LEBANON: MINISTER OF INTERIOR BAROUD: "I CONSULTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001639

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALIZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLEBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND
OSD FOR EDELMAN/LONG/STRAUB/DALTON
JOINT STAFF FOR RANK/NICHOLSON
CENTCOM FOR ALLARDICE/MACLEAN/PADDOCK
DIA FOR LARSON/CRONIN/KRAUSE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL UNSC MARR MCAP MOPS IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MINISTER OF INTERIOR BAROUD: "I CONSULTED
WIDELY BEFORE SYRIA TRIP"

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On November 14, Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud told
the Ambassador that his November 10 visit to Syria had been
approved -- prior to departure -- by the Council of Ministers
and that he had furthermore consulted with a range of
political figures, including via a call to Saad Hariri in
Moscow. With the exception of Minister of State Nassib
Lahoud, other political figures chose to air their concerns
and criticisms in the media rather than in official settings.
Indeed, PM Siniora confirmed to the press on November 14
that this visit had been pre-approved. Baroud said he would
not respond to the criticisms publicly (even those from the
March 14 Secretariat),but would file a full report on his
visit and answer questions during the cabinet meeting
scheduled for Saturday, November 15.


2. (C) In terms of the spring 2009 parliamentary elections,
Baroud also said that he was pessimistic about the chances
for independent political figures to gain a significant
number of seats. "It's practically impossible without
proportional representation." However, he did think it would
be important to support independent candidates, even those
who had little chance of winning in their districts, in order
to build a national profile for these figures. He also
confirmed that President Sleiman did not intend to form an
independent bloc for the upcoming elections. "It is too
risky and could be used to weaken his status as a national
leader." End Summary.

Exchange with Syrian Counterparts Was Frank, But Productive
--------------


3. (C) Meeting with Ambassador and Special Assistant in his
office, Baroud stated that he was, in fact, the only Minister
since 1990 who had actually received Council of Ministers
approval prior to a visit to Syria. He also said he was
careful to include in his delegation Internal Security Forces
General Ashraf Rifi and the Director General of Securite
General, Wafiq Jezzini, not only because they had technical
expertise on border security and other agenda items, but also
because they are representatives of the Sunni and Shia
confessional communities, respectively.


4. (C) Baroud said that Rifi was initially hesitant about
traveling to Syria, citing concerns about possible Syrian
retaliation against his own family if negotiations become
difficult. Baroud said that they would be traveling as a
group and that he, as head of the delegation, would not let
Rifi stand alone if there were any threats issued. Baroud
also said that he was extremely frank in his discussions, but
described the Syrian response as "positive" in regards to
border security cooperation. "I don't think they really plan
to cross the borders and roll back into Lebanon militarily.
It wouldn't make sense for them, given the current
international environment."


5. (C) Baroud told us that he would fully brief the ouncil
of Ministers the following day on his visit. "This was a
fact-finding mission and I am not proposing a new bi-national
security commission, as has been reported in the press.
However, I would like a formal mechanism with technical
border and security experts who can further explore the
issues that were discussed at a political level. I don't
have the expertise for this, but General Rifi does and he is
the government's point person on border issues. However, any
further discussions or committees would have to be approved
by the Council of Ministers first."

Political Backlash Disappointing, As Baroud Had Consulted
With Council Before Visit
--------------


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6. (C) On November 12, the March 14 Secretariat issued a
communiqu that stated, "After hearing the 'explanations'
presented by the Interior Minister on his trip to Damascus,
the Secretariat voices a strong reservation over the
formation of security cooperation committees between the two
countries, especially in wake of the suspicious intentions of
the Syrian regime when it accused Lebanon of being behind
Fatah al-Islam." The communiqu also rejected any type of
coordination under the auspices of the Higher Syrian-Lebanese
Council and called for no decisions to be taken before
diplomatic relations are fully completed, including the
exchange of ambassadors.


7. (C) Baroud was put off by this response, especially
because during the November 4 meeting where the visit was
discussed and approved, only Nassib Lahoud addressed the
group about his reservations. "Nassib Lahoud thoughtfully
presented his concerns about the Higher Syrian-Lebanese
Council, which were taken into account while preparing
briefing papers for the visits. Not one other person came
forward in that venue with reservations or concerns --
instead, they used the media to air their complaints."
Baroud characterized other figures who had criticized him as
"people with small agendas." Mentioning Mohammed Kabara,
Baroud said Kabara was angry that he had refused to place an
unqualified person recommended by Kabara onto the Ministry's
payroll.


8. (C) Baroud also told us that he had personally telephoned
Saad Hariri, who was in the middle of his Moscow visit, to
discuss the purpose of the discussions with Syria. "Saad told
me he had no objections," said Baroud. PM Siniora also
publicly supported Baroud by telling the press that the
cabinet had approved the visit before Baroud departed. The
next Council of Ministers meeting was rescheduled for
Saturday, November 15 so that President Sleiman could preside
upon his return from the United States. Baroud told us that
there were 64 agenda items for the November 15 meeting, but
he was preparing to give a formal report and answer questions
"in this official venue, as it should be."

Ministry Moving Forward With Election Preparations
--------------


9. (C) Baroud wants to create a new image for the upcoming
elections. "We didn't get all of the electoral reforms we
wanted, but we should give the Lebanese people a sense that
things have changed and improved. I am working on new
branding and information outlets for the elections, as people
have lost respect for the Ministry of Interior over the
years." (Note: Eli Khoury, of Saatchi and Saatchi and
NowLebanon.com, told us earlier this month that he was
assisting Baroud on this rebranding effort. End Note)
Baroud also said that he personally met with the 47 officials
charged with issuing national voter identification cards. He
wanted to stress the importance of this initiative and to
tell the officials that this was one of his highest personal
priorities for the Spring 2009 elections. Finally, he told
us that the Council of Ministers had granted Baroud
permission to hire an additional 146 employees to help
prepare for the elections.

Minimal Gains for Independent Candidates in 2009?
--------------


10. (C) Baroud questioned whether moderate political figures
like himself could gain a significant number of "independent"
parliamentary seats in the upcoming election. "When Doha
signed away the possibility for proportional representation
in 2009, hope was lost. The law, as written, states that you
have to be part of a list." Baroud also quipped that these
should really be referred to as by-elections, as it was clear
which side would win in about half of the 128 districts. He
is fairly certain that no coalition will win a two-thirds
majority and predicts that Lebanese politics will continue to
function in "shades of gray" with true progress ruled out and

BEIRUT 00001639 003 OF 003


the likelihood of stalemates continuing. (Note: March 14
planning is to recruit a number of "independent" Christian
candidates who would run in key Christian swing districts in
which Aoun's FPM party currently dominates. End Note)


11. (C) According to Baroud, President Sleiman did not plan
to form an independent bloc for the upcoming elections. "The
most he would be able to gain would be 4-5 seats and you
really need 10-12 seats to exert any influence. If he took
this chance, he could lose his status as a national figure
and become known as someone who only really controls a small
parliamentary bloc."


12. (C) Baroud then said that, regardless of their chances
for success in 2009, independent political figures should
still be supported during the campaign season. "Even if they
only win a portion of the vote, it will raise their profiles
on the national scene and begin to solidify their political
futures." Baroud concluded by saying, "We will work
differently with the independent candidates after these
elections, but the time is not right for them given the high
levels of polarization in this country today."
SISON