SERBIA: NEW CONFIGURATIONS ON THE SERBIAN RIGHT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001189

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: NEW CONFIGURATIONS ON THE SERBIAN RIGHT

REF: A. BELGRADE 1108

B. BELGRADE 1072

C. BELGRADE 913

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Thatcher Scharpf for reas
ons 1.4(b/d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) The aftermath of the September split in the Serbian
Radical Party (SRS) has ushered in a period of realignment on
the Serbian right as parties struggle to define themselves as
alternatives to President Tadic,s dominant Democratic Party
(DS) coalition. While ex-Radical Tomislav Nikolic,s Serbian
Progressive Party (SNS) claims to be targeting the political
center with pro-European rhetoric, the SRS continues to
occupy the ultranationalist space with unreformed rhetoric
and tactics. Meanwhile, Vojislav Kostunica,s Democratic
Party (DSS) of Serbia has aligned itself with the New Serbia
Party (NS) and ex-Radical Maja Gojkovic,s recently-formed
People,s Party (NP) in an attempt to present themselves as a
viable nationalist alternative. Vuk Draskovic,s Serbian
Renewal Movement (SPO) at the same time is claiming the
mantle of the pro-European Serbian right. While the
pro-European rhetoric from the SNS and SPO is encouraging, we
still await more evidence of pro-European political will on
the political right. End Summary.

Progressives: Targeting the Moderate Center-Right
-------------- --------------


2. (S) The emergence of the SNS, founded by former Radicals
Tomislav Nikolic and Aleksandar Vucic, has been the catalyst
for recent realignments on the Serbian right. Diplomatic and
political contacts have reported that the split between
ICTY-indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj,s Radicals and
Nikolic,s Progressives was in large part prompted by the
pragmatic recognition by Nikolic and his tycoon financiers
that the Serbian electorate was turning toward Europe. In
addition, Midodrag Rakic, a close adviser to President Tadic,
told the DCM on November 3 that Tadic had tasked him six
months earlier with encouraging Nikolic to split with the SRS
because the SNS support base would be important for advancing
Serbia,s pro-European agenda. Our media contacts report
that Rakic actively sought press coverage for the SNS
founding congress on October 21. Nikolic publicly has denied
speculation that the SNS would form a coalition with the DS
but has been careful not to rule out post-election scenarios.



3. (SBU) Recent national polling showing the SNS as the
second most popular party nationally behind the DS was
recently supported by the SNS,s first electoral test in four
municipal elections on November 9. The SNS came in second
behind the DS in Ruma, Vrnjacka Banja, and Prijepole, and
came in third in Knjazevac. In all contests the SNS
outpolled the SRS by an average of two-thirds. In the
municipality of Ruma, a Seselj stronghold, the SNS won over
17% to the SRS,s 8%. Party leaders on November 12 confirmed
that the victorious Sandzak Democratic Party in Prijepole
would seek to form a coalition with the SNS and the DS-led
coalition bloc. A national Medium Gallup poll released on
November 8 showed that the DS was supported by 38.9% of the
electorate, while the SNS and SRS won 22.7% and 10.8%,
respectively.


4. (C) A key part of the SNS political strategy is to present
a moderate image of SNS leadership while seeking to
disassociate the party from the ideas Nikolic and Vucic had
embraced during their days with the SRS. Pamphlets
distributed at kiosks around Belgrade in recent days have
highlighted SNS,s principles of preserving territorial
integrity, assisting Serbs everywhere, equal justice under
law, tolerance, neutrality, anti-corruption, and social
justice. In a mid-October conversation with Poloff, SNS
spokesman and member of the presidency Nebojsa Stefanovic
noted that the top priority of the SNS would be to focus on
economic development to assist Serbia,s impoverished
regions. The party,s first policy proposals in this realm,
Stefanovic said, would be made public in November. (Comment:
The SRS has long catered to the unemployed, pensioners and
others who lost economic standing during the transition. End
Comment.) Stefanovic said that the SNS has been successfully
winning over the SRS electoral base as well as attracting
moderate members of the DSS, NS, and even the DS-linked
oligarch Miodrag Nikolic Feman from Jagodina. The SNS,
Stefanovic said, does not adhere to ideology but to a party
&idea,8 which is less rigid than ideology and merely
&gives people something to stand for.8

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5. (C) Commenting on foreign policy, Stefanovic said that
Nikolic and Vucic would condition the Serbian public to
realize that the idea of Greater Serbia was &a dream that
could not be realized.8 Quickly disavowing Greater Serbia
would make Nikolic and Vucic appear like hypocrites or
opportunists, Stefanovic said. (Vucic on October 30 publicly
stated that Greater Serbia was &unrealistic policy.8)
Stefanovic reaffirmed his party,s desire for Serbian
membership in the EU, and estimated that a permanent
resolution to Kosovo could be achieved within 4-5 years. The
EU, however, needed to be more conscious of sending positive
signals before the electorate would be prepared to accept a
Kosovo solution. Regarding Bosnia, Stefanovic stated that
the SNS would not support separatist groups or movements in
the Republika Srpska (RS),but would support RS independence
if Bosnian Serbs vote for it.

SRS: Still the Ultranationalist Refuge
--------------


6. (SBU) While the SNS tries to demonstrate that its moderate
stance is a credible break from the past, the SRS continues
to offer ultranationalist, chauvinistic rhetoric and remains
under Seselj,s firm control. In response to post,s Defense
Attache,s request to meet with Dragan Todorovic in the
latter,s capacity as chairman of the Defense Committee, the
SRS on October 21 issued a vitriolic public statement
condemning U.S. policy toward Serbia and Kosovo. The
statement emphasized that Radicals do not meet with officials
of countries that have recognized Kosovo, and that the SRS
would not meet with the U.S. representatives &because
Washington is the creator of the NATO state of Kosovo and
heads the campaign for its recognition, thus seriously
threatening Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.8
(Other non-Radical members of the Defense Committee
criticized Todorovic,s statement, complaining they were not
consulted in the matter and saying the committee needed to
have dialogue with foreign diplomats.) The SRS continues to
obstruct the work of Parliament without offering alternative
policies, and has pledged never to work in conjunction with
the SNS.


7. (SBU) The SRS is seen as a threatening force that is not
reluctant to employ physical violence. Multiple press
reports indicate Seselj ordered the SRS to &make a little
war8 in Hrtkovic, an SRS base with enormous symbolic
significance where Vucic and SNS supporters planned to rally
on November 2. The rally was banned by authorities in
advance. Though an SRS spokesman denied claims that the SRS
had provided firearms to would-be protestors, some press
reported that Seselj himself sought to have Vucic
assassinated. Vucic and SNS colleagues eventually held a
rally in Hrtkovic on November 5 without major incident.
(Seselj,s Hague indictment accuses him of ordering the
deportation of Croats from Hrtkovic, thereby lending the city
additional historic significance.)

DSS, NS and NP: The New Nationalist Opposition
-------------- --


8. (SBU) As the SRS maintains its ultranationalist bent,
Vojislav Kostunica,s DSS and Velimir Ilic,s NS have
attempted to create a modern nationalist front while
espousing conditional support for Serbian EU membership. On
November 4, ex-Radical and former Novi Sad Mayor Maja
Gojkovic signed a coalition agreement between her NP and the
DSS and NS. The agreement lays out broad principles *such
as preserving the &highest moral principles8 in politics,
protecting Serbia,s territorial integrity, seeking European
integration, combating poverty, and fostering economic
development * with no specific policy prescriptions.
(Comment: The early alignment between DSS, NS, and NP appears
to be a shrewd political move, probably instigated by
Kostunica, to deprive the SNS of coalition partners and thus
keep the SNS isolated. End Comment.) One of the bloc,s
first moves was to call for a motion of no confidence in the
government, a move co-sponsored by the SRS with the support
of the SNS. A date for a vote on the motion has not been
set. The DSS-NS-SRS motion would fall short of succeeding,
even with promised SNS support, unless 18 other votes could
be won. The unlikelihood of this scenario indicates that the
no-confidence motion is an effort by the DSS to regain the
initiative as the most credible political alternative on the
right to the current government.


9. (SBU) The DSS may be facing growing internal divisions.
According to the weekly Daily Telegraf and several Belgrade
magazines, top DSS officials complained to Kostunica about

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the role of chief of staff Aleksandar Nikitovic at a late
October meeting of DSS leadership to discuss party
modernization. Claiming that Nikitovic for too long held
unjustified influence over party affairs, the DSS officials
told Kostunica that even Dejan Mihajlov, former secretary
general of Kostunica,s government, agreed with their
position that Nikitovic needed to be reigned in. Kostunica
reportedly agreed with the &insurgents,8 but other DSS
officials, including Slobodan Samardzic, Predrag Bubalo and
Zoran Loncar, remained supportive of Kostunica,s chief
advisor. The DSS remains Kostunica,s creature, however, and
there are no signs that Kostunica,s role will be challenged
(Ref C).

SPO: Seeking to Lead Pro-European Conservatives
-------------- --------------


10. (SBU) Though bound by its role in the governing
coalition, the SPO in recent weeks has attempted to take the
initiative in redefining its conservative ideas and role on
the Serbian right. At a party congress on October 18, SPO
President Vuk Draskovic unveiled its program for the
&European Serbian Right,8 which sought to protect the
&national, development, security and spiritual interests8
of Serbia. The twenty-page document describes the
development of the European Union and argues on historical,
religious, and economic grounds for Serbia,s membership in
the EU. According to one contact, efforts by Draskovic to
strip the platform of calls to return the Serbian king were
blocked by SPO delegates.


11. (SBU) After the publication of the European Serbian Right
platform and subsequent interviews, Draskovic was pilloried
in the press for commenting that Serbia would enter the EU
without Kosovo. Explaining his statement to the Ambassador
on October 24, Draskovic asserted the need to speak the truth
and it was important for the public to recognize that Serbia
lacked traditional sovereign authority over Kosovo since

1999. The only way for Serbia to regain Kosovo, he said, was
through gaining EU membership and reestablishing Serbian
authority over Kosovo within ten years. Claiming the moral
high ground as a conservative who spoke the truth, Draskovic
condemned the SNS and its leadership as tools of Milosevic,s
secret police, claiming that the SRS split was only the
consequence of the Milosevic cadre realizing that Serbia,s
future now lay in Europe. Portraying the SPO,s program as
reclaiming Serbia,s pro-Western conservative tradition from
the 19th Century until World War I, Draskovic voiced
confidence that the SPO would attract 90% of NS voters, 90%
of DSS voters, and &many8 unnamed intellectuals. Despite
his confidence, Draskovic does not appear to have developed a
clear political strategy to win these voters. Some SPO
contacts have told us that younger SPO members have been
looking for ways to sideline Draskovic and his wife to
ceremonial positions in the party so as to provide stronger
political leadership.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Of the parties on the Serbian right, the SNS at
present has the greatest potential to tap into the widest
cross section of the Serbian population disenchanted with the
status quo and seeking a pro-European orientation. However,
the combination of Nikolic,s pragmatism and his objective to
win over SRS and DSS constituencies makes us cautious to
believe that the SNS will be able to permanently relinquish
its ultranationalist heritage when pro-European rhetoric
becomes politically inconvenient. Support for the DSS-NS-NP
coalition, the SRS, and SPO will likely pale in comparison to
the SNS, and the parties over the next several months will
seek to portray themselves as the true Serbian conservatives
as they search for successful political strategies. Each of
these parties face an uphill climb toward becoming a viable
center-right alternative to Tadic,s increasingly powerful
DS. End Comment.

MUNTER