Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BELGRADE1234
2008-12-02 15:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

SERBIA/CROATIA: ICJ RULING HIGHLIGHTS STRAINED

Tags:  PGOV PREL HR SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #1234/01 3371511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021511Z DEC 08 ZDK CTG MULTIPLE SVC
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0694
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001234 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL HR SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA/CROATIA: ICJ RULING HIGHLIGHTS STRAINED
BILATERAL RELATIONS

REF: A. A. THE HAGUE 989

B. B. ZAGREB 778

C. C. ZAGREB 688

D. D. ZAGREB 797

BELGRADE 00001234 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Brad Bell, Deputy Political Chief, for reasons, 1.4(b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001234

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL HR SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA/CROATIA: ICJ RULING HIGHLIGHTS STRAINED
BILATERAL RELATIONS

REF: A. A. THE HAGUE 989

B. B. ZAGREB 778

C. C. ZAGREB 688

D. D. ZAGREB 797

BELGRADE 00001234 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Brad Bell, Deputy Political Chief, for reasons, 1.4(b,d)


1. (U) This cable was drafted jointly by Embassies Zagreb
and Belgrade.

Summary
--------------


2. (C) The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on
November 18 claiming jurisdiction to hear Croatia's genocide
case against Serbia for events in the 1990's stirred strong
reactions in Belgrade and Zagreb that highlighted the
continued strain in relations between the two capitals.
Belgrade responded with an ICJ countersuit as Serbian leaders
promised to investigate Croatian crimes throughout the 20th
Century. Zagreb reacted to the Serbian countersuit by
stating that the case was weak since Belgrade had been the
aggressor during the war. The GoC told Embassy Zagreb that
it hoped to open a new page in relations with Serbia, but
noted that it would wait until after the dust had settled
from FM Jandrokovic's planned trip to Kosovo the week of
December 8. As the ICJ process moves forward sharp
rhetorical exchanges between the two capitals are likely.
However, some high-level visits that look toward the future
could be an important step in improving bilateral ties. End
Summary.

Harsh Reactions In Belgrade; ICJ Countersuit Moving Forward
--------------


3. (SBU) Serbian officials reacted fiercely to the November
18 ruling by the ICJ that claimed jurisdiction in Croatia's
case against Serbia (REF A). Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic
told reporters that Croatia had not "responded adequately to
the hand of reconciliation Serbia had offered on several
occasions, and to our efforts to put the past behind us and
turn to a European future." The Serbian government,
therefore, on November 20 formally approved a countersuit at
the ICJ in which the Court would be asked to rule on whether
Croatia committed ethnic cleansing and war crimes during
Operation Storm in 1995. (NOTE: Operation Storm was the
offensive launched by Croatian forces in August 1995 which
successfully re-took separatist Serb regions in Croatia. End

Note.) Jeremic said Serbia would present evidence on "all
events of the 20th Century, including World War II" and told
Politika on November 20 that Serbia would not settle the
countersuit out of court.


4. (SBU) Representatives from most of Serbia's political
parties supported the countersuit against Croatia. Tomislav
Nikolic, head of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS),said
that Serbia's war crimes suit against Croatia should also
include crimes from World War II. Representatives from New
Serbia (NS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) also
highlighted Croatian crimes against Serbs while the Serbian
Socialist Party (SPS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)
deployed more moderate rhetoric in voicing disagreement with
the ICJ ruling and its impact on regional stability. Only
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) publicly opposed Serbia's
countersuit. Serbian press on November 21 reported that G17
Plus leader and Deputy PM Dinkic harbored doubts as to the
wisdom of the countersuit. There was also internal dissension
within the DS, evidenced by Oliver Dulic's absence from the
November 20 government meeting, which our contacts ascribed
to his opposition to the motion. G17 political advisor
Tomislav Damjanovic told us that the government meeting was
highly contentious when considering the countersuit.

Serbian Resentments: Real and Imagined
--------------


5. (C) Resentment toward Croatia had been building on the
Serbian side in the months prior to the ICJ ruling. Since
May 2008 high-level Serbian officials have made inflammatory
comments both publicly and privately. In May Jeremic
publicly stated that Croatia was a genocidal state, and in
September President Boris Tadic reportedly threatened
Croatian Prime Minister Sanader that Serbia could cause
problems in Croatia with its minority Serb community (Refs B
and C). After the October announcement that The Hague would
rule on Croatia's case, Jeremic and Croatian President
Stjepan Mesic exchanged barbs over which side bore more
responsibility for stagnant relations. President Tadic on
November 16 told Serbian media that he was concerned that

BELGRADE 00001234 002.2 OF 003


Croatia felt no responsibility toward Serbian war victims and
that chants of "Kill the Serbs" at Croatian sports events
reflected an uncivilized message that should be condemned by
Europe. Both Tadic and Jeremic commented that unequal
treatment of Serbian financial investments in Croatia had
also tarnished bilateral relations.


6. (C) The rhetoric reflects an exaggeration of underlying
grievances that exist in Belgrade's relationship with Zagreb.
Speaking with Poloff in October prior to the escalation in
rhetoric, Vladimir Odavic of the MFA,s Neighboring Countries
Directorate described property restitution, reciprocal
property protection, and border demarcation as the key
sticking points in the bilateral relationship. Belgrade also
sought a comprehensive solution to problems of restitution
and refugees, Odavic said, but Zagreb had repeatedly rebuffed
Serbia's overtures due to "internal political reasons."
Odavic and Serbian Chamber of Commerce representative Irena
Milojevic described anti-Serb sentiment in Croatia as
informally stalling Serbian investment and damaging Serbian
property in Croatia. Milojevic noted, however, that current
bilateral strains were unlikely to pose a major obstacle to
continued cross-border trade and investment.


7. (C) Belgrade is calculating that dredging up the past
will bolster the government's domestic political standing,
though at the cost of actually addressing grievances with
Zagreb. Diplomatic and NGO contacts told us in November that
Tadic is escalating bilateral strains in order to appeal to
his nationalist base. Dusan Spasojevic, State Secretary of
Serbia's Ministry of Defense, said some within the government
were using the strained relationship to "raise their own
public profile," alluding to Foreign Minister Jeremic.
Vladimir Todoric, editor of the Serbian Law Review, claimed
statements on both sides were designed to cover up systemic
shortcomings in Belgrade and Zagreb, using nationalist
rhetoric to cover up failures of politicians to deliver on
European integration in Serbia or stamping out organized
crime and corruption in Croatia. We have also heard
unconfirmed speculation from a local expert that Serbian
tycoon Miroslav Miskovic may benefit from the escalation in
tensions, which could complicate the business activities of
his Croatian competitors in Serbia.


8. (C) The inflamed nationalist sentiment continues to
complicate bilateral contacts on a range of issues. On
November 14, Croatia's MFA advised UNHCR that the GOC would
likely not attend the December ministerial with Serbian
counterparts that the High Commissioner would host to promote
dialogue on securing durable solutions for the 70,000
Croatian Serb refugees displaced in Serbia. Similarly,
organizers of a recent regional conference on missing persons
in Belgrade told us that they expected the Croatian
government to cancel participation because of the charged
political context. Ministry of Defense State Secretary Dusan
Spasojevic told us on December 1 that Serbia and Croatia's
military cooperation was hindered by the state of bilateral
relations. Spasojevic specifically mentioned Croatia,s
unwillingness to conduct joint military exercises. He said
on practical issues, such as border control or recent
investigations into cross border organized crime, relations
were better solely because "it was in Croatia's interest."

Croatia Welcomes ICJ Ruling; Sensitive about Countersuit
--------------


9. (C) For its part, the Croatian government welcomed the
ICJ's ruling, which came on the same day as the anniversary
of the fall of Vukovar to Yugoslav forces in 1991 (ref C).
One dissenting view came from Mesic Foreign Policy Advisor
Budimir Loncar, who maintains a back-channel contact for
Mesic with Serbian President Tadic. Loncar told the
Ambassador that he regretted Croatia had pursued the case,
and he had unsuccessfully urged Mesic to support dropping it.
The verdict Loncar said, would only complicate the
reconciliation process.


10. (SBU) Reaction in Zagreb to the news of Serbia's ICJ
countersuit was predictably negative, since senior Croatian
politicians feel obligated to defend Croatia's overall record
during the 1990's war. PM Sanader told the press on November
20 that: "It was not Croatian soldiers that went to Serbia --
instead, it was Serbian soldiers who came to Croatia." Mesic
characterized the countersuit as the "wrong move" since
Belgrade had been the "aggressor" during the war.

GoC Outlines Challenges and Opportunities with GoS
-------------- --------------


BELGRADE 00001234 003.3 OF 003



11. (C) The Director for the Croatian MFA's Regional
Department, Ambassador Davor Vidis, said on November 24 that
bilateral relations with Serbia always tended to dip in
November, around the anniversary of major events from the war
such as the fall of Vukovar and the subsequent mass killing
at the Ovcara farm. The ICJ ruling caused an even deeper
drop this year. Noting that bilateral relations had been
under strain since Croatia's decision early in 2008 to
recognize Kosovo, Vidis predicted that bilateral ties would
take another hit when FM Jandrokovic went to Pristina on the
week of December 8 to open the new Croatian embassy. Vidis
expressed concern that the GoS was making bilateral relations
too much a part of Serbia's internal politics, and noted FM
Jeremic had recently become one of the more nationalistic
voices in Belgrade.


12. (C) Even with the recent setbacks, Vidis noted that
several Serbian ministers had just visited Zagreb and that
the GoS recently returned artwork that was taken from Croatia
during the war. He stressed that the GoC wanted to focus on
the future with Belgrade, particularly since more
constructive bilateral relations would help both countries'
EU aspirations. Once the fallout from Jandrokovic's visit to
Kosovo blew over and Tadic accepted the credentials of new
Croatian ambassador to Serbia, the GoC would try to open a
new page in relations between the two countries. The GoC
wanted to try to engage with Belgrade, particularly on the
expert level, on all the bilateral issues on the table that
would produce a "win" for both sides. Croatia could also
provide more help to Serbia on its path to the EU, Vidis
said, but it would be difficult if the GoS continued to play
political "games" with the bilateral relationship through the
media.


13. (SBU) GoC officials say that a plan to send a high-level
parliamentarian delegation to Serbia to share experiences
from Croatia's EU bid, which has been proposed to Serbia but
is still awaiting a response, could be a step forward in
trying to focus the relationship more towards the future. At
a seminar in Germany on November 27, PM Sanader said that he
would also personally be ready to visit Belgrade to try and
clear the air, but we are unaware of any concrete plans for
any such trip. Spasojevic said he believed the timing would
be wrong for any high level visit ) particularly at the
Prime Minister level - between the capitals anytime soon.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) The reactions in Serbia and Croatia to the November
18 ICJ ruling show that, due to the long ICJ process, there
will be many opportunities over the next several years for
sharp rhetorical exchanges to the detriment of bilateral
ties. With the chance for further strains in the ties
between Zagreb and Belgrade, it is important to seek means to
strengthen the bilateral relationship, since it is key to
regional stability. Each side has an interest in good
neighborly relations as an integral part of both countries'
Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We should encourage, in
conjunction with our European allies, several high -level
visits between the two countries that focus on the future
cooperation instead of grievances from the past. Ultimately,
a functioning and mutually respectful bilateral relationship
between Serbia and Croatia will be essential to move the
region forward. End Comment.
BRUSH