LEBANON: WHAT DOES HIZBALLAH HAVE IN STORE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000711

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO-A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WHAT DOES HIZBALLAH HAVE IN STORE FOR
LEBANON NOW?

REF: A. BEIRUT 618 B. BEIRUT 704

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) This is part one of a three-part series of cables
looking at where Lebanon is headed after violence erupted
following the Siniora government's May 5 decisions to
confront Hizballah (Ref A). This message (part one) deals
with Hizballah's intentions now that it has withdrawn its
militants from downtown Beirut and allowed Beirut
International Airport (BIA) to reopen. Part two will explore
how the GOL, having been dealt a severe blow by the ordeal,
can regain the political advantage and its strategy for
dealing with a newly emboldened Hizballah. Finally, part
three will look at possible U.S. strategies, given the new
reality on the ground.


2. (C) In the wake of the week-long standoff between
Hizballah and the Lebanese government, neither party appears
to be the clear-cut winner, though Hizballah emerged
relatively stronge. However, forced to resort to violence
againstLebanese citizens to achieve its political
objectives, Hizballah did not emerge unscathed. Its next
order of business will be to regain its claim to legitimacy
as a "resistance," by appearing to play a constructive role
at the National Dialogue just launched May 16 evening in Doha
(leaving Michel Aoun to do its dirty work),while continuing
to pursue its own agenda behind the scenes. End summary.

A LOSE-LOSE SITUATION,
BUT HIZBALLAH EMERGES
RELATIVELY STRONGER
--------------


3. (C) Both the GOL and Hizballah were losers in the
week-long standoff, but the GOL lost more, leaving Hizballah
to enter negotiations from a relatively stronger position.
Having seen what Hizballah is capable of, the GOL is likely
to tread carefully in any future decisions, and the LAF,
successfully intimidated, unlikely to challenge Hizballah
openly any time soon. However, in some respects Hizballah
played its only card; by occupying downtown Beirut and parts
of the Chouf and instigating violence that resulted in dozens
of deaths, Hizballah overplayed its hand and public blame for
any second round would likely to fall on Hizballah's
shoulders. The National Dialogue is an opportunity for both
sides to step back and reflect before determining their next
moves.


4. (C) Hizballah achieved its immediate objective: to force
the government to rescind its May 5 decisions to transfer the
head of airport security and to confront Hizballah's fiber
optics network following the discovery of a Hizballah
surveillance camera at Beirut International Airport.
However, this victory came at the expense of exposing
Hizballah's true colors (e.g., gaining political control of
the country) while at the same time undermining the
credibility of its claim of holding arms exclusively for the
purpose of "resistance" against Israel.

TACTICAL GOALS:
PRESERVE ITS WEAPONS,
REPOLISH ITS TARNISHED IMAGE,
SOLIDIFY POLITICAL GAINS
--------------


5. (C) Realizing it may have gone too far, Hizballah's next
goal probably will be to save face by appearing to play a
constructive role at Doha, and, as usual, leaving the role of
spoiler to March 8 ally Free Patriotic Movement leader
General Michel Aoun. Aoun, happy to play this role to keep
his own prospects for the presidency alive, has many options
in this regard, which he has used in the past to block
efforts to reach an agreement: 1) insist on a prior
agreement on ministerial portfolios (which March 14 majority
leader Saad Hariri rejects); 2) insist on a blocking minority
(ditto); 3) insist on an electoral law that benefits his
party (1960 law). Using the Qataris as a front, Hizballah
probably will push for a 10-10-10 cabinet distribution (ten
seats each for the majority, opposition, and president) as
the starting point for discussions, knowing full well that
neither Saad nor Aoun will accept this.


6. (C) While playing the role of constructive interlocutor,
Hizballah's real agenda will be to preserve its key
interests: 1) keep discussion of its arms off the agenda at
Doha; instead confining the discussions to cabinet formation
and electoral law; 2) secure a blocking minority to ensure
that the GOL is unable to take decisions like those of May 5
or any other actions that could jeopardize Hizballah's arms
or security apparatus. This would also prevent the new
cabinet from stepping back from the previous cabinet's
ministerial statement in 2005 (which Hizballah, then still
part of the government, accepted),which said the cabinet
"considers the Lebanese resistance a natural and sincere
expression of the national right of the Lebanese people in
liberating their territory and defending their dignity in
face of the Israeli aggressions, threats, and desires, and
working on the continuation of liberating Lebanese territory."


7. (C) Hizballah almost certainly would court Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) Commander General Michel Sleiman to ensure that,
once elected, Sleiman does not challenge Hizballah's arms.
If at any point Hizballah feels that its arms are at risk, we
would not be surprised to see some sort of provocation of
Israel, whether attributable to Hizballah or not, to spark an
Israeli reaction that would restore Hizballah's credentials
as a "resistance" and expose the weakness of the LAF; 3)
maintain the "tent city" sit-in outside the Prime Minister's
office; 4) keep international focus on Doha to prevent a UNSC
Resolution addressing Hizballah's arms. By leaning on
friendlier UNSC members (Libya? Russia?),fostering the
perception that the Doha talks are productive, and stressing
that the issues are internal Lebanese matters, Hizballah (or
its allies) probably will seek to dampen UNSC enthusiasm for
a resolution at this time.

STRATEGIC GOALS:
GAZA-STYLE COUP D'ETAT
--------------


8. (C) Hizballah's longer-term strategic goal, we suspect, is
driven more by Iran than Syria and ultimately is to secure
political dominance of the country by peaceful means --
"Gaza-style," as Saad would characterize it (Ref A). This
strategy entails derailing the National Dialogue if it
appears to be forcing Hizballah to compromise, but otherwise
stringing it along as a stalling technique to bide time until
the international, regional, and domestic tides turn in
Hizballah's favor. The U.S. presidential election is a key
factor here, with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah all counting on
U.S. disengagement in Lebanon for the next six to nine months
starting from the run-up to the election until the new
administration gets settled in mid-2009. The wager is that,
regardless of who wins, there will be a friendlier face in
the White House. Meanwhile, Iran can continue with its
nuclear programs unhindered, solidifying its standing in the
region.


9. (C) To achieve this goal, Hizballah needs to consolidate
its domestic support and reestablish its legitimacy as a
"resistance." If necessary, this again could involve some
sort of Hizballah provocation of Israel, perhaps, as it did
in 2006, taking advantage of the situation in Gaza to launch
its own attack. Hizballah no doubt is angling for a repeat
of its 2006 rebound, when support among Lebanese Shia in the
south for Hizballah plummeted immediately after the war, only
to bounce back once memories faded on who initiated the
conflict.


10. (C) Hizballah also will continue its efforts to build
what is essentially a state-within-a-state, building up its
military arsenal, and expanding its fiber optics and social
service networks. While its arms and telephone network will
continue to be painted as essential for countering Israel
aggression, the tangible on-the-ground services, highlighted
by a sophisticated public relations campaign, provided to
Lebanese Shia probably are key to expanding its public
constituency.


11. (C) The flip side of this strategy is continued efforts
to weaken those state institutions that threaten Hizballah's
hegemony: the LAF and GOL. Hizballah will work to discredit
the LAF, either by demonstrating its ineffectiveness at
defending the country from Israel or, capitalizing on the
violence of the last week, its inability to prevent sectarian
clashes within the country. We would not rule out further
Hizballah-induced sectarian skirmishes in an attempt to upset
the LAF's fragile unity, albeit avoiding an eruption into a
full-fledged Sunni-Shia conflict, which we doubt Iran wants
to see at this time.


12. (C) Hizballah will continue its efforts to undermine the
Siniora government through "erosion" by providing social
welfare services where the GOL has failed (or taking credit
for GOL-provided services) and by disrupting the economy,
e.g., through labor demonstrations. The week-long closure of
Beirut International Airport, in addition to the political
impact, also has economic consequences. So far the country
has exhibited its usual, if not remarkable, resilience in
times of crisis, thanks in large part to the efforts of
Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, whom we suspect is
another ripe target for Hizballah courtship.


13. (C) Hizballah also will work to weed out its enemies
within the Shia community. Its recent ousting of the Mufti
of Tyre is the most visible example of what appears in be a
full-blown effort to clean house (septel) and install Shia
religious leaders of its own choosing in the country's most
powerful positions. Finally, we suspect Hizballah will seek
ways to sow divisions among the Christians, leaving Aoun as
the strongest Christian leader.

SISON