Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT894
2008-06-13 17:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: HOW WOULD HIZBALLAH REACT TO A

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC IR IS LE 
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P 131756Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2263
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2512
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2811
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000894 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC IR IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HOW WOULD HIZBALLAH REACT TO A
RESOLUTION ON SHEBA'A?

REF: BEIRUT 711

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000894

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC IR IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HOW WOULD HIZBALLAH REACT TO A
RESOLUTION ON SHEBA'A?

REF: BEIRUT 711

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) A resolution of the Sheba'a Farms issue is a necessary
but not sufficient step toward disarming Hizballah.
Hizballah has responded to recent increased international
attention on Sheba'a Farms by insisting that only complete
Israeli withdrawal from "all of the occupied lands" would
satisfy Hizballah's goal of liberating Lebanon. An Israeli
withdrawal would undermine Hizballah's primary raison d'etre
for its weapons, the "resistance." It is not surprising,
therefore, that Hizballah's definition of Sheba'a includes
areas not claimed by the GOL itself, or that Hizballah points
to other issues, such as Lebanese prisoners held in Israel or
Hizballah's role in helping to "liberate" Iraq and the
Palestinian territories, to further justify its existence and
ensure that its weapons are included in any future national
defense strategy. Furthermore, regardless of improvements in
the relationship between Lebanon and Israel, Iran is unlikely
to let go of its strongest strategic asset against Israel.


2. (C) Should Israel eventually withdraw, Hizballah will seek
credit, arguing that only the threat of Hizballah's arms
(vice the "soft" diplomacy used by moderate Arab states) is
capable of securing victory against Israel, thereby
continuing the justification for its weapons. Nevertheless,
a resolution to the issue of Sheba'a Farms would go a long
way toward bolstering the credibility of the Siniora
government and undermining public support for the
"resistance." End summary.

GOL REJECTS BILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS
--------------


3. (SBU) Since the June 8 visit of French President Sarkozy
and the June 9-10 visit of British Foreign Secretary David
Miliband, and Israeli PM Olmert's recent public statements

suggesting bilateral talks between Lebanon and Israel, the
issue of Sheba'a Farms and adjoining Kfar Shouba Hills has
been the focus of political discussions and public
statements. Responding to Olmert's overture in a statement
published on its official website, the GOL rejected a
bilateral approach, insisting instead on resolving
differences through existing UNSC Resolutions (informal
Embassy translation provided in paragraph 9, below).
Underscoring the GOL's position, PM-Designate Siniora
publicly reiterated in late March that "Lebanon will be the
last Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel."

HIZBALLAH RAISING
THE STAKES?
--------------


4. (C) The head of Hizballah's parliamentary bloc, MP
Mohammed Raad, in a June 10 interview on Hizballah-run
al-Manar TV, said, "I believe that entering into a
transitional phase and placing Sheba'a Farms under the
sovereignty of international forces does not achieve the goal
of regaining full sovereignty on our Lebanese territories."
However, Raad expressed his support for "a real diplomatic
effort to liberate Sheba'a Farms and all of the occupied
lands (NFI)," saying that, "only then would we have achieved
the liberation goal to which we are committed." He also
criticized the GOL for "giving up claims on 30 percent of the
Sheba'a territory (NFI)."


5. (C) Resolving Sheba'a would be a Pyrrhic victory for
Hizballah. It would cost Hizballah popular support, more so
than what the organization suffered when it used its arms
against Lebanese during the May clashes (reftel). Ordinary,
politically-disinterested Lebanese repeatedly call for
resolution on Sheba'a. A resolution on Sheba'a may not draw
a significant number of Hizballah supporters away, but it
will empower those in the middle to take a stand against
Hizballah's arms.

BEIRUT 00000894 002 OF 002




6. (C) Hizballah has stated that disarmament is contingent
upon the resolution of Sheba'a, the release of Lebanese
prisoners, and the formation of a national defense strategy.
Hizballah's recent rhetoric might suggest that, by expanding
the definition of "occupied" territories, Hizballah is
attempting to move the goal post. Many believe it is
therefore critical for the UNSC to make a clear political
determination on what exactly constitutes Sheba'a Farms to
avoid allowing Hizballah to claim that other areas remain
under Israeli occupation.


7. (C) However, if Israel eventually does withdraw from
Sheba'a, Hizballah's goal will be to ensure that it, and not
the GOL, receives credit for an eventual Israeli withdrawal
from Sheba'a. Hizballah has long prided itself as being the
only Arab force capable of standing up to Israel, in 2000,
when Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon, and
again in 2006, when Hizballah scored its "divine victory"
against Israel. Most recently, Hizballah took sole credit
for the June 1 release of Lebanese citizen Nassim Nasr,
imprisoned by Israel for espionage charges. Hizballah scoffs
at Arab states that attempt to win back territories through
diplomacy, and openly supports other "resistance" movements
in the Palestinian territories and Iraq. If Sheba'a is
resolved, Hizballah will be quick to claim that only the
"stick" of its arms made a solution possible, a "stick" that
should be maintained to counter future, unforeseen threats.


8. (C) A resolution on Sheba'a is therefore a necessary but
not sufficient step toward Hizballah's disarmament. Having
lost part of its "raison d'etre," Hizballah would shift its
efforts instead to securing credit for again having
"defeated" the Israeli occupiers to bolster its argument that
its arms are still needed. After Sheba'a and the prisoners
have been removed as legitimating factors, Hizballah will use
its call for a national defense strategy, which President
Sleiman has recently said would be acted upon after Sheba'a
is resolved, to its advantage by insisting that the state
still cannot defend Lebanon as Hizballah can.


9. (U) Informal Embassy translation of GOL statement:

Begin text. The unwavering Lebanese position is to remain
committed to the Arab Peace Plan that calls for just and
comprehensive peace and to move forward with the peace plan
on all tracks. Concerning the pending bilateral issues
between Lebanon and Israel, they are governed by
international resolutions that Israel must respect, namely
UNSCRs 425 and 1701, and are non-negotiable politically.
Lebanon is trying to fully implement these two resolutions,
namely the articles calling for putting an end to Israel's
occupation of the Sheba'a Farms, and through implementing the
solution stipulated in the 7-point plan which calls for
Israel's withdrawal from the Sheba'a Farms and bringing them
under UN authority until a final delineation of the borders
between Lebanon and Syria is finalized.

Lebanon is not bilaterally involved in the principle of land
for peace, therefore Israel's withdrawal from the territories
it still occupies is mandatory, as well as that it must
respect Lebanon's sovereignty over its territory, water,
release the prisoners, and provide maps on the landmines and
cluster bombs, according to the above mentioned resolutions.
Afterwards, the armistice truce between Lebanon and Israel
would go into effect. As for the remaining issues pertaining
to the permanent and comprehensive plan, namely the
Palestinians' right to return to their homeland, it is an
Arab interest that primarily concerns Lebanon, and should be
negotiated according to the Arab Peace Plan. End text.
SISON