Kosovo. Ruling parties plan to
convene parliament to oppose both moves, while nationalist groups
have announced protests calling an EU mission equal to an
"occupation" of Kosovo. While the GOS is still finalizing how it
will react, there are indications of what impact Kosovo independence
will have in Serbia in the immediate, medium and long terms. End
Summary.

Immediate reactions
--------------


2. (SBU) The GOS will react both politically and legally, based on
the GOS "action plan" (ref a) and parliament's Kosovo resolution
(ref b). While the plan remains, as DSS Vice President Milos
Aligrudic told poloff February 12, a "state secret," an advisor in
the Kosovo Ministry said the plan was generally based on the
supremacy of UNSCR 1244 and its mandate for UNMIK (ref c). In a
February 13 statement to a state news agency, Prime Minister
Kostunica reiterated the provision in parliament's December 2007
resolution that the GOS will immediately "annul the unilateral
Kosovo independence." He called it "historic...because it is
Serbia's ultimate decision to reject the existence of a false state
on its territory once and for all." Kostunica said that the GOS
will then inform the UNSC and UN Secretary General that "all illegal
acts of unilateral independence declaration have been declared null
and void." Aligrudic told poloff, February 12, that the GOS would
expect the UN, and UNMIK, to annul Kosovo's declaration of
independence as well. On an encouraging note, Serbia's Chief of
Defense Zdravko Ponos publicly reiterated that Serbian would not use
military to respond to developments in Kosovo.


3. (SBU) According the February 13 edition of the pro-government
daily "Politika," the Cabinet is meeting February 14 to discuss
immediate actions against those governments that recognize Kosovo.
A follow-on article further elaborated that the first step would be

to recall Serbian ambassadors from capitals. There was no mention
of downgrading diplomatic relations. Embassy's contacts earlier
have said that the most severe response would be for those countries
in the first wave of recognition. Serbian leaders have also said
the GOS will increase investment in parallel structures in Kosovo.
"Politika" also reported on February 13 that according to "unnamed
government sources" these parallel institutions could last six to
eight years. In Kostunica's February 13 statement, he called on
Kosovo Serbs to remain in Kosovo and he promised GOS support. The
GOS, he said, "considers every person in Kosovo an equal and fully
legitimate citizen of Serbia, and it is our duty to do absolutely
everything to ensure normal living conditions for our people in the
province."


4. (SBU) As a possible sign of things to come, the Kosovo Ministry
was dismissive of post's repeated efforts for meetings this week.
Elsewhere in the GOS, there was a sense of uncertainty about the
path Serbia is on, and growing resentment within the ruling
coalition. A contact within the avowedly pro-EU, Democratic Party
(DS) Deputy Prime Minister's European Integration Office told
econoff that the office questioned whether the name should be
changed to the "Russian Integration Office" because of the Prime
Minister's policies. In a February 12 meeting with poloff, a G17
Plus official called Kosovo Minister Samardzic "Serbia's Acting
Foreign Minister." Nevertheless, both the DS and G17 have rejected
the idea of leaving government over these differences.


5. (SBU) Serbia also intends to mount a last-ditch effort at the
UNSC, with Russian support. MFA Political Director Boris Stefanovic
confirmed to DCM that Foreign Minister Jeremic left February 13 for
New York. A local UN Office representative (protect) told poloff,
Feburary 13, that the GOS had officially requested a UNSC meeting
"soon" but that it all seemed to be orchestrated by Moscow. The GOS
aim, it seemed, was for a meeting, possibly over the weekend, in
order to get the Council to agree -- and inform the Secretary
General -- that Kosovo's declaration of independence would be
illegal, and that the UN should react accordingly (i.e. compelling
UNMIK to annul Pristina's declaration).

Nationalist Reaction
--------------


6. (SBU) Two nationalist groups announced that they will stage a
protest on Saturday, February 16, in front of the Slovenian Embassy
in Belgrade to rally against the EU's plans to send a mission to
Kosovo. The groups, "1389" and "Nasi," have advertised the

BELGRADE 00000171 002 OF 003


demonstration as a way to equate the EU mission as the "occupation."
Slovenian poloff told poloff, February 13, that his mission did not
expect more than 300 protestors and they were not worried about
violence or damage. The Slovene DCM, however, told EU DCMs at a
February 13 EU meeting that the Slovenes were evacuating dependents.
Apparently the Slovenian Embassy is the only EU embassy to
evacuating dependents.

NGOs, U.S. Investment Worried
--------------


7. (SBU) Some groups, however, are concerned. President of the NGO
Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Andrej Nosov, told poloff on
February 13 that human rights NGOs were "running around, meeting
with each other" to plan for post-Kosovo contingencies. U.S. Steel
officials informed the embassy that it is permitting family members
and dependents of international staff in Serbia to depart Serbia for
neighboring countries for the next 7-10 days. U.S. Steel clarified
that it took this action on its own accord and the decision to do so
was made at U.S. Headquarters. It was not based on any credible
threat, and is only precautionary at this stage, US Steel told the
embassy. Normal US Steel operations in Serbia are expected to
continue during this time.

Kosovo's Political Lifespan
--------------


8. (SBU) There are conflicting signs of how long Kosovo's
independence will be a serious political factor in the GOS, Serbia's
European future, and U.S.-Serbia relations. Srdjan Miljkovic, North
Americas Division Chief at MFA, told poloff on February 13 that he
expected the Kosovo issue to be the issue on the agenda for "two to
three months." Miljkovic said he did not foresee problems on the
working level on the days following a decision on Kosovo. In
further clarification, he said he expected working level meetings
and dialogue would still occur without any hindrance or delay. He
acknowledged that Serbia would of course respond diplomatically at
higher levels to any decision. It was obvious by his response that
those specific actions had not yet been widely shared within the
Ministry. Ministry of Defense officials have assured DATT
representatives that mil-to-mil cooperation would continue, though
they acknowledged a strong DSS-orientation among some of the "older"
officers.


9. (SBU) A political analyst at the pro-Western Balkan Trust for
Democracy was more pessimistic. Filip Medic told poloff, February
13, that he saw a DSS-Radicals "shadow coalition" emerging from the
internal divisions over Serbia's relationship with the EU. (Serbian
Orthodox Church Bishop Artemije reiterated previous statements on
February 13, calling for a "government of national salvation" with
all political parties to oppose Kosovo independence and reject the
EU offer.) Medic said the "nascent truce in the [DS-DSS] governing
coalition...might prove very damaging to Tadic and the DS in the
short to mid term" because the DS is still the flagship pro-EU
party. Aligrudic similarly told poloff, Feburary 13, that the
DS-DSS differences over EU accession would remain as long as the EU
insisted on sending a mission to Kosovo based on the Ahtisaari Plan.
Even more gloomily, Nenad Sebek, Director of the Center for
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, told DCM on
February 12 that by reconciling with the DSS, Tadic had "reached in
to Kostunica's cold dark grave and brought him back to life." In
this regard, Kosovo's independence will remain a serious political
obstacle indefinitely.


10. (SBU) Similarly, "Politika" wrote on February 13 that the
Kosovo issue was "strengthening" the government coalition and would
keep it focused (distracted). The article did not give any
indication on how long Kosovo would figure as the major issue on
Serbian political scene, but assessed that other pressing issues --
such as EU accession -- would not return as politically relevant
issues for up to six months (sooner if the EU offered an SAA, the
paper wryly wrote.) "Politika" estimated that following a Kosovo
declaration of independence, GOS parties would likely continue their
agreed "united state politics" on Kosovo for at least a couple of
months. In the following two to four months, Serbia would have to
respond to UDI with a hard-line stance that there be neither
contacts nor cooperation with Kosovo Albanians and government who
recognize Kosovo independence.

Long-term Disruption
--------------


11. (SBU) Serbian officials have said publicly and privately over
the last several months that the GOS will only consider legitimate
those Kosovo institutions authorized by UNSCR 1244. According to
"Politika," Serbia should resist all external pressures to sign
individual agreements (i.e. on electricity or water) with the new
Kosovo government. According to an "anonymous DSS source" for

BELGRADE 00000171 003 OF 003


"Politika," the GOS would prohibit ministries from entering such
agreements, as these would imply gradual recognition of
independence. Agreements must only be made with UNMIK not the EU
mission, and all communication on Kosovo-related matters must go
through the UN, not the EU. "Politika" wrote that this state of
affairs could last up to six-eight years, but Kostunica and those
close to him have given no indication that this policy will ever
change.


12. (SBU) Local and municipal elections planned for May 2008 will be
the first major test as DS and DSS, along with all other parties,
will have to encourage voters with domestic policy platforms and not
entirely about Kosovo.

Comment
--------------


13. (SBU) In the short term, the Serbian government will push as
hard as possible in the UN to try to stop a Kosovo declaration of
independence. After Kosovo declares, parliament will annul it and
the GOS will ask all international bodies to reject as well. The
ruling coalition will remain united on Kosovo, particularly now that
it has achieved consensus to delay any decision on the offered EU
agreement. For the next weeks, it is not reasonable to expect
Serbian leaders to focus on anything else. In the medium and long
term, the challenge will be to reintroduce the critical issue of
Serbia's progress on European integration. The DS may profess it
wishes to move the national political discourse back to European
integration, but Kostunica will oppose this as long as he is Prime
Minister and the EU mission remains in Kosovo. End Comment.

BRUSH