LEBANON: AS BACKUP, KLEYATE AIRPORT REQUIRES US

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000686

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO:KHARRINGTON, MPOPAL, NEA/ELA,
EB A/S SULLIVAN, EB/TRA,
ALSO FOR A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO
DEPT PASS TO DOD/PSP USDPEDELMAN, DAS KIMMITT, MDALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2018
TAGS: EAIR EFIN PTER PINR MASS ASEC UNSC SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AS BACKUP, KLEYATE AIRPORT REQUIRES US
SUPPORT TO GO OPERATIONAL

REF: A. BEIRUT 499

B. BEIRUT 533

C. BEIRUT 670

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Summary: USG support will be required to make the
northern Kleyate Airport viable for commercial flights.
Request DOS and DOD/OSD feedback on possibility of either
Paris III funds or Section 1206 or Section 1210 of the 2006
National Defence Authorization Act funding. With the Beirut
International Airport (BIA) barricaded by Hizballah, serious
consideration should be given to providing both monetary and
technical assistance, in order to secure an alternative to
BIA. Director General of Civil Aviation has full
specifications for the upgrades, prepared after the July 2006
war, and based on serious safety and security issues.
Chairman of Middle East Airlines (MEA) Hout believes that
airport security is compromised by opening up operations
through competitive bidding. Recent problems, including
access to jet fuel, highlight vulnerabilities of BIA. End
summary.

USE OF KLEYATE SHOULD BE EXAMINED
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2. (C) With Beirut International Airport (BIA) currently
under siege by Hizballah, immediate consideration must be
given to equipping the other Lebanese airport, Rene Mouawad,
otherwise known as Kleyate. This airport, in the northern
part of the country, has been used previously for commercial
flights, but now is a military airport for a country with no
military aircraft other than helicopters. It is currently
operational during daylight hours, and with the right wind
conditions. (Ref. A) While Kleyate would need navigation,
security and ground handling equipment, BIA is far from
secure at any time. Additionally BIA is vulnerable to
immediate takeover by Hizballah, as demonstrated both
05/07/08 and previously on 01/23/07, when the airport was
effectively closed by Hizballah, through the use of road
barricades. Currently, we understand that Hizballah is in
the process of installing permanent gates to allow them to
open and close the airport roads at will.

BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT VULNERABLE
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3. (C) BIA is vulnerable from several perspectives, some of
which are immutable. The location, in the southern suburbs
of Beirut, is in the backyard of Hizballah. Positioned on
the sea front, there is limited access by road, which is
easily blocked. Delivery of fuel is done by truck, and on
05/13 Hizballah temporarily blocked access to the fuel tank
farm, in an apparent attempt to demonstrate that the airport,
which continues to have airplanes landing and taking off, is
ultimately unable to insure continuous operations. Employees
are required to reach the airport through questionable
neighborhoods. The airport support operations are currently
under the control of the GOL-owned MEA, but efforts to open
the operations to outside companies, according to MEA
Chairman Mohammed Hout, will allow private companies to
control critical parts of the operation. (Ref. C)

INCIDENTS AT BIA
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4. (C) Over the last ew months, there have been specific
incidents of breaches of security at the airport, including
the mock targeting of planes with lasers and the discovery of
a camera pointed at the runway, and apparently installed by
Hizballah. The discovery of this camera, and the decision by
the cabinet of the GOL to remove it and the Brigadier General
in charge of airport security, was a leading cause of the
current civil disturbances. According to the Director
General of Civil Aviation Hamdi Chouk, other serious
vulnerabilities include the lack of safety equipment, such as
fire trucks destroyed in the July 2006 war, and ground
communications. Currently airport staff communicate through
personal cell phones,

BEIRUT 00000686 002 OF 002



LIMITATIONS OF KLEYATE AIRPORT
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5. (C) Kleyate is not a perfect substitute. The location is
vulnerable to wind direction, with unfavorable winds
permitting approaches only through Syrian air space. This
happens 50 percent of the time for large planes (bigger than
a Gulfstream V) and 30 percent of the time for smaller
aircraft, but during landing only. Taking off is not a
problem. Currently the perimeter defenses are old and
inadequate. However the runway is in good condition, having
been fully repaired after the damages incurred during the
July 2006 war, and is of an adequate length (10,000 feet) for
large commercial aircraft. The buildings are in use by the
Lebanese Armed Forces, and are in a good state of repair.
(Ref. B)

REQUIRED UPGRADES
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6. (C) Upgrades will be required to use Kleyate for
commercial flights, and at night. All upgrades proposed are
for minimum requirements for safety and security. Full
specifications are available from the GOL. The basic
requirements are as follows:


A. Airport navigation Equipment

1. An airport movable tower control system -
fully equipped.

2. Instrument Landing System (ILS),
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME),
and VHF Onmidirectional Radio (VOR)
equipment.

3. Area control radar.


B. Airport security equipment

1. Passenger and baggage inspection machines
(x-ray and hand held metal and
explosive detectors, six of each.)

2. Closed circuit television (CCTV) network.

C. Airport ground equipment

1. Runway and taxi way solar lighting system
(200 solar lights.)

2. airport electric generator.

3. Two fire fighting trucks.

Full specifications and cost estimates are being prepared for
dissemination through NEA/ELA Lebanon desk.


7. (C) Comment: In any discussion of fully outfitting Kleyate
for use as a commercial airport, careful consideration must
be given to the message; does this give tacit approval to
Hizballah to control BIA? Hizballah has previously declared
that the opening of Kleyate would be a red line. In
addition, Kleyate is vulnerable to other opposing forces,
including Syria. However, Lebanon has only two land borders,
with Israel and Syria, and as such, egress can never be
guaranteed. Currently the GOL cannot control the use of the
only viable airport, and therefore USG employees and Lebanese
alike are extremely vulnerable to a hostile force. End
comment.

SISON