LEBANON: WITH PM DECISION ACCEPTED, SAAD HARIRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000795

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR EAID UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH PM DECISION ACCEPTED, SAAD HARIRI
LOOKS TO 2009 ELECTIONS

REF: A. BEIRUT 765

B. BEIRUT 788

C. BEIRUT 786

D. BEIRUT 773

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Majority leader Saad Hariri appears to have accepted
March 14's nomination of Fouad Siniora as prime minister, but
expects lengthy and difficult negotiations over cabinet
formation. Focusing now on winning the 2009 parliamentary
elections, Saad suggested several ways the U.S. could help,
including Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa farms, U.S.
assistance in rehabilitating the Kleyate airport in the
north, a waste disposal project in the south, and, as always,
Cobra attack helicopters for the Lebanese Armed Forces. End
summary.


2. (C) CDA Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with
majority leader Saad Hariri at his office in Qoreitem on May
28, just as Prime Minister-designate Fouad Siniora was making
his acceptance speech live on TV. Hariri advisors Ghattas
Khoury and Nader Hariri and notetaker Nadine Chehab also
attended the meeting.


3. (C) Hariri, smiling and smoking a cigar, appeared as if a
great weight had been lifted from his shoulders following
March 14's decision to name Siniora as prime minister (vice
Saad) in the next cabinet. Referring to Congressman Issa's
comment during CODEL Rahall's meeting with him (Ref A),in
which Issa stressed the need for continuity in the
premiership, Saad smiled, saying, "I would prefer
continuity." Khoury recommended that the USG not
congratulate Siniora publicly, as "he has been burned by the
U.S. before." He called polstaff the next day to again
stress that the U.S. should avoid referring to the "Siniora
government" and instead focus its congratulations on
President Sleiman and his government (a sentiment we also
heard May 29 from March 14 leaders Amine Gemayel and Nayla
Mouawad).

CABINET FORMATION
WILL TAKE WEEKS
--------------


4. (C) Prior to Saad's entrance, Khoury said that President
Sleiman's choice for prime minister had been Hariri. Khoury
expressed no concerns about negotiating with President Michel
Sleiman over cabinet portfolios, saying Sleiman had no "fixed
idea." If Sleiman wanted the Ministry of Interior for his
own candidate, however, he would have a problem keeping Elias
Murr on as Defense Minister, Khoury noted, suggesting that
Murr was the President's choice for this position. Khoury
saw the blank votes cast by Hizballah and Amal (septel)
during their consultations with Sleiman on the premiership as
an indication they were willing to cooperate as well, but
were setting themselves up to demand more concessions by not
challenging March 14's choice for prime minister.


5. (C) Nader Hariri warned that determining who gets which
portfolios will be difficult. "Every Tom, Dick and Harry
wants a ministry," he complained. Nader, noting that
independent Shia activist Abdullah Bitar had seen Saad
earlier in the day, said March 14 should include an
independent Shia among its cabinet positions. Khoury agreed,
but said that while March 14 would choose a "decent" Shia
candidate, the opposition's choice for a balancing Sunni
candidate would be "crap."


6. (C) Saad suddenly remembered he had forgotten to return a
call to Tripoli MP and Minister of Transportation Mohamad
Safadi. Asked about Tripoli dynamics, Saad said it was not
true that Safadi had voted against Siniora; this was a rumor
spread by Aoun's bloc, he claimed. To reinforce this point,
Saad then spoke with Safadi by phone, switching to English
for the benefit of his guests, and telling Safadi, "You did
the right thing today" (by voting for Siniora).

BEIRUT 00000795 002 OF 003




7. (C) Noting that Siniora would begin binding consultations
with parliamentary blocs on May 30, the Charge asked how long
it would take to form a cabinet. Khoury predicted "some
weeks," and Saad, joining in on the conversation, quipped,
"some months." In 2005, under then President Emile Lahoud,
it took 20 days, he noted, and that was going "full steam
ahead." He later added that the opposition was not in any
hurry to form a cabinet.

WHEN DO WE GET SHEBAA?
--------------


8. (C) Changing the subject abruptly, Saad asked, "When are
we going to get Shebaa?" The return of Shebaa farms would be
a visible signal of support to the GOL, he argued, and
undermine Hizballah's pretext for war. Why won't the
Israelis turn it over to the UN? he asked. Instead, they are
conducting "tomfoolery" over the release of prisoners, which
they should have done through the UN.


9. (C) Israel is just helping Hizballah, Saad complained,
predicting that Samir Kantar, the longest held prisoner,
would be released shortly before the 2009 parliamentary
elections, further boosting Hizballah's credibility. Khoury
said cynically that every time Hizballah faces a crises,
Israeli PM Olmert steps in to save him. And when Olmert is
in trouble, Hizballah does the same for him, Saad added
wryly. He added that USG comments that Hizballah was losing
support also backfired against March 14.

WELCOMING VISIBLE
U.S. ASSISTANCE
--------------


10. (C) The Charge said the U.S. was looking at other
possible ways to assist Lebanon which had been raised by the
March 14 leaders, such as rehabilitating the Kleyate airport
in northern Lebanon. Saad noted that there had been an
earlier plan to do so, at an approximate cost of $50 million.



11. (C) Khoury agreed that "expedited" U.S. assistance (a
jibe at U.S. military assistance for the Lebanese Armed
Forces, which Saad continuously complains is too slow) would
be welcome. Kleyate airport would create 4,000 jobs, he
said, adding that for March 14 to win the 2009 elections, it
needed to focus on development and job creation, projects
with lasting value, he stressed. We already are losing
Jezzine (Christian enclave in the Shia south) and Zgharta
(Minister Mouawad's constituency, where she faces still
competition from opposition Christian leader Suleiman
Franjieh),Khoury said, and we need to do something for Druze
leader Walid Jumblatt in the Baabda-Aley district. The U.S.
must do something dramatic, he said; something visible, Saad
stressed.


12. (C) The Charge agreed, noting that the U.S. already had
providing substantial support via Paris III assistance.
Referring to her May 26 visit to Sidon, where she met with
Nader's mother (and Saad's aunt) Bahia Hariri (Ref D),she
asked whether the U.S. could help in this region. Ghattas
cited Sidon's problem with garbage disposal as a possibility.


FOREVER COBRAS
--------------


13. (C) Saad downplayed the suggestion slightly, noting that
the real problem in the Sidon area was political. Speaker
Nabih Berri, who controlled much of the surrounding land,
refused to allow residual waste to be dumped on his property.
Saad also noted that a project like a waste treatment plant,
though visible, was relatively inexpensive and something
March 14 could take on itself. What we really need from you
are Cobra attack helicopters for the Lebanese Armed Forces,
he said.

COMMENT
--------------


BEIRUT 00000795 003 OF 003



14. (C) We expected to find Saad in the same defeatist mode
in which he appeared during our most recent meetings,
including with CODEL Rahall. On the contrary, he indeed
seemed as if a great weight had been lifted from his
shoulders now that the decision on who will be prime minister
has been resolved. Perhaps he was only putting on a good
face, but we are relieved that he now seems to have his
priorities in order, e.g., facing the battle ahead for the
2009 elections. End comment.

SISON