Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1614
2008-11-10 19:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF

Tags:  MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREL PTER UNSC IS LE SY 
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P 101924Z NOV 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3494
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3148
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3357
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001614 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
OSD FOR A/S LONG
PM FOR A/S KIMMITT
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREL PTER UNSC IS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE ERIC CLAPPER

BEIRUT 00001614 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

OVERVIEW
----------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001614

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
OSD FOR A/S LONG
PM FOR A/S KIMMITT
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREL PTER UNSC IS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE ERIC CLAPPER

BEIRUT 00001614 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

OVERVIEW
--------------


1. (C) Under Secretary Clapper: Welcome to Lebanon. Your
trip provides an excellent opportunity to reinforce the
message of strong U.S. government support for Lebanon. The
expansion of the U.S.-Lebanese military partnership
represents an historic opportunity to bolster the cause of
democracy, peace and stability in Lebanon and the Middle
East. The Government of Lebanon (GOL) has demonstrated a
commitment to strengthening our military-to-military ties.
The October 6, 2008 Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting
offered an opportunity to confirm the mutual benefits of the
relationship and press for further engagement in key areas.
Since the departure of Syrian forces in April of 2005, the
USG has provided over $410 million in training and equipment
to the LAF. Your visit is important for maintaining momentum
in our military to military relationship.

(C) The MOD will continue to press, at a minimum, for release
of some form of Close Air Support (CAS) with a precision
weapons capability, Tactical UAVs, (RAVEN),TOW-2A missiles,
Night Vision Equipment, and perhaps precision artillery
munitions. The LAF is also in USCENTCOM-led discussions with
the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to transfer M-60 tanks to
replace the aging Soviet T-55s and U.S. M-48 tanks. This
transfer will require Third Party Transfer (TPT) authority
from the USG. You can expect that your interlocutors will ask
you for additional military equipment and training for use by
their military intelligence service.


THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE
--------------


2. (C) There have been significant political developments
since May 2008, when the government's decision to dismantle
Hizballah's communications systems and remove the chief of
airport security sparked armed clashes between Hizballah and
Lebanese civilians. The clashes ended in a few days and led
to the Qatari-brokered Doha Agreement of May 21 which ended
the months-long political impasse and paved the way for the
May 25 election of consensus candidate and former Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman as President.
After much wrangling between the majority and the opposition,
Prime Minister Siniora completed formation of a national
unity government on July 11, composed, per the Doha
Agreement, of 16 majority ministers, 11 from the opposition,
and three for President Sleiman (including the key Defense
and Interior ministry portfolios). The Saad Hariri-led
majority coalition and Hizballah-led opposition coalition
have been uneasy partners in the new national unity
government. Both coalitions are intensely focused on
parliamentary electionsless than a year away. The Christian
vote, dividd between the two groups, will be decisive in
determining who wins the next majority in the elections to be
held in the April-June 2009 period. In the short term, the
question of Hizballah's role and its arms in the national
defense strategy will be the main focus of debate.


3. (C) On August 28, a Lebanese Armed Forces helicopter
operating in Hizballah-controlled territory in southern
Lebanon was shot down, resulting in the death of an LAF
officer. A young Hizballah fighter was arrested, and the
military investigation is ongoing. Meanwhile, sporadic
violence has plagued the northern city of Tripoli and
surrounding areas, to include villages in the Northern Bekaa
valley, although many are hopeful that a Hariri-brokered
reconciliation agreement signed September 8 will prove a
positive first step in overcoming a volatile political and
security environment. On September 10, Druze politician
Saleh Aridi was assassinated, sparking concerns over future
actions by those elements opposed to Lebanon's national
reconciliation. A clash in the north between rival Christian
groups on September 17 resulted in two deaths.


BEIRUT 00001614 002.2 OF 004



4. (C) As called for in the Doha Agreement, President Sleiman
launched a National Dialogue to discuss the national defense
strategy, including the role of Hizballah's weapons. He
chaired the first session on September 16 and the second on
November 5. Nonetheless, expectations in Lebanon are low
that the Dialogue will actually lead to an agreement whereby
Hizballah would actually give up its arms.


5. (C) During the summer of 2007, as Commander of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),Michel Sleiman steadfastly led
the LAF to victory against Fatah-al-Islam extremists at the
Nahr al Barid Palestinian refugee camp. However, he is by
nature a cautious man. He refrained from deploying the LAF
to counter Hizballah's May 2008 aggression, fearful of
putting the army in the middle of a sectarian conflict and
openly confronting Hizballah. Sleiman is trying to walk a
fine line between pro-Syrian and pro-western forces.


6. (C) We must stress to the GOL that Hizballah must be
disarmed. We should insist that the state of Lebanon must
have a monopoly over the use of force and that more must be
done to control arms smuggling from Syria. We should also
focus on the positive relationship between the United States
and Lebanon and U.S. support for the role of the Presidency.
We believe that emphasizing the U.S. commitment to Lebanon is
the best way to increase the GOL,s confidence in the U.S. as
a partner and consolidate support in Lebanon for the GOL.

REGIONAL ISSUES
--------------


7. (C) Sleiman was in the U.S. September 23-26. He addressed
the UNGA and meet Secretary Rice in New York and traveled to
Washington DC to meet President Bush and Secretary Gates on
September 25. He sought the President's views on the Middle
East Peace Process. Sleiman argues that failure to resolve
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has fueled terrorism in the
region, including Lebanon, where extremists use the
Palestinian cause to justify their actions.


8. (C) The Government of Lebanon has urged that Israel
withdraw from the disputed Sheba'a Farms territory and for
Sheba'a to be placed under the authority of the United
Nations. Government of Lebanon leadership has also urged the
United States to pressure Israel to put an end to Israeli
overflights and turn over complete cluster bomb strike data
to aid in clearance efforts.


9. (C) President Sleiman recently traveled to Damascus and
reached agreement with President Asad that Syria and Lebanon
establish diplomatic relations between the two countries for
the first time since Lebanon's independence 65 years ago.
However, Asad yielded little in terms of demarcating the
common border (including Sheba'a Farms) or providing
information on Lebanese citizens presumed missing in Syria.
The latest report by the UN's Lebanon Independent Border
Assessment Team, dated August 27, highlights the fact that
Lebanon has made almost no progress in securing its border
with Syria and points of entry as required by UNSCR 1701.
The team noted that progress in fortifying Lebanon's border
with Syria had been minimal. Sleiman and the government of
Lebanon have had no official reaction yet.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
--------------


10. (C) Since the departure of Syrian forces in April of
2005, the USG has provided over $410 million in training and
equipment to the LAF. The bulk of this aid has been Foreign
Military Funding (FMF),but also include significant amounts
of International Education and Training (IMET),Section 1206
funding, Counterterrorism Force Protection (CTFP),Joint
Combined Exercises and Training (JCET),and various other
military aid. FMF for FY 09 and FY 10 is tentatively
scheduled at $95M and $100m respectively. The LAF five year
acquisition plan is designed to take full advantage of these
historic amounts of military aid.

BEIRUT 00001614 003 OF 004



U.S. GAINS FROM THE RELATIONSHIP:
POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC
--------------


11. (C) The benefit the USG seeks from the strong
military-to-military relationship with the LAF is to develop
a valid alternative to Hizballah for the people of Lebanon to
turn to for protection. A strong LAF also serves to
counteract Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon.

AREAS FOR GREATER COOPERATION
--------------


12. (C) Interoperability: Currently there is an Acquisition
and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Lebanon and the
U.S. which was used to great advantage by both countries in
the Nahr al Bared fight in 2007. There is no Status of
Forces agreement (SOFA) or Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA) and no expectation the GOL would approve such
agreements in the foreseeable future.


13. (C) Training: The key component of U.S. military
training to the LAF will be the Comprehensive Training
Program (CTP). Because of the regular security threats to
official USG personnel in Lebanon, the life support of the
CTP needs to be closely coordinated with the LAF, USCENTCOM,
and the U.S. Embassy. The robust JCET program needs to be
maintained at its historic level of 6 missions per FY.
Mobile Training Teams from ARCENT, MARCENT, AFCENT, NAVCENT
and the USCG should also be programmed to assist the LAF.


14. (C) Modernization: After considerable U.S. urging,
Lebanon has drafted a five year modernization plan. Getting
Lebanon to ensure that its requests for Foreign Military
funding (FMF) acquisitions are consistent with its plan will
be key, and we should stress this in JMC discussions. We
should also encourage the MOD to think more critically about
whether they still need to retain their stock of aging and
difficult-to-maintain Soviet equipment, particularly the
T-54/55 tanks as well as the aging M-48 tanks.

WEAPONS RELEASE
--------------


15. (C) The MOD will continue to press, at a minimum, for
release of some form of Close Air Support (CAS) with a
precision weapons capability, Tactical UAVs, (RAVEN),TOW-2A
missiles, Night Vision Equipment, and perhaps precision
artillery munitions. The LAF is also in USCENTCOM-led
discussions with the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to transfer
M-60 tanks to replace the aging Soviet T-55s and U.S. M-48
tanks. This transfer will require Third Party Transfer (TPT)
authority from the USG. You can expect that your
interlocutors will ask you for additional military equipment
and training for use by their military intelligence service.

YOUR INTERLOCUTORS
--------------


16. (C) Defense Minister Elias Murr has taken great pride in
our expanded military cooperation over the past 24 months.
He is also not shy about taking his share of the credit. He
was instrumental in the passage of our bilateral Acquisition
and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA),even playing a role
from his hospital bed as he was being treated for wounds
received in a July 2005 assassination attempt. He is very
good at focusing on strategic level concepts and -- while he
is an expert at embellishment and putting himself in the
central role of all positive developments -- you will find
him to be a knowledgeable interlocutor. In recent meetings,
MinDef Murr has pressed strongly for a CAS Platform with
precision capability as well as acquiring M60 tanks from
Jordan. He would like to increase the size of the LAF,
especially the Special Operating Forces, (SOF).


17. (C) LAF Commander Kahwagi has tended to focus on

BEIRUT 00001614 004.2 OF 004


tactical level issues with recent VIPs, but we will stress to
him ahead of time that you are here to explore
strategic-level policy topics. Kahwagi is not squeamish
about USG activities and associating the LAF with USG
training and doctrine. He is a straight-forward, muddy boots
kind of soldier that is greatly admired by the LAF. Kahwagi
is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Infantry Center at Fort
Benning, Georgia and Italy's War College. He was also a
Marshall Center graduate in 2006.


18. (C) LAF Intelligence Director Edmond Fadel's appointment
came as a surprise to many in Lebanon. Fadel appears to be
very interested in increasing the Intelligence Directorate's
capabilities and its cooperation with the USG. It is likely
that Fadel will ask you for direct assistance for the
intelligence directorate (G-2).


19. (SBU) Your visit is a good opportunity to deliver
several key messages, as follows:

--Reiterate the strong and enduring U.S. commitment to an
independent and sovereign Lebanon;

--Stress the constructive role that a peaceful and prosperous
Lebanon can play in contributing to regional stability;

--Emphasize that the U.S. plans to continue to provide
support to strengthen Lebanon's state institutions, including
a robust package of U.S. military training and assistance, as
well as assistance to the police (Internal Security Forces);

--Emphasize that continued USG support for the LAF,
particularly in the U.S. Congress, is tied to perceptions
that there is serious action being taken to Hizballah's use
of force under GOL control;

--Note that in addition the U.S. will continue to assist the
Government of Lebanon in building economic viability and
building governance capacity; and

-- Provide assurances in response to concerns that we might
be tempted to trade away our strong support for Lebanon's
sovereignty for concessions elsewhere in the region.
SISON