Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT936
2008-06-26 18:00:00
SECRET
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: ONE MONTH LATER, HOW CAN THE U.S. SUPPORT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE 
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VZCZCXRO4096
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0936/01 1781800
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261800Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2343
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2543
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2840
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000936 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ONE MONTH LATER, HOW CAN THE U.S. SUPPORT
SLEIMAN?

REF: A. BEIRUT 933

B. BEIRUT 766

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000936

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ONE MONTH LATER, HOW CAN THE U.S. SUPPORT
SLEIMAN?

REF: A. BEIRUT 933

B. BEIRUT 766

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) One month since he became president, the optimism and
celebration that followed President Sleiman's election seem
to have faded. The Lebanese political scene has returned to
its all too familiar picture of squabbling leaders unable to
resolve their differences, this time on cabinet formation, a
disappointing start to Sleiman's presidency. As a result,
some observers believe the President's initial shine may be
fading; rather than the new era of consensus that the
Lbanese hoped his election would usher in, Lebanon emains
deeply divided, with intermittent sectarian clashes an
indication of what is brewing beneath the surface.


2. (C) Sleiman could well use an international vote of
confidence, before, as some have already warned, he is
dismissed as being more of an end of term "lame duck" rather
than newly elected president. The U.S. must continue to
publicly and privately support President Sleiman, avoiding
references to the "Siniora government," a loaded term that
carries connotations of U.S. interference. (We often hear
this suggestion from Siniora's caretaker cabinet, we note.)
As happened with the PM, however, too much U.S. praise could
backfire, subjecting Sleiman himself to criticism of being an
American "puppet." Tangible U.S. military, financial,
political and diplomatic support (particularly on Shebaa
Farms) is urgently needed now to shape the path of Lebanon's
first post-Syrian withdrawal president. End summary.

SHEBA'A FARMS HEADLINE
TALKS WITH FOREIGN VISITORS
--------------


3. (C) During his first month in office, Sleiman received a

number of prominent international visitors, including the
June 7 visit of French President Sarkozy, and also including
Secretary Rice, U.S. Under Secretary for Defense Policy
Edelman, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier, British Foreign
Minister Miliband, British Special Middle East envoy
Williams, Arab League SYG Amr Moussa, and a Vatican
delegation led by Cardinal Jose Saraiva Martins (in Beirut to
attend the June 22 beatification of Lebanese priest Yaacub
Haddad). In what probably will be his first overseas trip,
Sleiman will travel to Paris for the July 13 Mediterranean
Union summit, to which Syrian President Bashar Asad also has
been invited.


4. (C) During these meetings, Sleiman repeatedly stressed the
liberation of Sheba'a Farms, urging international mediation
to expedite a resolution. Sleiman reportedly presented
historical maps never seen before to build the case that the
territory belongs to Lebanon.

DELAYS IN CABINET FORMATION:
PRESIDENCY OFF TO A BAD START
--------------


5. (C) Sleiman's shine is most tarnished by the delay in
cabinet formation, now in its fifth week. The Doha agreement
and his election as the consensus candidate spurned hopes
that feuding Lebanese politicians would at long last put
their differences aside and that the next steps, cabinet
formation and a new electoral law, would follow suit.
Instead, the various blocs continue to jockey for cabinet
positions, threatening to prolong the process and feeding
criticism that Sleiman has been unable to exert leadership to
persuade political factions to form a cabinet. Some Lebanese
comment that he appears to be at the end of his term, rather
than the beginning. Meanwhile, Sleiman has held several
consultations with PM Siniora on cabinet formation, and has
resumed weekly meetings with Speaker Nabih Berri, a tradition
suspended since the 2005 assassination of former PM Rafiq
Hariri.

BEIRUT 00000936 002 OF 004




6. (C) Sleiman is determined to nominate the Ministers of
Interior and Defense himself (he is hoping to nominate
Christians to both posts, with Elias Murr remaining as
Defense Minister). We view Sleiman exerting control over the
two security ministries as a wise move, given the role of
these ministries in overseeing the country's security
services. However, they also opened the door for Michel Aoun
to impede cabinet formation. Aoun, accusing Murr of being
pro-March 14 rather than independent, is demanding a
sovereign ministry for his own Christian bloc, urging Sleiman
to select one Christian and one Muslim to maintain
Christian-Muslim balance in the four sovereign ministries
(Interior, Defense, Finance, and Foreign Affairs). Aoun's
tactics are twofold: to raise his stature in the cabinet and
to discredit Sleiman, the biggest threat to his efforts to
secure the support of the majority of Lebanon's Christians.
Aoun also harbors lingering resentment against Sleiman, whom
he believes "stole" the presidency from him.

HIZBALLAH'S ARMS:
ALL TALK AND NO ACTION?
--------------


7. (C) In his inaugural speech, Sleiman promised to pursue a
national defense strategy that would incorporate Hizballah's
arms (Ref B). While the inaugural speech was tough on
Hizballah's weapons, referring to them in the past tense, his
subsequent remarks have been less so, and recent remarks by
Hizballah indicate it intends to hold fast to its weapons
even if Israel withdraws from Sheba'a Farms.


8. (C) Observers note that inaugural speeches often set the
bar high, but fail to result in matching actions. They point
to former President Emile Lahoud's inaugural speech in 1998,
in which he also "said all of the right things."

SPIRITUAL SUMMIT:
MORE GOOD WORDS,
WITH LITTLE RESULTS
--------------


9. (SBU) On June 24, as part of his call for national
reconciliation, President Sleiman hosted a spiritual summit
that included 15 Muslim and Christian religious leaders. In
his welcoming speech, he expressed hope that the summit would
pave the way for launching the national dialogue, adding that
the differences among Lebanese have reached the point of
"committing suicide." Sleiman also stressed the need to
speed up cabinet formation even if that meant making
concessions.


10. (C) The religious leaders issued a statement stressing
Lebanon's unity and its pluralistic nature. The statement
condemned fanaticism and violence and banned the use of
weapons, adding that constitutional institutions are the
tools for solving differences. The religious leaders urged
cooperation with President Sleiman to facilitate his mission
and also urged the expedition of launching the national
dialogue. Again, however, strong statements so far have
failed to produce any concrete results.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR SLEIMAN
--------------


11. (S) Visible, concrete U.S. support in terms of increased
military assistance to Lebanon's security forces--Lebanese
Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces--is the most
critical way to demonstrate U.S. confidence in President
Sleiman's leadership, strengthen his ability to counter
Hizballah, and convince the Lebanese that the U.S. is sincere
in its efforts to help build the Lebanese state to enable it
to counter extremism.


12. (S) Such support would also would counter criticism
(voiced by majority and opposition members alike) that the
U.S. is all talk and no action, and that our Israel policy
limits our ability to support Lebanon. Attack helicopters
for the army remain the most significant deliverable, and we
should expedite a decision on this issue, as well as RAVEN

BEIRUT 00000936 003 OF 004


UAV's, to strengthen Sleiman's hand in light of ongoing
sectarian clashes and the LAF's recent ineffectiveness in
preventing Hizballah from occupying much of downtown Beirut
and fighting in Aley and Chouf.


13. (C) Movement on Sheba'a Farms also would be a strong
feather in Sleiman's cap, boosting his credibility among the
Lebanese and undermining Hizballah's primary justification
for keeping its weapons, despite Hizballah's comments to the
contrary. While we may disagree with the GOL on next steps
on Sheba'a, we should stress to Sleiman that the U.S. shares
the ultimate goal of seeing the area returned to Lebanon.


14. (C) Similarly, addressing the issue of Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon (a key theme during Sleiman's June 16
meeting with Secretary Rice) would give Sleiman a political
boost. We should capitalize on the $22 million U.S. pledge
at the June 23 Nahr al-Barid donors' conference in Vienna to
publicize our efforts to help better the lives of both
refugees and Lebanese affected by violence in the camps,
while at the same time actively stressing the U.S. view that
ultimately the refugees should return to a future Palestinian
state, once a two-state solution is reached. Such statements
would help counter continuing accusations, especially from
Michel Aoun, that the real U.S. (and Sunni) intent is
permanent resettlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon.


15. (C) Now that Lebanon has a new president -- the first in
many years not imposed by the Syrians -- the U.S. should
focus its public support on the presidency, and not the
"Siniora government," which evokes images of a U.S.-dominated
government in the minds of many Lebanese, thanks to effective
media campaigns engineered by the opposition. However, too
much U.S. praise opens the door to the opposition to label
Sleiman as a U.S. "puppet," as it has done with PM Siniora.
U.S. public statements therefore should be used judiciously,
and also include support for the Lebanese people, while in
private meetings we should of course express our full-fledged
support for the president.


16. (C) We should encourage Sleiman to visit Washington soon,
around the time of the UN General Assembly, and roll out the
red carpet when he does. (Note: Sleiman's political
advisor, Nazem Khoury, recently asked whether Sleiman's visit
should be delayed until after the U.S. presidential election;
we strongly discouraged this dea and stressed that we would
welcome a visit a soon as possible to continue to build on
the strong relationship between the U.S. and Lebanon. End
note.)


17. (C) At the same time, we should continue to encourage
high-level U.S. visits to Lebanon, following the visits of
Secretary Rice, USDP Edelman, and upcoming visits of CODEL
Green and Acting CENTCOM Commander Dempsey. We also should
encourage moderate Arab states to send prominent envoys (most
of Sleiman's visitors have been Europeans) and extend
invitations for him to visit their countries.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) All in all, we give Sleiman grade of "B-" for his
first month in office. His tough words on Hizballah and UN
Security Council resolutions during his inaugural speech have
not yet translated into concrete results; on the contrary,
his follow-up statements have been disappointing. However,
as was the case when his presidency was still in doubt, it
may be that Sleiman is reluctant to take strong stands at
this juncture that could further derail progress on cabinet
formation.


19. (C) Furthermore, Sleiman's performance to date can be
blamed partially on the fact that he and his staff are not
yet up to speed; in our meeting with political advisor Nazem
Khoury, Khoury, fumbling for materials in his newly
refurbished office and struggling to operate a newly provided
telephone, repeatedly complained that he did not yet have
adequate staff and resources to do his job. With Baabda
Palace vacant for six months, and dominated by Syrian
influence before that, we expect there is little

BEIRUT 00000936 004 OF 004


institutional memory or continuity on which Sleiman can rely.


20. (C) The bottom line is that stepped up U.S. support now
can help shape the path of Sleiman's president. Tangible
U.S. military, political, and diplomatic support up front
will go a long way in restoring the shine to the promising
May 25 start of the Sleiman presidency.
SISON