Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1793
2008-12-24 09:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SLEIMAN TELLS DAS HALE TO "WAIT AND SEE"

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS LE SY 
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLB #1793/01 3590910
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240910Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3845
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0262
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3304
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3514
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001793 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR PRM A/S KIMMITT AND PDAS RUGGIERO
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR AMBRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS LE SY
RU
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SLEIMAN TELLS DAS HALE TO "WAIT AND SEE"
IF GOL RECEIVES MIG-29 FIGHTER JETS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001793

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR PRM A/S KIMMITT AND PDAS RUGGIERO
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR AMBRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS LE SY
RU
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SLEIMAN TELLS DAS HALE TO "WAIT AND SEE"
IF GOL RECEIVES MIG-29 FIGHTER JETS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a December 19 meeting with visiting NEA DAS David
Hale and the Ambassador, President Michel Sleiman said
everyone should &wait and see8 what comes out of the
Russian MiG-29 offer to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). He
said the entire GOL had been surprised by the offer, and the
LAF would need time to do an assessment as to whether or not
it could absorb such equipment. Sleiman added that the
Council of Ministers also needed time to review the Russian
offer and to approve the deal. However, he said that if
Lebanon accepts the Russian offer, it would do so without
offering Russia any political commitments, adding that no
country could come between the positive relationship Lebanon
has with the U.S. Sleiman believed parliamenary leader Saad
Hariri was the person who had the most contact with Russian
officials and that the Russians may be attempting to fulfill
an earlier promise made by Hariri to the LAF for free Russian
equipment.


2. (C) On Ghajar, Sleiman said direct or indirect talks with
the Israelis were unnecessary and that Israel should accept
the UNIFIL proposal for an Israeli withdrawal, as Lebanon had
done. However, he said Lebanon would continue working with
UN Special Coordinator on Lebanon (UNSCOL) Michael Williams
on the issue. Sleiman added that there should be a list of
independent candidates running in the 2009 parliamentary
elections, but that he could not endorse such a list as it
would damage his ability to mediate among the battling
political parties. DAS Hale told Sleiman he had made the

trip to Lebanon to show GOL partners that during the USG's
presidential transition period U.S. goals and policy towards
Lebanon would remain constant. End summary.

WAIT AND SEE IF
RUSSIAN JETS ARRIVE
--------------


3. (C) In a December 19 meeting with visiting NEA DAS David
Hale and the Ambassador, accompanied by NEA/ELA Desk Officer
Matthew Irwin and Poloff, President Michel Sleiman said
everyone should, "wait and see," regarding a Russian offer to
supply the GOL with 10 MiG-29 fighter jets. The GOL needed
time to look at the details of the offer, according to
Sleiman. He said he spoke with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
Commanding General Jean Kahwagi to determine whether the LAF
could absorb such sophisticated equipment into its Air Force
squadron. According to Sleiman, Kahwagi said the LAF would
need to complete an assessment to gauge the LAF's ability
could sustain such equipment. Sleiman also stressed that the
GOL had no codified political or military commitments with
Russia, at this point, over the MiG-29s. He added that the
Council of Ministers would have to sign off on any foreign
government donations.


4. (C) Sleiman noted that the GOL's relationship with the
U.S. was "deep," and no country could damage this
relationship, adding that other relationships were
"temporal." Sleiman said Lebanon had no intentions to attack
Israel with the iGs. He added that the deal should not
effect te USG offer to equip the LAF with M-60 tanks and i
the GOL were to accept the Russian offer, it would do so
without making any political commitments.

5. (C) DAS Hale said the USG was surprised by the Russian
offer and that it raised a lot of questions in Washington.
He continued that the USG valued its long-term working
relationship with the LAF, as evidenced most recently through
the Joint Military Commission (JMC). While the U.S. had
developed a list of items needed by the LAF to support
Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, DAS Hale pointed out
that fighter jets had never been on this list. He explained
that the USG had done a lot of work to convince both the U.S.
Congress, as well as the Israelis, that the USG's military

BEIRUT 00001793 002 OF 002


assistance program with the LAF was no threat to Israel.
However, now USG would have to explain to both groups how
fighter jets fit into this plan.


6. (C) DAS Hale also noted the negative comments made by
Defense Minister Elias Murr concerning USG assistance towards
the LAF, and how such comments damage the USG relationship
with the LAF. He urged President Sleiman to ensure positive
official statements about the U.S.-Lebanon military
relationship were made soon, to counter damage done by Murr.
DAS Hale emphasized that U.S. sought to preserve the
relationship it has with the LAF. Therefore, the U.S. would
not publicly criticize the offer and would say as little as
possible, even though in his view the Russian motivation was
meant to embarrass the U.S. He asked that the LAF make its
own assessment and determination as to the desirability of
accepting the offer.

GOL WILL CONTINUE TO WORK
WITH UN FOR GHAJAR SOLUTION
--------------


7. (C) DAS Hale briefed Sleiman on his recent trip to Israel,
stating that he held encouraging talks with Israeli officials
in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Foreign Ministry
concerning a Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar. Israel wanted
to find a solution to Ghajar because Israelis officials
recognized that a withdrawal from Ghajar would be a easy
political victory for March 14, by demonstrating the state of
Lebanon can deliver results to the Lebanese people through
peaceful means, Hale said.


8. (C) DAS Hale noted that the GOI would like three things to
occur if a withdrawal from Ghajar was going to take place
soon. Primarily, Hale reported, the GOI wanted its
withdrawal to be recognized by the international community.
In addition, the GOI wanted to be notified in advance of any
changes by the UN or GOL to the status of Ghajar, as such
changes may effect Israel's security. Finally, Israel wanted
a political framework on Ghajar, possibly signed documents,
with the GOL to recognize the withdrawal, he said. DAS Hale
noted that when UN Special Coordinator on Lebanon (UNSCOL)
Michael Williams traveled to Tel Aviv on December 22-23 to
hold discussions with Israeli officials over a possible
Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar, he would find receptive and
open individuals on the Israeli side.


9. (C) Sleiman said the GOI should accept the UNIFIL proposal
for an Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar without direct or
indirect talks. He added that Lebanon should not have to
negotiate at all over Ghajar as it is Lebanese territory.
Sleiman noted that Lebanon accepted the UNIFIL proposal and
that the Israelis were stalling on making a decision on the
deal. However, Sleiman said the GOL would continue working
with Williams on the issue.

INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES SHOULD RUN FOR
PARLIAMENT, BUT I CANT ENDORSE THEM
--------------


10. (C) On the issue of his endorsement of an list of
independent candidates for the 2009 parliamentary elections,
Sleiman affirmed his belief that there should be a central,
independent bloc of candidates in the Parliament. He said
such a group would not have to be aligned with, or endorsed
by, the President. Sleiman added that it would be
inappropriate for him to organize or endorse any lists for
the elections and that he preferred to stay neutral and
maintain his role as mediator to the battling parties.


11. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.

SISON