LEBANON: MARCH 14 SECURITY MOST IMPORTANT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000865

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC EG LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 SECURITY MOST IMPORTANT TO
CARETAKER SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER NAYLA MOUAWAD AND SON

REF: A. BEIRUT 733

B. BEIRUT 652

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Linking success in the 2009 parliamentary elections to
March 14's ability to "protect its people," caretaker Social
Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad and her son Michel Mouawad
proposed that March 14 implement a security strategy. This
would include developing a force within the Internal Security
Forces (ISF) trained and responsible for defending Beirut,
organizing a lobby of March 14 supporters within the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) to coordinate with the Defense Minister,
and coordinating a common platform with President Michel
Sleiman on Hizballah's arms.


2. (C) Gearing up for what are sure to be hotly contested
elections, Nayla and Michel believe President Sleiman can
help peel the Armenian Tashnaq party votes away from the
opposition. Michel further argued that the March 14 parties
work as a team to maintain the bloc's majority, rather than
by party.


3. (C) Nayla expressed her appreciation of at the USG
donation of nearly 200 police vehicles to the ISF, calling it
an important symbol of U.S. support. Assessing the likely
candidates to become the next LAF Commander, Michel endorsed
LAF Commander of the Tenth Brigade General Charles Chikhani.
End summary.

MARCH 14 MUST
PROTECT ITS OWN
--------------


4. (C) The Charge, accompanied by PolOff, met caretaker
Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad and her son Michel at
Nayla's home in Hazmieh on June 6. Calling the May clashes a
"worse loss" for March 14 than what it lost politically in
Doha (Ref A),Michel was adamant that March 14 give priority
to resolving security issues.


5. (C) Prior to the May clashes, he explained, March 14
relied on its relationships with the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF),and the arms of
Saad Hariri's Future Movement for protection. "This strategy
failed," he asserted, and now March 14 needs to develop an
alternate approach.


6. (C) Looking ahead to the 2009 parliamentary elections,
Michel concluded that the Lebanese citizens will vote for the
leaders they believe can protect them. Sunnis in Tripoli
realized during the clashes that "Saudi Arabia and Saad
cannot protect them. This is a long-term strategy, beyond
the 2009 elections, because if we do not get this right, al
Qaeda's Ayman Zawahiri will be in Tripoli," he warned. He
added that March 14 would not likely retain the majority if
security did not improve in the north or in Beirut.


7. (C) First, he proposed, there should be a security
strategy within the LAF. He explained that opposition
supporters in the LAF are well-organized, which is not the
case with the majority supporters within the Army. Soldiers
seen as allied with Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces are
"disliked," Kataeb (Phalange) is not represented in the Army,
and Hariri's Future supporters lack cohesion, said Michel.
He recommended that a March 14 "lobby" be formed within the
LAF to offer the alliance protection and to work with
caretaker (and possibly re-appointed) Defense Minister Elias
Murr.


8. (C) Rejecting majority leader Saad Hariri's idea to arm
Future supporters, Michel argued that the ISF should have 700
to 900 well-trained men to defend Beirut. Believing that
General Ashraf Rifi will stay on as ISF's DG, Michel
suggested that the ISF develop a "serious plan" on how to
defend Beirut. "Hizballah has to know it cannot take Beirut
in ten minutes," he asserted.

BEIRUT 00000865 002 OF 003



OPPOSITION TO
MAINTAIN INSTABILITY
--------------


9. (C) Michel suspects the opposition will try to maintain a
degree of instability throughout Lebanon to remind the
majority that it can attack "at any moment." He noted that
the opposition had recently opened over 100 offices in Beirut
to "remind us they are here."

SLEIMAN, TASHNAQ PLAY
BIG ROLE IN ELECTIONS
--------------


10. (C) Talk turned to the 2009 elections. Listing the areas
where the competition will be tough between majority and
opposition Christians (Zgharta, where the Mouawads are
expected to face fierce competition against rival opposition
member Suleiman Franjieh; Koura; Batroun; Kessarwan; Baabda;
Zahle; Ashrafieh; Jbeil; and Metn),Michel said that
President Michel Sleiman's influence will determine the
winners.


11. (C) He concluded that March 14 must coordinate its
election platform, based on disarming Hizballah, with the
President. Egypt, he posited, could play a positive role in
working with the President because Sleiman is close to Egypt
and it was the first country to promote his presidency so "he
has a debt to Egypt."


12. (C) President Sleiman is also best-positioned to move the
Armenian Tashnaq party away from its alliance with the
opposition, Michel proposed. Michel relayed that he
befriended Tashnaq MP Hagop Pakradonian during the Doha
negotiations and had met with him earlier in the week.
Anticipating that March 14 could win 68-70 parliamentary
seats, Michel said the addition of the Tashnaq seats would be
important.


13. (C) He broke down his calculations wherein March 14 gains
the following seats: 25 in the north, 15 in Beirut perhaps 1
in Jbeil, 2 in Kessarwan, 4 in Metn, 13 in Aley/Chouf, 2 in
Zahle, 6 in West Bekaa, and 2 in Sidon. In Sidon, the
support of MP Bahia Hariri, Saad's aunt, and the group Jamaa
Islamiyah would be important. Nayla relayed that
representatives from Jamaa Islamiyah in Sidon visited her the
previous month to argue that Hamas is separate from
Hizballah. She characterized the politburo's chief in
Lebanon, Ali Sheikh Ammar, as "moderate."


14. (C) Michel lamented that the Tashnaq are "still
uncomfortable" with majority leader Saad Hariri, noting that
in Doha, the Tashnaq had asked for a meeting with Saad, but
were refused. Michel said the Tashnaq believe Saad is
deliberately avoiding meeting with them. Michel expressed
his fear that Saad will focus on Future party victories in
the parliamentary elections, rather than March 14 alliance
victories, which could cost March 14 the majority status.


15. (C) Michel explained that the Tashnaq used to take
guidance from the Armenian community in Los Angeles, but are
now looking more towards Armenia, which he added is close to
Iran. Nevertheless, he concluded, the Armenians "cannot
afford to be opposed to the U.S."

NEED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SHIA IN LEBANON AND IRAQ
--------------


16. (C) Nayla argued for the "legitimization" of Shia in
Lebanon, in particular, by forging a relationship between the
Lebanese Shia and the Shia in Iraq. She expressed her
disappointment that the electoral law agreed upon in Doha
does not allow for a March 14 penetration into Shia
communities (via proportional representation).

VOTE-BUYING
--------------


17. (C) Speaking frankly about spending by political parties

BEIRUT 00000865 003 OF 003


preceding the 2005 parliamentary elections to gain votes,
Michel said that the timing of funding is critical. (Note:
He is referring to the common practice of payment by
candidates to buy votes in both villages and cities, often in
the form of local development projects, such as building or
repainting a church. End note.) "If the money comes too
early in Tripoli, for example, you will have to pay again.
Conversely, in the rural, Christian areas, you have to start
very early because their votes cannot be bought quickly,"
Michel explained.

MARCH 14 IN-FIGHTING
--------------


18. (C) Michel told us that the March 14 leaders had not met
as a group for nearly a month to discuss politics. During
the May clashes, he relayed, each leader acted on his own.
Michel added that former President and Kataeb leader Amine
Gemayel should relent in his push for a ministerial position,
believing the competition among March 14 leaders is costing
the alliance public support. Michel quoted PM-designate
Fouad Siniora as saying, "When united, we win, and divided,
we lose. We cannot negotiate with Arab leaders when March 14
leaders publicly dispute their positions."

USG'S POLICE CAR DONATION
"VERY GOOD" OPTICS
--------------


19. (C) Nayla was jubilant in her appreciation for the
previous day's donation by the U.S. of 188 Dodge Charger
police vehicles to the ISF. She said this demonstration of
support is the best way the U.S. can change the perception
that it was absent during the May clashes.

CHIKHANI "BEST" CANDIDATE
FOR LAF COMMANDER
--------------


20. (C) Michel said he thought the LAF 10th Brigade General
Charles Chikhani was the strongest candidate to become the
next LAF Commander, saying that Second Brigade Commander BG
Jean Kawahji is former President Emile Lahoud's "man," LAF
G-2 Director General Georges Khoury would be better as the DG
at Surete Generale, and the other frequently-mentioned
candidate, current DG of Surete Generale Wafiq Jezzini,
"obeys only Hizballah."


21. (C) Michel argued that if Georges Khoury, who is
Christian, was named DG of Surete Generale, it would
strengthen Sleiman's presidency by having a Christian at the
helm of the traditionally Shia-dominated immigration and
security branch. Besides, he added, if Khoury were instead
the LAF Commander, he would focus more on becoming the next
president.
SISON