LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER GENERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001701

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA, PM FOR A/S KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR POLAD MIKE GFOELLER
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREL PTER UNSC IS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER GENERAL
DAVID PETRAEUS

REF: A. BEIRUT 1639

B. BEIRUT 1638

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

OVERVIEW
--------------


1. (C) General Petraeus: Welcome back to Lebanon. Your
trip provides an excellent opportunity to reinforce the
message of strong U.S. support for a sovereign, democratic,
and stable Lebanon to reassure Lebanon's moderates that a
change in the U.S. Administration does not equal a change in
U.S. policy. The expansion of the U.S.-Lebanese military
partnership represents an historic opportunity to bolster the
cause of democracy, peace and stability in Lebanon and the
Middle East. The October 6, 2008 Joint Military Commission
(JMC) meeting, the first U.S.-Lebanon bilateral defense
talks, offered an opportunity to confirm the mutual benefits
of the relationship and press for further engagement in key
areas. Since the departure of Syrian forces in April of
2005, the USG has provided over $410 million in training and
equipment to the LAF (as well as $76 million to the national
police, the Internal Security Forces).


2. (C) The MOD will continue to press us for release of some
form of Close Air Support with a precision weapons
capability. The LAF has submitted a letter of request for
three Grand Caravan fixed wing aircraft and 135 Hellfire
missiles. MOD will press for release of Tactical UAVs
(RAVEN),TOW-2A missiles, Night Vision Equipment, and perhaps
precision artillery munitions. The LAF is also in
USCENTCOM-led discussions with the Jordanian Armed Forces to
transfer M-60 tanks to replace the aging Soviet T-55s and
U.S. M-48 tanks. This transfer will require Third Party
Transfer authority from the USG. Another issue: hoped-for
Saudi funding for the Close Air Support and tanks is not yet
confirmed. You can expect that your interlocutors, Prime
Minister Siniora and LAF Commander Gen. Jean Kahwagi, will
ask about U.S. support for key defense procurement needs and
also ask you for additional military equipment and training
for the military intelligence service (LAF-G2). We should
continue to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (and Internal
Security Forces) while underscoring the need for Lebanese
government commitment to combat terrorism, strengthen border
controls, bring Hizballah's arms under state authority, and
ensure implementation of UNSCRs 1559 and 1701.

THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE
--------------


3. (C) There have been significant political developments
since May 2008, when the government's decision to dismantle
Hizballah's communications systems and remove the chief of
airport security sparked armed clashes between Hizballah and
Lebanese civilians. Hizballah closed Beirut International
Airport and took control of most of west Beirut in a standoff
that lasted several days. The Qatari-brokered Doha Agreement
of May 21 put an end to the months-long political impasse and
paved the way for the May 25 election of consensus candidate
and former Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel
Sleiman as President. After much wrangling between the
majority and the opposition, Prime Minister Siniora completed
formation of a national unity government on July 11,
composed, per the Doha Agreement, of 16 majority ministers,
11 from the opposition, and three for President Sleiman
(including the key Defense and Interior ministry portfolios).



4. (C) The Saad Hariri-led March 14 majority coalition and
Hizballah-led opposition coalition have been uneasy partners
in the new national unity government. Both coalitions are
intensely focused on parliamentary elections scheduled to
take place next spring, which we expect to be close. The
Christian vote, divided between the two groups, will be
decisive in determining who wins the next majority. Many,
especially on March 14's side, are pinning their hopes on
President Sleiman forming his own list of independent
Christians -- or backing such candidates behind the scenes --
to challenge opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun. While
it is conceivable that either the current majority or the
current Hizballah-led opposition will win a clear majority to
form the next government, it is more likely that neither will
score a decisive victory and the two sides will form a
national unity government, as exists now.


5. (C) Hizballah's arms remain the most controversial issue.
As called for in the Doha Agreement, President Sleiman
launched a National Dialogue to discuss the national defense
strategy, including the role of Hizballah's weapons. To date
he has chaired two sessions, with the next session scheduled
for December 22. Expectations in Lebanon are low, however,
that the Dialogue will actually lead to an agreement whereby
Hizballah would actually give up its arms.

HIZBALLAH ACTIONS
--------------


6. (C) On August 28, a Lebanese Armed Forces helicopter
operating in Hizballah-controlled territory in southern
Lebanon was shot down, resulting in the death of an LAF
officer. A young Hizballah fighter was arrested, and the
military investigation is ongoing. On November 24, Israel
sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council
accusing Hizballah of conducting military maneuvers both
north and south of the Litani river (the latter would be a
violation of UNSCR 1701). However, LAF Commander General
Kahwagi told us that there had been no such maneuvers south
of the Litani, which was also reported by UNIFIL contacts.

SPORADIC VIOLENCE; RECONCILIATION EFFORTS
--------------


7. (C) Meanwhile, sporadic violence has plagued the
predominantly northern city of Tripoli and surrounding areas.
A clash in the north between rival Christian groups on
September 17 resulted in two deaths. In reaction to the
violence, various groups have engaged in "reconciliation"
meetings, including the October 26 meeting between Hariri and
Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah (their first-ever since the
2006 war ended),followed by lower level talks on policy
issues, ongoing talks between Walid Jumblatt's Progressive
Socialist Party and his rival Druze leader and Hizballah to
discuss security issues, and thus far unsuccessful attempts
between rival Christian parties. The LAF's attention is
focused on the Beddawi and Ain al Hilweh Palestinian refugee
camps.

REGIONAL ISSUES
--------------


8. (C) Sleiman was in the U.S. September 23-26. He addressed
the UNGA and meet Secretary Rice in New York and traveled to
Washington DC to meet President Bush and Secretary Gates on
September 25. He sought the President's views on the Middle
East Peace Process. Sleiman argues that failure to resolve
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has fueled terrorism in the
region, including Lebanon, where extremists use the
Palestinian cause to justify their actions. Sleiman also
traveled to New York September 12-13 to attend the
Saudi-sponsored Interfaith Dialogue, where he again raised
the issue and stressed that Palestinian refugees could not
seek permanent settlement in Lebanon. Sleiman traveled to
Iran November 24-25, one of several foreign trips he has made
since becoming president.


9. (C) The Government of Lebanon has urged that Israel
withdraw from the disputed Sheba'a Farms territory and for
Sheba'a to be placed under the authority of the United
Nations. Government of Lebanon leadership has also urged the
United States to pressure Israel to put an end to Israeli
overflights and turn over complete cluster bomb strike data
to aid in demining efforts.


10. (C) President Sleiman traveled to Damascus in mid-August
and reached agreement with President Asad that Syria and
Lebanon establish diplomatic relations between the two
countries for the first time since Lebanon's independence.
However, Asad yielded little in terms of demarcating the
common border (including Sheba'a Farms) or providing
information on Lebanese citizens presumed missing in Syria.
The latest report by the UN's Lebanon Independent Border
Assessment Team, dated August 27, highlights the fact that
Lebanon has made almost no progress in securing its border
with Syria and points of entry as required by UNSCR 1701.
Meanwhile, numerous GOL officials have since traveled to
Damascus, including Interior Minister Baroud, who agreed to
form a bilateral security committee in the wake of Syrian
accusations that Fatah al-Islam extremists in Lebanon are
posing a threat to Syria (Ref B).

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
--------------



11. (C) The benefit the USG seeks from the strong
military-to-military relationship with the LAF is to develop
a valid alternative to Hizballah for the people of Lebanon to
turn to for protection. A strong LAF also serves to
counteract Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon. Since
the departure of Syrian forces in April of 2005, the USG has
provided over $410 million in training and equipment to the
LAF. The bulk of this aid has been Foreign Military Funding
(FMF),but also include significant amounts of International
Education and Training (IMET),Section 1206 funding,
Counterterrorism Force Protection (CTFP),Joint Combined
Exercises and Training (JCET),and various other military
aid. The Lebanon FMF request for FY-2010 is at $100 million;
FY-2010 IMET request is $1.5 million. The LAF five year
acquisition plan is designed to take full advantage of these
historic amounts of military aid.

AREAS FOR GREATER MILITARY COOPERATION
--------------


12. (C) Interoperability: Currently there is an Acquisition
and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Lebanon and the
U.S. which was used to great advantage by both countries in
the Nahr al Bared fight in 2007. There is no Status of
Forces agreement (SOFA) or Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA) and no expectation the GOL would approve such
agreements in the foreseeable future.


13. (C) Modernization: After considerable U.S. urging,
Lebanon has drafted a five year modernization plan. Getting
Lebanon to ensure that its requests for Foreign Militay
funding (FMF) acquisitions are consistent withits plan will
be key, and we should stress this in JMC discussions. The
MOD has begun to think more critically about whether they
still need to retain their stock of aging and
difficult-to-maintain Soviet equipment, particularly the
T-54/55 tanks as well as the aging M-48 tanks by agreeing to
receive 66 M-06 tanks from Jordan.


14. (C) Training: The key component of U.S. military
training to the LAF will be the Comprehensive Training
Program (CTP). Our goal is to have 8-10 ARCENT-supervised
civilians trainers in place by mid-2009 to train LAF in all
war fighting functions, including marksmanship and battle
staff training. Meanwhile, the robust JCET program needs to
be maintained at its current level of six missions per year.
Mobile Training Teams from ARCENT, MARCENT, AFCENT, NAVCENT
and the USCG should also continue to be programmed to assist
the LAF.

WEAPONS RELEASE
--------------


15. (C) The MOD will continue to press, at a minimum, for
release of some form of Close Air Support with a precision
weapons capability, (Note: LAF has submitted an LOR for three
Grand Caravan fixed-wing aircraft and 135 Hellfire missiles.)
They also will press for tactical UAVs (RAVEN),TOW-2A
missiles, Night Vision Equipment, and perhaps precision
artillery munitions. The LAF is also in USCENTCOM-led
discussions with the Jordanian Armed Forces to transfer M-60
tanks to replace the aging Soviet T-55s and U.S. M-48 tanks.
This transfer will require Third Party Transfer authority
from the USG. The Close Air Support and tanks require
funding that the Lebanese hope will come from Saudi Arabia
(however, that funding is not nailed down; DOD/OSD is also
looking at the possibility of UAE funding). You can expect
that your interlocutors will ask you for additional military
equipment and training for use by their military intelligence
service. The FY-2010 FMF request for Lebanon is $100
million; the FY-2010 FMF request is $4 million. (Note: We
understand that during President Sleiman's November 24-25
trip to Tehran, the Iranians had made a generous offer of
military support to Lebanon, which Sleiman diplomatically
declined.

YOUR INTERLOCUTORS
--------------


16. (C) Prime Minister Siniora is likely to press for
enhanced U.S. efforts to equip the LAF. He is frustrated
with Lebanon's lack of progress with the Israelis on the Blue
Line, Ghajar, and strike data provision. He is focused on
developing a strategy with donors to take control of
Lebanon's borders. However he has not been overly concerned
by Syrian deployment along the Syrian border with Lebanon,

saying he would take Syria's claim that it was trying to
reduce smuggling at face value.


17. (C) LAF Commander Kahwagi has tended to focus on
tactical level issues with recent U.S. visitors. He
consistently complains that the flow of U.S. assistance is
very slow. Kahwagi is not squeamish about USG activities and
associating the LAF with USG training and doctrine. His
straight forward approach is greatly admired by the LAF.
Kahwagi is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Infantry Center at
Fort Benning, Georgia and Italy's War College. He was also a
Marshall Center graduate in 2006.

KEY MESSAGES FOR THIS VISIT
--------------


18. (SBU) Your visit is a good opportunity to deliver
several key messages, as follows:

--Reiterate the strong and enduring U.S. commitment to an
independent and sovereign Lebanon.

--Stress the constructive role that a peaceful and prosperous
Lebanon can play in contributing to regional stability.

--Emphasize that the U.S. plans to continue to provide
support to strengthen Lebanon's state institutions, including
a robust package of U.S. military training and assistance, as
well as assistance to the police (Internal Security Forces).

--Emphasize that continued USG support for the LAF,
particularly in the U.S. Congress, is tied to perceptions
that there is serious action being taken to Hizballah's use
of force under GOL control.

--Note that in addition the U.S. will continue to assist the
Government of Lebanon in building economic viability and
building governance capacity.

SISON