LEBANON: GEMAYEL DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM MARCH 14?

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001663

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEMAYEL DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM MARCH 14?

REF: BEIRUT 1638

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former President and Kataeb head Amine Gemayel told
the Ambassador and visiting NEA/ELA Office Director Nicole
Shampaine that March 14 would not develop a common platform
by the coalition's January convention. At a November 20
meeting at Kataeb Headquarters, Gemayel emphasized the need
to "maintain flexibility" in coalitions, platforms, and
lists, and said publicizing independent candidates on March
14 lists "earlier than necessary" could damage their
credentials as independents. The Ambassador stressed the
need for March 14 unity to win the 2009 parliamentary
elections.


2. (C) Gemayel also expressed concern regarding Sunni leader
Saad Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's recent meetings
with Hizballah, stressing that he would not participate in
any coalition platform granting concessions to Hizballah.
Gemayel noted the importance of U.S. "pressure" on
independent candidates and Armenian Tashnaq members to run
with March 14 in the upcoming elections. Gemayel also
described his plan for indirect talks between Israel and
Lebanon to return to the terms of the 1949 Armistice
Agreement. End summary.

MARCH 14 LISTS AND PLATFORM NOT ON THE HORIZON
-------------- -


3. (C) Former President and Kataeb head Amine Gemayel,
meeting with the Ambassador and visiting NEA/ELA Office
Director Nicole Shampaine on November 20, the day before the
second anniversary of Gemayel's son Pierre's assassination,
was adamant that March 14 would not issue a unified platform
or reveal an electoral list during the coalition's convention
in January. Gemayel, accompanied by potential "independent"
candidate in Ksarawan Sejean Azzi, accused March 14 Secretary
General Fares Souaid of "running a private club" and failing
to consult with March 14 political leaders before making
statements that bind the coalition's various political
entities to timelines and actions. Gemayel said "too many
questions" remain in the selection of candidates and forming
policies to lock March 14 into an announcement date.


4. (C) On publishing of unified March 14 candidate lists in
January, Gemayel argued that announcing the inclusion of
independents that early would "embarrass" the candidates and
bring into question their credentials as independents. He
argued that lists still need to be "flexible" to allow for
"shifting alliances." He said lists should be announced
locally, not at a unified party rally. (Note: Souaid told us
separately the list will include 100 named candidates,
leaving 28 seats for unnamed independents. End Note.)


5. (C) Gemayel also noted that independent candidates need to
participate in the forming of March 14 electoral lists; he
cited the possibility that potential Ksarawan independent
Nemat Frem would refuse to participate on a March 14 list
with a Lebanese Forces (LF) candidate -- judging the LF as
unpalatable to his own electoral backers -- to show the
fluidity of the selection process. He also noted the need to
coordinate closely with independent Christian MP Michel Murr
to form electoral lists in the Metn. Gemayel said Kataeb now
is doing its homework -- "Homework with a capital H," he
stressed -- and will bring its electoral lists to the media
only on the party's timeline.


6. (C) Explaining his hesitation to announce a unified March
14 platform in January, Gemayel said he was unsure that he
could accept any platform proposed by fellow March 14 leader
Saad Hariri. Gemayel suspected that in recent meetings with
Hizballah representatives, Hariri had agreed to certain
stands, on Hizballah's weapons in particular, or political
alliances and concessions that Gemayel's constituents would
not support.

7. (C) Gemayel also expressed concern that Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt was looking to make political inroads with
Hizballah. Gemayel argued that any such deals with Hizballah
would strengthen Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun by
validating Hizballah and Aoun's alliance with the group.
Gemayel noted several times that Kataeb and the Lebanese
Forces had opposed the July 2008 cabinet declaration passage
that justified Hizballah's maintaining an armed resistance.


8. (C) Citing again the need for "flexibility," Gemayel
argued that March 14 political actors would make deals,
assume platforms, and appoint candidates in their personal
best interests; because their specific stances would at times
diverge, March 14 leaders could not adopt a single strong
platform. No national platform is possible unless Hariri and
Jumblatt are "willing to go all the way" regarding Hizballah,
he said. The Ambassador stressed the need to provide a clear
message to the Lebanese population regarding what March 14
represents -- themes such as sovereignty of the state and
full authority to the army for national defense. She noted
the danger of March 14 continuing without a unified March 14
vision, particularly as the parliamentary elections are
expected to be very close. The Ambassador emphasized that
strong stands by March 14 in key swing districts will be
crucial for electoral success. Gemayel offered that maybe a
broad, vague coalition platform was a possibility, but then
focused on his efforts to find a Kataeb party platform that
appeals to the common voter.

TASHNAQ AND INDEPENDENTS NEED U.S. PUSH
--------------


9. (C) Gemayel assessed that President Sleiman's "subtle"
influence was necessary to encourage potential independent
candidates, such as businessman Nemat Frem, to participate in
elections. Gemayel said President Sleiman feared that any
hint of his outward involvement in the political arena would
damage the neutral position of the presidency. Gemayel said
Sleiman, however, did want to quietly encourage independent
candidates to participate is unlikely to make any strong
public statements of support. Gemayel also stressed the
importance of the U.S. in encouraging independent candidates
to run and helping to push the Armenian Tashnaq party to the
March 14 side. On Tashnaq, Gemayel said the party probably
would stay with Aoun, hypothesizing that the close
relationship of the Armenia-based international leader of the
Tashnaq party to Iran could be the cause. (Note: In a
November 14 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, Tashnaq leader Hagop
Pakradunian, again avowed the Lebanese Tashnaq's complete
independence from Iran. End Note.) Gemayel added that the
strong ties between Lebanese Armenians and the large Armenian
community in the U.S. could make U.S. pressure for Tashnaq to
side with March 14 helpful.

INDIRECT TALKS WITH ISRAEL TO DISARM HIZBALLAH
-------------- -


10. (C) Gemayel stressed Lebanon must regain Sheba'a Farms in
order to remove Hizballah's pretext for carrying arms and to
restore "domestic peace" to the country. To accomplish this,
Gemayel proposed indirect talks between Lebanon and Israel.
He stressed that such talks would not seek the establishment
of a peace treaty but instead a return to the terms of the
1949 Armistice Agreement. (Note: The 1949 Armistice
Agreement, signed by Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and
Syria, ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and established
armistice lines with Israel. End Note.) Gemayel opined that
the Lebanese population would be amenable to indirect talks
with Israel since the need for Lebanon to return to the
Armistice terms is stipulated in Taif and has been voted on
by the cabinet on several occasions. He said he had followed
closely statements by Israeli politicians and assessed they
would be willing to hold indirect negotiations. Gemayel also
said Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas had
offered to mediate Lebanese-Israeli talks.


11. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about the
possibility of including such a move in the March 14
platform, Gemayel was certain many March 14 leaders would
agree with his plan in principle. However, he said, Lebanese
leaders lack courage for "unusual ideas" and may be reluctant
to support a project that could draw criticism.

GEMAYEL'S PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL DIALOGUE
--------------


12. (C) In Gemayel's view, "serious conversations" have not
occurred at the September and November National Dialogue
sessions. Further, setting the date for the next session on
December 22, close to the Christmas holiday and the Islamic
new year, and failing to set an agenda for the session, show
that no serious dialogue will take place soon. He said
Lebanese need first to agree on the definitions of concepts
such as sovereignty and allegiance before they can agree on a
national defense strategy to protect the country.


13. (C) Gemayel said that in the last Dialogue session, he
proposed a defense strategy that he says was agreed upon by
March 14. His strategy was based on the Swiss-model --
reserving the role of national protection for the army while
acknowledging the importance of local participation in the
defense of the nation -- but no further work has been done on
forming a unified March 14 defense plan. Gemayel said the
National Dialogue session -- which he likened to working to
"keep a sick man alive" -- remained valuable as they kept
communication lines open and provided an option other than
street fighting to discuss differences.


14. (C) More broadly, Gemayel argued that Lebanon is
currently operating in a "broken" framework and needs an
entirely new political system. He said establishing a
bicameral legislature could be a possibility, but cited a
federal system as a way to bring peace to Lebanon.


15. (C) Comment: With regard to March 14 unity, we have
noticed disturbing signals coming from Kataeb in recent
weeks. In mid-October, Gemayel announced the names of five
candidates Kataeb plans to run in the 2009 parliamentary
elections, alluding to possible others. On November 14,
Kataeb Vice President Selim Sayegh shared with Pol/Econ Chief
a detailed power point presentation outlining Kataeb's
strategy for winning the elections, and was unresponsive to
her suggestions on how to meld the ideas with those of the
March 14 Secretariat. Furthermore, Tashnaq leader Hagop
Pakradunian told us on November 14 that his party was in
talks with Aoun, Michel Murr, and Kataeb regarding the
elections in Metn, where the Murr/Tashnaq/Aoun alliance cost
Kataeb the seat to replace assassinated MP Pierre Gemayel in
the 2007 by-election. We will continue to promote the ideas
of a unified message, unified list, and room for independent
moderates to all March 14 leaders. End comment.

SISON