LEBANON: JUMBLATT AND HAMADEH ON INDEPENDENT BLOC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001615

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT AND HAMADEH ON INDEPENDENT BLOC
FORMATION, BALANCING SYRIA

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and March 14 MP Marwan
Hamadeh discussed ongoing negotiations for election blocs and
contentious cabinet atmospherics during dinner with the
Ambassador on November 8. Jumblatt said he planned to offer
his own national defense strategy during the next National
Dialogue session if March 14 cannot agree to present a
unified proposal for the coalition. Hamadeh believed Sleiman
had tacitly agreed to back an independent list, but also
expressed concern about how to ensure independent candidates
remain independent after the election. Hamadeh described
Sunni leader Saad Hariri's outreach to the Armenian Tashnaq
party and negotiations with former Prime Minister Najib
Mikati. Hamadeh also relayed to the Ambassador and Jumblatt
independent MP Michel Murr's maneuvering with former
President Amine Gemayel. Jumblatt stressed the need for
continued Arab and international involvement in Lebanon as a
counterweight to Syria, and Hamadeh noted that Lebanese
leaders should travel to Damascus only to discuss the
technical matters of their portfolios. Jumblatt said he was
still unsure about meeting with Hizballah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah and had not yet moved to set up the
exchange. He also floated the idea of March 14 "flirting"
with Nabih Berri to wean support from Hizballah. End summary.

MARCH 14 OR JUMBLATT STRATEGY AT NEXT DIALOGUE SESSION
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2. (C) In a November 8 meeting with the Ambassador and March
14 MP Marwan Hamadeh, Druze leader Jumblatt said Michel
Aoun's national defense strategy, presented at the November
11 National Dialogue session, had been lifted directly from a
June 2007 article by Hizballah deputy Naim Kassem on the need
to transform all of Lebanon's territory into the resistance.
Jumblatt prepared a defense strategy as part of Lebanon's
2006 National Dialogue, and he plans to offer another updated
version in response to Aoun's proposal. Jumblatt prefers a
March 14 common draft but said coalition members had not
discussed the idea; if they cannot agree before the next
Dialogue session on December 22, Jumblatt will present a
separate strategy. Marwan Hamadeh noted that Lebanese Forces
leader Samir Geagea had "his own ideas" about the defense
strategy that would have to be incorporated into a common
March 14 vision. Hamadeh said National Dialogue participants
had not yet engaged in serious dialogue on this matter and it
would take time before meaningful discussions occurred.


3. (C) Regarding participation of the National Dialogue,
Jumblatt thought President Sleiman, potentially squeezed by
Hizballah, was still inclined to expand membership. However,
Jumblatt said he had told an envoy sent by President Sleiman
to see him earlier in the day to gauge political opinions on
the issue that National Dialogue expansion would be
unhelpful.

HAMADEH AND JUMBLATT ON MARCH 14 STRATEGY, INDEPENDENTS
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4. (C) According to Hamadeh, who said he had met with Defense
Minister Elias Murr until two o'clock that morning, the
Defense Minister's father, Michel Murr, had told Sleiman he
must "not be like the former President," referring to former
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud. Murr told Sleiman he should
be a "real" president and form a small electoral bloc of his
own. Michel Murr believed Sleiman, through an independent
list, could play the role of an arbiter and prevent a
collision course between March 14 and March 8. Minister
Elias Murr told Hamadeh that Sleiman seemed amenable to
forming a list; Sleiman reportedly told Michel Murr he would
ask advisor Nazem Khoury to resign and run as the independent
candidate in Jbeil. Hamadeh, however, saw a potential
obstacle to the President's independent bloc in the attitudes
of March 14 Christians; he said Geagea does not like the idea
and former President Amine Gemayel was "quiet" on the issue.
He also said Sleiman must be sure the independent bloc will
stay independent. According to Hamadeh, his niece Neyla

BEIRUT 00001615 002 OF 003


Tueni refused to be part of an independent bloc; she will run
as March 14 or she will not run at all. (Note: Nayla is also
Michel Murr's grand daughter. End Note.)


5. (C) Minister Murr also told Hamadeh his father had agreed
with Gemayel on Christian seats in the Metn district.
Gemayel would get one seat and the other seat "could be
settled with Nassib Lahoud." According to Hamadeh, Murr
wants one of the two MP's in Ashrafieh in return. Hamadeh
warned, however, to "not count Ashrafieh as a done deal."
Additionally, Sunni leader Saad Hariri asked Murr to give
Geagea one seat in the upper Metn district, but Murr refused.
Minister Murr told Hamadeh the refusal could be retracted if
his father determines Geagea has strong support in the
district.


6. (C) Discussing elections in Tripoli, Jumblatt said
Minister of Economy and Trade Mohammed Safadi would run as
March 14 in the elections. Hamadeh said Former Prime
Minister Najib Mikati was also trying to make an arrangement
with Hariri, but Hamadeh assessed that a Mikati-Hariri
alliance would not benefit March 14. He said March 14 has a
solid bloc in Tripoli currently and Mikati's presence on a
March 14 list would weaken the coalition. Hamadeh also said
Hariri was close to a deal with the Armenian Tashnaq party
although no high-level meeting had occurred. Noting that
Speaker Nabih Berri had played a positive role regarding
Dialogue expansion, Jumblatt assessed that March 14 should
"flirt" with Berri, since he may have trouble in the upcoming
elections. Hamadeh believed that Shia of the public sector
are still close to Berri; he appointed all the Shia civil
servants and thus still retains influence.


7. (C) March 14 coalition members hope the announcement of
its candidates at its January 14 convention will boost
popular support leading up to rallies on February 14 and
March 14. Jumblatt and Hamadeh reiterated the need for a
March 14 media outlet to improve visibility of coalition
activities and messages. Jumblatt thought March 14 needed,
in particular, a Christian alternative to Aoun's Orange "O"
TV. Due to financial constraints of opening MTV, however,
Hamadeh and Jumblatt agreed that trying to work with the
Lebanese Broadcasting Company (LBC) was the best option.
Hamadeh said LBC still invites some March 14 guests on its
shows, and March 14 should accept all invitations.


8. (C) Jumblatt also stressed that March 14 needed to avoid
mistakes such as the defeat of the March 14 candidate in the
recent Tripoli doctor's syndicate elections. Hamadeh
described March 14 victories, announced that day, in student
union elections in Tripoli as a positive sign. March 14 won
all the seats for Saint George University and Notre Dame
University elections in Tripoli and also the Zahle student
group race. He said Beirut's student elections were split
almost 50-50 with March 8 candidates. March 8 won only
Sidon, where they took the Shia vote.

UNPLEASANT CABINET ATMOSPHERICS
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9. (C) Hamadeh described the contentious atmosphere at
cabinet sessions, the most recent of which took place earlier
the same day. Minister of Social Affairs Mario Aoun left the
meeting after a fight occurred at the Serail gate between his
bodyguards and Serail guards. Deputy Prime Minister Issam
Abou Jamra, who is boycotting all Cabinet sessions at the
PM's office (Grand Serial),did not attend, although he will
apparently still attend cabinet sessions held at President
Sleiman's Baabda Palace. Jumblatt believed the Cabinet was
"cornered" by the Doha Accords, as ministers had agreed to
"fix the government" and promised not to resign. Jumblatt
described tension between Minister of Transportation and
Public Works Ghazi Aridi and Prime Minister Siniora, and
Hamadeh said Safadi was also not on good terms with the Prime
Minister. Hamadeh thought cabinet sessions would become more
difficult as elections approach.

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON COUNTERS SYRIA
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BEIRUT 00001615 003 OF 003



10. (C) Jumblatt argued that continued Arab and international
involvement in Lebanon was important, particularly as a
counterweight to Syrian influence. He thought Damascus
opposed Arab and international involvement in Lebanon for the
same reasons -- the purpose of Hamas political chief Khalid
Maashal's visit to Lebanon, according to Jumblatt, was to
signal, through Lebanon, the cancellation of Palestinian
talks in Cairo and Syrian displeasure with growing Egyptian
involvement in Lebanese and Palestinian affairs. Jumblatt
plans to talk to the French about playing an active role in
Lebanon. He said Qatari, Saudi, and Egyptian activities in
Lebanon helped balance against Syria.


11. (C) However, Jumblatt termed Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak's comments that UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon and Arab League
SYG Amr Musa were unnecessary to Lebanon's National Dialogue
as "unhelpful." Commenting on media reports of Sleiman's
visit to Egypt, Hamadeh judged Musa had been "put on the
shelf for the time-being" in favor of a more active role by
Mubarak. Jumblatt said it was dangerous to depict Lebanon as
capable of solving all problems on its own, particularly when
some issues, such as resolving the status of Sheba'a Farms,
required international mediation.


12. (C) Hamadeh noted the increasing number of Lebanese
leaders "being forced" to visit Damascus. He argued that as
long as meetings focused on technical issues, such
cooperation was positive. Hamadeh said Defense Minister Murr
was still contemplating his invitation to Damascus, since he
also wanted to be sure "real" issues, such as smuggling and
border coordination, were on top of the agenda, rather than
making a "political visit."


13. (C) Jumblatt and Hamadeh judged the timing premature for
successful indirect Israel-Syria talks and predicted Syria
would wait until the new U.S. administration took office in
order to curry favor from the U.S. President-elect with the
deal. Jumblatt and Hamadeh opposed talks, direct or
indirect, between Israel and Lebanon. Regarding the Middle
East policy of the incoming U.S. administration, Jumblatt
said the U.S. should engage with Iran and Syria only when
conditions are appropriate. Hamadeh said if the U.S. gives
Iran or Syria the impression of victory, meaningful
discussions will be impossible.

JUMBLATT STILL CONTEMPLATING NASRALLAH MEETING
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14. (C) Jumblatt, without solicitation, mentioned to the
Ambassador the possibility of a meeting between himself and
Nasrallah. Jumblatt said he was still "not sure" about how
he wanted to proceed. He said he had not been approached by
Hizballah contacts to meet Nasrallah and had not yet sought
the meeting himself. Jumblatt preferred to meet Nasrallah
without a mediator, but if unable, he would select Speaker
Nabih Berri over Druze opposition leader Talal Arslan.
However, Jumblatt believed Syria would choose the mediator
and would want to bestow prestige on Arslan.

SISON