LEBANON: HARIRI ON OPPOSITION ATTACKS ON SUNNIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001729

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY QA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI ON OPPOSITION ATTACKS ON SUNNIS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador and DCM met December 4 with Parliamentary
Majority Leader Saad Hariri, who said opposition March 8's
fanning of anti-Sunni sentiment was not succeeding
politically. He claimed that Michel Aoun's trip to Syria
would backfire on Aoun, and said it was a "fact" that Aoun
was receiving funding from the Qataris. He believed the
Saudis were unconcerned about March 8 verbal attacks on them,
despite the Saudi Ambassador's recent complaints about the
statements. He was upset by Lebanese Armed Forces Commander
General Jean Kahwagi's recent trip to Damascus, but said he
would stand against attacks on Defense Minister Elias Murr,
who will travel to Syria soon at the request of President
Sleiman.


2. (C) Hariri noted he had met previously with Tripoli
leaders Najib Mikati and Mohammed Safadi about potential
alliances, but was not sure where they now stood and was
waiting to hear back from them. He had problems with Michel
Murr's insistence on including Armenian Tashnaq in any
potential alliance with March 14. He said he was still
meeting regularly with Hizballah representatives to resolve
issues of common concern, and he inquired about the
deliverables of General Petraeus's December 2 visit to
Beirut. End summary.

"INDEPENDENT" CANDIDATE AT QOREITEM DAILY
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador and DCM, accompanied by PolEconOff,
called on Saad Hariri December 4 at Qoreitem. Hariri
advisors Nader Hariri and Nadine Chehab also attended the
meeting. "Independent" politician from Keserwan Mansour Bon
was in the hallway as the Ambassador entered Hariri's office,
and she commented on his presence to Nader Hariri. Nader
reported that Bon visits Qoreitem daily and is in "constant
consultation" with Saad. Nader said Bon was "on board" with
Hariri, though he insisted Bon would not take specific March
14 candidates on his list, particularly those from Samir
Geagea's Lebanese Forces. He said Geagea understood he could
not run candidates in Keserwan, though Amine Gemayel planned
to run a Kataeb candidate, Sejean Azzi, in that heavily
Christian district. (Note: Mansour Bon is among the most
prominent of the "independent" Keserwan politicians expected
to run in the spring parliamentary elections and to form a
bloc in support of President Sleiman. End Note.)

MARCH 8 PAINTING SUNNIS AS TERRORISTS
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting with Saad Hariri by
expressing concern about pro-Syrian politicians' fanning of
anti-Sunni sentiment, among Christians in particular, by
casting the upcoming elections as a choice between fanatical
Sunni Salafists and Wahabi extremists on one hand, and a Shia
Hizballah working within the system on the other. Hariri
said it was clear the March 8 strategy was not working. He
pointed to March 14 successes in recent university and
syndicate elections, and said accusations that he had funded
Salafist groups would lead to nothing. He called March 8
tactics portraying law-abiding Sunnis as terrorists as
"racist."


5. (C) The Ambassador continued on the theme, asking what
March 14 or Hariri's Future Movement could do to counter the
impact of these March 8 tactics, particularly among
Christians. Hariri said he refused to go on the defensive.
He explained that he would simply demonstrate his moderation
and tell people what he stands for. He was unconvinced
footage on March 8 television stations of Fatah al-Islam
members detained in Syria, pictures he claimed were intended
to paint all Sunnis as terrorists, would have much of an
impact in Lebanon. The DCM expressed concern that after this
opposition campaign, any security incident in Tripoli or
elsewhere involving Sunnis would leave Hariri open to
political attack. "Yes," said Hariri. "That is what Lebanon

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is all about."

AOUN'S FOREIGN BACKERS; ANTI-SAUDI ATTACKS
--------------


6. (C) Hariri said March 8 leader Michel Aoun's current trip
to Syria would backfire on him. He pointed to Aoun's foreign
supporters as Aoun's key weakness, saying that in addition to
support from Iran and Syria, it was "a fact" that Aoun was
receiving money from Qatar as well. He noted that pro-March
8 television station OTV was partially owned by the Emir of
Qatar. He downplayed the need for Saudi Ambassador
Abdel-Aziz Khoja's recent protest of March 8 attacks on the
Kingdom. He said the Saudi regime was "bigger than that,"
and viewed the criticism of KSA in a regional context,
understanding they originated with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah.

MORE VISITS TO SYRIA
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador solicited Hariri's reaction to Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Jean Kahwagi's recent
trip to Syria. Hariri said he had known about the visit, but
had not known Kahwagi would meet with Bashar Asad and issue a
joint statement with him. Hariri called the trip
"ridiculous." Nonetheless, he said, he would stand behind
Defense Minister Elias Murr when he goes to Damascus, since
he was going at the request of President Sleiman to deal with
specific issues. "He won't get anything done there, on
(UNSCR) 1701 or anything, but he will go," stated Hariri.

ELECTORAL ALLIANCES
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador asked Hariri how his negotiations with
political leaders over electoral alliances were proceeding.
Hariri said he had held discussions with leaders from Tripoli
and with independent Christian Michel Murr, but that nothing
solid had emerged from them yet. He noted he had met with
Tripolitan leader Najib Mikati a month and a half before, but
had not touched base with him since. He stated they were due
to meet again later in December or in January. With regard
to Tripoli heavyweight and current March 14 minister Mohammed
Safadi, Hariri said, "I have no clue where he is
(politically)." He expected both leaders would come to him
soon, though he claimed the Syrians were attempting to bring
Mikati, Safadi, and former president Omar Karame together
into an alliance at the expense of Hariri.


9. (C) Hariri said he had had good discussions with Michel
Murr about putting together an alliance of independents with
March 14, but believed, Murr's insistence on including
Armenian Tashnaq was a problem. According to Hariri, Murr
presented him with a proposal for seat allocation which would
give the Armenian Tashnaq party an unacceptable number of
seats. Hariri made a counter offer, with fewer seats for
Tashnaq, but giving them two ministries inthe new
government. He noted he did not trust Tshnaq, which had
just sent a delegation to Damasus to meet with Syrian
President Bashar Asad, to keep its MPs with March 14
following the elections. He believed it likely the party
would take its seats to Michel Aoun's side once the electoral
campaign was over to eat into March 14's bloc. "(Tashnaq
leader Hagop Pakradounian did not go see Bashar Asad to tell
him he will ally with Saad Hariri. Bashar told them what to
do," said Hariri. The Ambassador pointed out that
Pakradounian had seemed open to the idea of an alliance with
March 14 in a meeting with DCM the day before. "I don't
believe it at all," insisted Hariri.

STILL TALKING TO HIZBALLAH
--------------


10. (C) In response to Ambassador's question about his
continuing dealings with Hizballah, Hariri said he had had
another meeting with Hizballah Political Advisor Ali Hassan
Khalil, his fourth such meeting in six weeks, two days
before. He stated that their discussions centered on finding
a solution to Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri's refusal to
let parliament take up 73 draft laws the previous government
had submitted after the March 8 ministers left the cabinet.

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The two sides also discussed pushing forward with political
appointments requiring parliamentary approval, said Hariri.
He noted that Hizballah had agreed to remove its political
posters from the road leading to Beirut airport.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE, STL
--------------


11. (C) Hariri asked the Ambassador how General Petraeus'
December 2 visit to Beirut had gone. The Ambassador noted
that the General's visit had been very productive, with
General Petraeus outlining the U.S. commitment to continue to
train and equip the LAF. The U.S. was working to provide the
LAF with M60 main battle tanks, and had already provided
Humvees, rifles, body armor, and grenade launchers. The U.S.
was also working to respond to the LAF's request for the
Cessna Caravan, which will require Congressional
notification. Nader counseled that the best way to counter
press misinformation on U.S. military assistance was to
continue to deliver the equipment. The Ambassador also asked
for Hariri's reaction to the UN report noting that the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon was on track to commence
functioning on March 1, 2009. "It's great!" Hariri responded
enthusiastically.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) We believe Hariri may be underestimating the possible
resonance among Christians in key swing districts of Aoun's
accusations that Hariri's Future Movement participated in the
funding of Sunni extremist groups. The current efforts to
denounce Saudi Arabia by pro-Syrian politicans Michel Aoun
and Wi'am Wihab divert attention away from the March 8
alliance with Hizballah and emphasize a Sunni "threat" to
Lebanon. Meanwhile, though Hariri has said previously March
14 would have unified lists prepared by January, March 14
contacts tell us there was no discussion of electoral lists
at the December 4 meeting of the March 14 leadership, which
occurred a few hours after Ambassador's call on Hariri.
Hariri seems to be slow in forcing alliances with those
currently outside March 14, something that potential allies
continually point out to us. The Embassy will continue to
engage the March 14 leadership and potential allies to
encourage movement, but Hariri himself will have to spearhead
efforts to forge these alliances and assemble strong lists.
End comment.

SISON