SINIORA SWEET ON CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001788

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF,GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV MASS PREL UNSC MARR LE SY IS
SUBJECT: SINIORA SWEET ON CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS,
SOUR ON GHAJAR

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Flush with March 14's victory in parliament's election
of Constitutional Council members on December 18, PM Siniora
and aide Rola Noureddine met with visiting NEA Deputy
Assistant Secretary (DAS) David Hale, Ambassador, and NEA
Lebanon Desk Officer Matthew Irwin on December 19. Siniora
bristled at new Israeli conditions for withdrawal from
northern Ghajar, but emphasized he would continue indirect
discussions via the UN. While generally positive on Russia's
offer to donate MiG-29s to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
Siniora noted that LAF leadership and the cabinet would "wait
to see the details."

MAJORITY STARTS TO ACT LIKE ONE
--------------


2. (C) In a mild rant, PM Siniora called the post-Doha unity
government "unsustainable," decrying opposition threats to
block March 14's candidates for Lebanon's Constitutional
Council, duly elected on December 18 by parliamentary
majority but subject to cabinet review and possible
opposition veto. "We can compromise on many things, but
sometimes people will be unhappy." Siniora said he hoped the
situation would improve after the elections; DAS Hale
expressed skepticism that elections would resolve the
fundamental differences between March 14 and March 8 or
Hizballah's ability to resort to veto-by-force, but suggested
March 14 could preserve gains made since 2005. "And add to
them," Siniora interjected, clearly pleased that March 14 had
begun to flex its parliamentary muscle. "Yesterday we
learned what can be done when we take a strong, united
position."

GHAJAR
--------------


3. (C) Summarizing his recent meetings in Israel, DAS Hale
told Siniora that "it's clear Israel is looking for a way out
of Ghajar" and understands the need to help Lebanese
moderates in advance of the 2009 parliamentary elections.
"Ghajar won't just help March 14," replied Siniora, "it will
send a message that we can accomplish something with Israel
through non-violent means." Both noted their high hopes for
UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams' upcoming
visit to Israel. PM's aide Rola Noureddine said she was
pleased with Williams' work on Lebanon and Israel's
appointment of MFA Director General Aaron Abramovich as lead
negotiator for Ghajar. "He's creative. He's the one who
pushed new ideas to FM Livni about possible reciprocal
arrangements with Lebanon, including the idea of a renewed
armistice."


4. (C) DAS Hale told Siniora that the Israelis had laid out
three conditions for withdrawal from Ghajar. First, they
want international acknowledgment, probably via the UN, that
they've returned to their pre-2006 compliance with the 2000
line of withdrawal (the blue line). Second, they want
Lebanon to agree to consultations prior to any "change in the
security situation in northern Ghajar." Third, they want
some form of acknowledgment from Lebanon that northern Ghajar
was resolved diplomatically, perhaps enshrined in a
UN-drafted document and signed by the parties.


5. (C) Responding to the first condition, Siniora said, "I
will not censor international reaction to Israel's
withdrawal. The UN Security Council is free to comment." On
the second condition, Siniora said the idea of consultations
had been "raised and rejected." He reiterated his commitment
to indirect discussions via UNIFIL, but said he would not
seek Israel approval to exercise sovereignty over Lebanese
land. Bristling at the third condition, he said, "Neither I

BEIRUT 00001788 002 OF 003


nor any Lebanese leader can sign such a document."


6. (C) Similarly frustrated, Noureddine added that Israel had
once again changed its demands. "First they wanted a
security framework, then negotiations at the political level,
and now they want a document. We've signed and delivered our
agreement to the UNIFIL plan, which clearly shows this has
been resolved through negotiations." "I'm beginning to think
this is more than political intransigence," added Siniora,
"but that perhaps vested Israeli interests are at stake,
wrapped up in corruption or smuggling. The previous
condition, to which we agreed, was that withdrawal not be
portrayed as a victory for Hizballah. But the status quo is
a victory for Hizballah. The Israelis are getting too
greedy, and they might end up with nothing. I'd rather this
continue for one hundred years than give more concessions."

PREPARING FOR TRANSITIONS
--------------


7. (C) Siniora said he did not expect the new Administration
"to bring us from the night into the day," but that its
anticipated focus on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would
be good for the region and regional perceptions of the United
States. Musing on the impact of President-elect Obama's
election, Siniora added, "It's clear that America is looking
to purge years of intolerance. Similarly, Arabs look at
Lebanon as a place where the values of freedom, tolerance,
and humility are respected, or where we can return to their
being respected. That's one more reason for the new
administration to stick with Lebanon."


8. (C) Hale urged Siniora to ensure that the Lebanese
developed their own strategy to achieve their goals, rather
than waiting for the international community to provide one.
Siniora noted that "March 14 has a plan," but that the
coalition would need to remain united for it to succeed. "In
Lebanon, we have micro-aspirations and macro-consequences.
For example, this Kataeb-Lebanese Forces bickering (referring
to the debate between Kataeb head Amine Gemayel and Lebanese
Forces leader Samir Geagea's over which March 14 candidates
would run in disputed Christian electoral districts) is
stupid. We need to forget about individual seats, about
little victories, and do whatever it takes to win."

MIFFED ABOUT MIGS
--------------


9. (C) DAS Hale outlined U.S. concerns with Defense Minister
Murr's televised acceptance of Russia's offer to donate 10
MiG-29 fighter jets to the LAF, saying the United States
would say nothing negative in public, but was privately
dismayed. First, Murr had jeopardized his good relations
with Pentagon and CENTCOM officials by contradicting
assurances that he had no intention of accepting Russian
equipment. Second, the MiG deal bolstered Israeli and
Congressional arguments that the LAF was not a responsible
force committed to a long-term strategic partnership with the
United States. Third, the United States was concerned that
funds intended for U.S.-origin equipment like the M-60 tanks
in Jordan would be diverted to fund an unnecessary and
expensive MiG program. Finally, DAS Hale relayed
Washington's displeasure at Murr's remarks on Russian
television implying he had been driven to accept the offer of
Russian assistance because "other countries" had offered too
little, too late, interpreted as a swipe at the United States.


10. (C) Echoing a line heard in many of DAS Hale's other
meetings with senior Lebanese officials, Siniora averred that
he'd been unaware that MiGs were under discussion in Moscow.
"There was talk of ammunition and possible tanks, but not
MiGs." Noting that he and the cabinet (whose approval is
required for the LAF to accept foreign military assistance)
would "wait to see the details," Siniora commented that the
announcement of the MiG offer had been good for LAF morale,
good for the state, and made Hizballah and Syria very

BEIRUT 00001788 003 OF 003


uncomfortable."


11. (C) Objecting to Israeli concerns, Siniora claimed that
10 planes were not a serious threat. "Nor would we use them
against the Palestinian camps. The LAF's weapons aren't
meant for confrontation. The value of such a stick lies in
not having to use it." Siniora said he was comfortable that
the cabinet and LAF leadership would make "the right
decision" about the MiGs. "We don't want to antagonize our
friends or play one against another, but it is important to
demonstrate to the Lebanese people that the state is capable
of defending itself."

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) It was clear from his tone that, while he would say
nothing to disparage Murr or the right of the LAF to seek
whatever assistance it deemed necessary, Siniora shared our
skepticism at the wisdom of the MiG deal. As head of the
cabinet and penny-pinching former Minister of Finance,
Siniora understands the long-term financial burden that
maintaining the MiGs would place on the cash-strapped LAF.
While working to squeeze electoral benefit from the deal for
March 14 and capitalize on the boost in LAF morale, Siniora
may well seek an excuse to turn down the offer when the time
is right.


13. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this message.

SISON