LEBANON: NASSIB LAHOUD ON SHIA SEEKING A NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001691

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: NASSIB LAHOUD ON SHIA SEEKING A NEW
"VETO"; ELECTORAL POLITICS

REF: BEIRUT 1638

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a November 25 call on the Ambassador, Minister of
State Nassib Lahoud described a Hizballah goal of "rewriting"
the Taif Accord to allow the election of the president by
popular vote. Until this long-term change is achieved,
Lahoud expects the group will continue to demand veto
authority over government decisions affecting Lebanon's Shia
population. (Currently, the president is elected by the
Lebanese Parliament, which is carefully split 50/50 between
Muslims and Christians. The implication of a popular vote is
that Muslims, thought to be a majority in Lebanon although
there is no official data or census, would have a greater
say. Further, such a move would give increased power to
Shia, thought to be the fastest-growing confessional group in
Lebanon). Lahoud said President Sleiman is still formulating
plans for an approach to the role of independents in the 2009
election. This could follow a "seat-sharing" formulation by
grouping March 14, opposition, and independent candidates on
the same electoral list. Sleiman wants former Prime Minister
Najib Mikati and Minister of Economy and Trade Mohammad
Safadi included in an independent bloc, according to Lahoud.
If March 14 fails to win a majority in the 2009 elections,
Mikati could be selected as prime minister, he said. Lahoud
assessed Minister of Defense Elias Murr as not firmly in the
March 14 camp, despite Saad Hariri's confidence that Murr is
indeed allied with him. End summary.

LOOKING FOR A SHIA VETO
--------------


2. (C) In a November 25 meeting, Minister of State Nassib
Lahoud described Hizballah Chief of Research Ali Fayyad's
proposal for electing the president by a popular vote.
Fayyad presented the proposal at a November 14 conference,
organized by the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military
Analysis (INEGMA),on defense strategy ideas for Lebanon.
Fayyad argued that until a popular vote could be enacted, the
"consensual aspects" of the Taif Accord should be emphasized.
"In practice, veto authority," he clarified. (Note: Taif
stipulates that cabinet should adopt decisions by consent,
but adds that if consent is impossible, then by vote. End
note.) Lahoud assessed from Fayyad's statements that
Hizballah will demand enough seats for a veto in all future
cabinets. (Note: Although many Lebanese leaders have
mentioned the formation of a national unity government after
2009 parliamentary elections, this is the first explicit
mention we have heard of a mandatory veto authority for the
Shia. A "Shia veto" will equal a veto for Hizballah, at
least until another Shia movement might gain significant
momentum to challenge Hizballah's monopoly of the sect. End
Note.)

SLEIMAN'S INDEPENDENT BLOC
--------------


3. (C) Lahoud said Sleiman was "adamant" in his desire to see
an independent bloc in the 2009 parliamentary elections.
Sleiman, however, envisions the bloc as part of a
"seat-sharing" formulation in which leaders would agree,
ahead of elections, on a list containing 14 March,
opposition, and independent candidates. Using the Metn as an
example, Lahoud suggested that there would be a deal under
which three seats would go to March 14, three to March 8, and
two to the President, if the Armenian Tashnaq party joins
with the President. (Note: According to Lahoud, Tashnaq is
discussing possible arrangements with the President. End
Note.) Sleiman will seek to encourage the formation of these
lists through "friendly persuasion," Lahoud noted.


4. (C) If the other Metn political powerhouses -- including
Defense Minister Elias Murr, his father MP Michel Murr,
former President Amine Gemayel, Tashnaq, Lebanese Forces head

BEIRUT 00001691 002 OF 003


Samir Geagea, and Lahoud -- agree on the seat-sharing
formulation, opposition leader Michel Aoun will have no
choice but to accept, Lahoud said. Additionally, Lahoud
assessed that although Geagea and Gemayel were not yet in the
mindset to give up their own seats for the good of a
consensus list, they would come around to the idea. Lahoud
acknowledged the system was less democratic than would be
desirable, but said Sleiman believed it would reduce tensions
surrounding elections and increase his ability to reach
consensus with MPs and Ministers. Lahoud, who will run in
the Metn, said he would be counted as a March 14 seat there.


5. (C) Regarding possible independent seats in the north,
Lahoud said Sleiman wants two key Sunnis included: former
Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Minister of Economy and Trade
Mohammad Safadi. Lahoud said Sunni leader Saad Hariri "has
no problems" with Mikati and Safadi and trusts Mikati as a
"friendly, independent player." In response to the
Ambassador's question about what Mikati would want in return
for participating in any list, Lahoud said Mikati was pushing
for an additional electoral seat, either in Tripoli or a
smaller Beirut suburb like Daniyeh. Lahoud noted that Mikati
being named as the next prime minister could be a "solution"
if March 14 fails to win the majority (i.e. both the current
opposition and majority could accept him). However, Lahoud
said Hariri as prime minister would be "natural" if March 14
wins the majority, and Hariri probably would insist on the
position.


6. (C) Discussing other potential independents, Lahoud
confirmed Nazem Khoury had officially resigned within the
past week from his post of presidential advisor to become
eligible to participate in parliamentary elections.
According to Lahoud, Khoury opened an electoral office in
Jbeil and was seriously considering running there (reftel).
Lahoud described Nemat Frem, another potential independent
candidate, as "non-confrontational."


7. (C) Lahoud said the President was still formulating his
plans for electoral lists. Lahoud also assessed Sleiman was
"correcting" after coming out too strong in favor of an
independent bloc. Lahoud argued that no one in Lebanon knows
what the "pulse" of the elections is; Sleiman will wait until
closer to the elections before making any public calls for
independent candidates.

"HELP HIM HELP OUR CAUSE"
--------------


8. (C) Lahoud assessed that Sleiman agreed with March 14
principles in general and could further the coalition's
agenda, even if he avoided referring to the goals
specifically as "March 14". Lahoud said Sleiman supported
the need to characterize Syria-Lebanon relations as relations
between two sovereign states. He understood, according to
Lahoud, the need to distance the new relationship from
previous cooperation agreements between the two nations. Such
distancing is a March 14 platform point, Lahoud pointed out.
Lahoud noted a "covert alliance" between March 14 and the
President would enable the coalition to encourage Sleiman to
work on delineating the border with Syria and other bilateral
issues. Lahoud emphasized the importance of March 14
"staying friendly" with independent figures.

MURR NOT FIRMLY WITH HARIRI?
--------------


9. (C) Players other then the President may also be waiting
to see which way the election tides turn before making firm
alliances. According to Lahoud, Hariri was convinced the
Murr bloc would side with him in 2009 elections. Lahoud was
not convinced. (Note: In a November 21 meeting with the
Ambassador, Minister Elias Murr expressed intense frustration
at Hariri's lack of political savvy and motivation in
cultivating electoral alliances. His criticism and comments
that he "could not afford" to lose the elections because of
Hariri made Elias Murr seem anything but firmly entrenched in
an alliance with Hariri. End note.) Lahoud assessed an
independent bloc allied with March 14 made sense for the

BEIRUT 00001691 003 OF 003


Murrs, as they have good relations with the U.S. and with
Hariri. Lahoud argued the Murrs would support a consensus
list in the Metn.

SISON