Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT625
2008-05-07 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SHIA NGO HEAD TALKS ABOUT OPERATING IN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PINR EAID OEXC OVIP PROP SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7707
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0625/01 1281716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071716Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1744
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2210
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2517
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000625 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/PI, ECA/FO
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/ZARATE
OVP FOR HANNAH AND KAREM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR EAID OEXC OVIP PROP SY
IS, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SHIA NGO HEAD TALKS ABOUT OPERATING IN
THE SOUTH

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000625

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/PI, ECA/FO
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/ZARATE
OVP FOR HANNAH AND KAREM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR EAID OEXC OVIP PROP SY
IS, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SHIA NGO HEAD TALKS ABOUT OPERATING IN
THE SOUTH

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On May 6, the Charge met with Ali al Amine, an
independent Shia who heads Shoun Janoubiyeh, an NGO which
publishes an independent magazine covering events of interest
to the people of Southern Lebanon. Amin said that small arms
proliferation continues to be a major problem in south
Lebanon. Even though Hizballah has "talked" to him about
some of his cooperative efforts with the USG, he continues to
preserve the independence of his organization by maintaining
that he is "open to dialogue with all sides." When asked how
the international community could support the independent
Shia movement, al Amine said that the GOL must step in to
replace Hizballah as the actual or perceived provider of
social services. Finally, he said that many independent Shia
are distrustful of March 14 and the West after being "sold
out" by March 14 after a deal was struck with the opposition
in advance of the 2005 parliamentary elections. End Summary.

Small Arms Inflow Equals Trouble
--------------


2. (C) Al Amine told us that the current political tensions
have produced feelings of insecurity among the residents of
Dahiyeh, in Beirut's southern suburb, and Shia villages in
the South. In his opinion, no one wants to return to an
all-out civil war, but all sides -- not just the opposition
-- continue to build stocks of small arms. "Sparks will fly
when you mix guns and anxious people during troubled times."
The GOL made an effort to collect large weapons and
ammunition after the end of the civil war, but proliferation

of small arms has continued with no GOL interference since
the 1990s, he stated.


3. (C) When asked where the small arms come from, Amin said
that it is well known the one can purchase weapons in
Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps. He said the bulk of the
weapons are smuggled in via sea routes and beach landings,
not overland via Syria. He urged the Charge to explore
options for maritime security in addition to programs such as
the Northern Border Pilot Program.

Partnering on USG-Funded Programs
--------------


4. (C) Al Amine told us that he was proud to be one of the
seven NGO implementers for the MEPI-funded "Citizen Lebanon"
project, administered by the National Democratic Institute.
It has just launched and is part of a multi-million dollar,
three-year program to promote "a sense of citizenship"
throughout Lebanon. Al Amine was pleased that the multi-year
format allows for long-term work. "It will take time for the
ruling sectarian divisions to fade."


5. (C) Shoun Janoubiyeh is the "Citizen Lebanon" local
partner working in the deep South. The Charge asked if this
partnership with the USG had caused him any problems. Al
Amine said Hizballah has indeed "talked" to him, but Al Amine
responded to them point blank that he is open to working with
all sides and said he fully intended to maintain his dialogue
with the USG. He said Hizballah, in general, is opposed to
all projects and programs by independent Shia groups.
However, his NGO has a respected 15 year history of working
in the region and he did not seem overly concerned by
Hizballah's notice of his work. He said his program is also
strengthened by a large number of independent Shia volunteers
who are committed to the NGO's mission.

USG and March 14 Should Support Independent Shia
-------------- ---


6. (C) Al Amine admitted that, in many instances, direct
funding from the USG can be problematic in the South. He
said it would be more prudent to provide additional support
to the GOL so that is can step in to provide much-needed
social services to the local residents. "People only see
Hizballah programs and they wonder why the GOL, which

BEIRUT 00000625 002 OF 002


receives so much international financial support, fails to
meet their needs."


7. (C) Al Amine shared some concrete ideas to support
independent Shia youth in South Lebanon by providing them
with internet access, youth clubs or entertainment options,
and sport fields. (Note: EmbOffs referred him to USAID's
local Office of Transition Inititives and AMIDEAST's
Transparency and Accountability grants as potential sources
of funding. End Note.) He told us that these would be
effective counter-radicalization tools and that "Hizballah
absolutely hates the pilot programs that have been started by
UNIFIL." When asked why, Al Amine explained that Hizballah
targets young, unemployed, and uneducated Shia for
recruitment. He told us that in Nabatiyeh, Hizballah goes
into villages with a list of target individuals, gives them
USD 500, a gun and a sense of self-importance before shipping
them off to training camps. Hizballah also prays on the Shia
community's feelings of insecurity by telling them to look at
the plight of the Shia in Iraq and implying that they could
be the next victims of Sunni domination in the region.


8. (C) Al Amine also said that the independent Shia feel
politically marginalized. "March 14, which is strongly
supported by the USG, is largely seen as a non-inclusive
group which does not stretch out its hand for dialogue. You,
the U.S. Government, are criticized by association. There are
a few individuals within March 14 who are the exception to
the rule, such as Nassib Lahoud -- but the most powerful
leaders, including the Prime Minister, continue to ignore
us."


9. (C) Al Amine then shared his personal assessment of
various March 14 leaders:

-- Saad Hariri: Al Amine believes Saad is looking for
"followers, not partners." For the independent Shia who have
no wish to formally join March 14, this approach is a
non-starter.

-- Amine Gemayel: We were surprised to hear Al Amine tell us
that Gemayel had a strong relationship with the independent
Shia. His diplomatic approach is well-received, but the Shia
also believe that he has become only a marginally influential
figure within March 14.

-- Walid Jumblatt: The Shia have a hard time accepting
Jumblatt's conversion from a pro-Syrian figure into a key
March 14 player.

-- Samir Geagea: Al Amine called him the most intelligent of
the March 14 leaders. However, he believes that GeaGea's
prison sentence permanently isolated him from the Shia
community. "He's lost touch."


10. (C) AID Mission Director asked why the independent Shia
aren't more proactive about developing their relationship
with March 14 leaders. Al Amine then placed the relationship
into historical context. In April 2005, Al Amine's father, a
respected Shia cleric in Sidon, organized a conference of
approximately 500 Lebanese independent Shia figures. During
the conference, the group issued a political declaration
which nicely paralleled March 14 democratic ideals and
adopted a concrete work plan to move forward. "Hizballah and
Amal were furious with us because we were pulling away some
of their Shia support base. However, March 14 then made a
deal with Hizballah and Amal in advance of the 2005
parliamentary elections that pulled the rug out from
underneath the independent Shia. Moderate Shia still feel
burned by those events and ironically, that backroom deal by
March 14 only helped to make their enemies stronger."

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Al Amine is a credible interlocutor with tremendous
experience on the ground. We agree with his belief that
efforts to counter Hizballah's control of the south will
require long-term effort and long-term support. End Comment.

SISON