LEBANON: MARCH 14 SELECTS FOUAD SINIORA AS PRIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000780

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 SELECTS FOUAD SINIORA AS PRIME
MINISTER

REF: A. BEIRUT 770

B. BEIRUT 766

C. BEIRUT 747

D. BEIRUT 733

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Shortly before March 14 announced on May 27 that Fouad
Siniora was its candidate for prime minister, Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt shared ongoing deliberations affecting
majority leader Saad Hariri's decision whether to take the
job himself. On cabinet formation, Jumblatt argued that
March 14 should retain the Ministries of Finance and Justice.
Although unaware of who Sleiman's choices would be for top
army positions, he argued strongly against nominating the
current head of military intelligence as the
Commander-in-Chief. Jumblatt viewed Hizballah SYG Hassan
Nasrallah's May 26 speech as a rejoinder to President
Sleiman's "strong" acceptance speech, and warned of growing
Hizballah influence in Beirut. Hizballah and other
opposition members probably will not endorse Siniora as prime
minister, leaving consensus President Sleiman to start of his
term without a consensus prime minister. End summary.

SAAD SHOULD NOT BE
PRIME MINISTER
--------------


2. (C) CDA Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt at his residence in Clemenceau on
May 27, shortly before Jumblatt attended an unexpectedly
short March 14 meeting that resulted in the nomination of
Fouad Siniora as Prime Minister in the next cabinet, ending
speculation that majority leader Saad Hariri intended to keep
the job for himself. (Jumblatt phoned the Charge less than
an hour after the meeting to relay the news, some two hours
before the decision was announced publicly.) Jumblatt told
the Charge that he had advised Saad "gently" not to be prime
minister, but did not know whether he would heed his advice,
especially since others were pushing him to take the job.


3. (C) Saad reportedly had pleaded for Jumblatt's support,
warning that without help in countering (current Minister of
Transportation and Tripoli bloc MP) Mohamad Safadi's
influence, he would have to take the job himself. (Comment:
Safadi, a member of March 14, has waned from the coalition in
the past, most notably last fall, when he supported the
opposition's assertion that a two-thirds parliamentary quorum
was necessary to elect a president. He had said he would
support Saad's candidacy for prime minister, but would oppose
Siniora. End comment.)


4. (C) According to Jumblatt, President Sleiman had sent Saad
several messages expressing his support, while Iranian
journalists had told Druze MP Wael Abu Four that Iran would
"help" Lebanon if Saad were chosen, but not if Siniora became
prime minister. Druze Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi,
on the other hand, reportedly told Saad that Saudi King
Abdullah had sent Saad a message that he should not take the
position. Ultimately, Jumblatt predicted, the decision will
depend on Saad's "inner court." "Saad is a friend," he said;
"if he wants to be in the prime minister club, that is his
decision. If I were Saad, I wouldn't, but it is tempting."


5. (C) The Charge noted that the most important objective was
to lay the political groundwork to win the 2009 parliamentary
elections. Jumblatt agreed, saying March 14 needed to
consolidate its position, and Saad in particular needed to
work on his own Future movement and the Sunnis, especially in
the north, where Future MP Samir Jisr was no match for the
likes of Sunni heavyweights Mohamad Safadi and Najib Mikati.
"Saad doesn't like strong, independent personalities,"
Jumblatt commented, adding that Independent Tripoli MP Mosbah
Ahdab was good.


6. (C) Jumblatt also agreed that the new government would
have to make tough economic choices, leaving Saad as the fall

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guy if he were the prime minister. Where is the famous $1
billion Saudi Central Bank deposit? he asked rhetorically.
Saad had asked the Saudis for $400 million to purchase land
to prevent Hizballah from buying up the country, but the
Saudis would never give him this much, Jumblatt said. Saad
should pony up the money himself, he suggested, instead of
wasting it on Sunni "security forces" and Solidere shares.
(Comment: Solidere share prices increased 15 percent, the
maximum allowed, several days in a row in the wake of the
recent violence, which some attribute to a strong dose of
Hariri funds rather than a reflection of actual market
reactions, Ref C. End comment.)

FORMING THE NEXT GOVERNMENT
--------------


7. (C) On cabinet formation, Jumblatt foresaw a big dispute
between Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement and March 14
Christians. If independent MP Michel Murr became Minister of
the Interior, this would resolve the issue, he said. For
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jumblatt caustically predicted
"this brilliant guy" Salloukh (the current, albeit resigned,
Foreign Minister). At a minimum, March 14 should retain the
Ministries of Defense and Justice for itself, he stated
firmly. For the Minister of Energy, who would face a $1
billion deficit, Jumblatt said, "Let them (the opposition)
have it."


8. (C) Jumblatt had no information on who would be tapped as
Sleiman's chief advisor, saying only he would like to know
who had written Sleiman's speech. Noting that LAF G-2
(military intelligence) Director Georges Khoury would be
dining at his home the following evening, Jumblatt warned
that it would be bad if Khoury became the next LAF Commander,
given his close connection with Hizballah military
intelligence chief Wafiq Safa. He also warned against
General Boulos Matar, a former Aounist and current Commander
south of the Litani river, claiming that after Aoun's ousting
as President in 1989 Matar had been sent to Damascus for
training.

HIZBALLAH'S ANTICS
--------------


9. (C) Raising his eyes in mock, Jumblatt said Hizballah SYG
Hassan Nasrallah had "again!" delivered a "victory speech"
during his May 26 Liberation Day delivery (Ref A). He opined
that the speech was an answer to President Sleiman's "strong"
acceptance speech (Ref B),which had not pleased Hizballah.
Jumblatt again expressed concerns that Saad was being misled
by Hizballah, citing pictures of him embracing Hizballah MP
Mohamad Raad in Doha and adding in typical blunt Jumblatt
fashion, "I don't like it." (Note: Jumblatt himself has
been accused of cozying up to the Iranians at the May 25 Biel
dinner, an accusation he denies, Ref B).


10. (C) Commenting on clashes reported earlier in the evening
between Druze and Hizballah in the mixed Sunni/Shia/Druze
Aramoun area of Beirut (south of Beirut International
Airport),he said the dispute began between a Druze family
and a Shia cleric living in the same building. The Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) had intervened, and one LAF soldier was
killed by a Druze, who was subsequently arrested. Jumblatt
scoffed at reports the government was banning motorcycles and
inflammatory slogans. He predicted demographic changes in
Beirut as residents, especially Sunnis, fled the city because
they no longer feel secure there.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) In choosing Siniora, March 14 has opted for
continuity. President Sleiman begins consultations the
morning of May 28 with parliamentary blocs from both the
majority and opposition to make a formal decision on whether
Siniora will indeed head the next government. While the
opposition, which viewed the current Siniora government as
illegitimate following the November 2006 resignation of six
opposition ministers (including all five Shia ministers),is
not expected to endorse March 14's choice, opposition
contacts have told us that ultimately the decision rests with

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the majority. However, by appointing a prime minister who
does not enjoy a broad endorsement in parliament, President
Sleiman will be starting his six-year term without the
consensus that many Lebanese view as necessary to promote
reconciliation between Lebanon's deeply divided factions.


12. (C) On the other hand, the announcement that March 14 had
selected Siniora was greeted with unanimous support by the
100 and some guests at a May 27 dinner in honor of the Charge
representing the creme de la creme of Lebanese business
society. End comment.
SISON