Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1582
2008-11-05 15:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: BOUTROS HARB URGES INDEPENDENT LIST, EVEN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051542Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3453
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3134
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3343
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001582 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BOUTROS HARB URGES INDEPENDENT LIST, EVEN
ABSENT OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL BACKING

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001582

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BOUTROS HARB URGES INDEPENDENT LIST, EVEN
ABSENT OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL BACKING

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) March 14 MP Boutros Harb, on the eve of the U.S.
presidential elections, expressed hope that the "Lebanese
message" would be well-understood by the new U.S.
administration. During his November 4 meeting with the
Ambassador, Harb said March 14 had agreed to reach a unified
position on candidates for the spring parliamentary
elections. The coalition will continue to oppose expansion
of National Dialogue participation and lowering of the voting
age. Harb asked for U.S. assistance urging parties, including
Michel Murr, LBC head Pierre Daher, and Armenian Tashnaq
party, to cooperate with March 14's democratic goals. He
believes President Sleiman will avoid publicly supporting an
independent electoral list but Harb is working to encourage
the President to offer "vocal" private support for
independent candidates. Harb believed Sleiman would not be
able to refuse any Iranian offer of military aid during his
November 24-25 trip to Iran. He expressed concern that Walid
Jumblatt may ask the new U.S. administration to work with
Hizballah. The Ambassador reiterated continued U.S. support
for Lebanon regardless of U.S. election results and supported
U.S. and March 14 collaboration ahead of Lebanon's spring
parliamentary elections. End Summary.

MARCH 14 VICTORY THROUGH COOPERATION
--------------


2. (C) Harb assessed the March 14 coalition will win a
majority in the 2009 parliamentary elections, if its members
work together in the coming months. During their November 3
coalition meeting, members agreed on the need for a unified
strategy and to name a common list of candidates. They
agreed to support postponing until 2013 parliamentary
elections discussion of amending the voting age or inclusion

of out-of-country voting; they also decided to oppose, during
the November 5 National Dialogue session, expanding the list
of National Dialogue participants.


3. (C) According to Harb, March 14 and the Future Movement
"mishandled" the election for the Tripoli Bar Association --
in which their candidate lost to the March 8 candidate -- and
should avoid similar missteps in the run-up to the election.
However, Harb argued the results of the bar association vote
do not foreshadow election results in the north, where he
said March 14 has 70 percent of the vote.


4. (C) Harb is encouraging Hariri to hold more frequent March
14 Secretariat meetings to show the Lebanese people the group
is gathering and discussing ideas, an important optic into
the democracy of the group's operation and its contrast to
Shia Hizballah and Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun's
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Regarding March 14 SYG Fares
Souaid, Harb said Souaid was doing a good job but questioned
if his mindset -- knowing he would lose election in Jbeil --
was appropriate for his role organizing and motivating March

14.


5. (C) Additionally, Harb stressed the importance of the
media in the upcoming elections. March 8, with Aoun's
"Orange TV," has an advantage over March 14 because,
according to Harb, no Christians watch broadcasts by Hariri's
Future television. He described March 14 efforts to sway
Lebanese Broadcasting Channel (LBC) -- previously neutral but
recently opposition-slanted -- back to an unbiased reporting
line as unsuccessful, despite personal outreach by March 14
members. Harb called Lebanese Forces and March 14 leader
Samir Geagea's attempt to repossess LBC a "big mistake."
Working with LBC would be better than opening a new
television station, Harb thought, since a new station would
require more time and resources than are available to March

14. (Note: The Lebanese Forces controlled LBC from 1985 until
Geagea was arrested in 1994 for crimes committed during the
civil war. At that time, ownership transferred to co-founder
Pierre Daher. Geagea in 2007 filed a lawsuit, still pending,
to restore ownership of the channel to the LF. Furthermore,

BEIRUT 00001582 002 OF 002


LBC's largest shareholder is Walid bin Talal. Saad Hariri
and bin Talal have an extremely acrimonious relationship,
which explains LBC's sometimes anti-March 14 editorial bent.
End Note.)

SLEIMAN: "NO GUTS" FOR INDEPENDENT LIST...
--------------


6. (C) Harb saw little likelihood that President Sleiman
would offer anything more than "behind the scenes" support
for an independent Christian list. Although Sleiman wants an
independent bloc in parliament, as it would give him more
political room to maneuver, he does not want to help create
or put his name on such a bloc. Harb said the independent
list would have the cover of the President, but not
officially. He is encouraging Sleiman to push March 14's
Mansur Ilbon and Neemat Frem to run against Aoun in Kasrawan,
since the two are unlikely to participate in the elections
without insistence from the President. Michel Murr, who
ideologically should be closer to Sleiman than Aoun,
according to Harb, might consider running as an independent
if he faced political pressure, including from the U.S. Harb
also mentioned the Frem family's extensive interests in the
U.S. as a means to encourage electoral allegiances. He noted
Armenian Tashnaq Party participation on an independent list
would help March 14.


7. (C) Harb agreed with the Ambassador that discussions of an
independent list are making Aoun nervous. Harb described
Aoun's supporters as unwilling to see Aoun's mistakes or
scrutinize the dramatic changes in his positions since 2005.
A new Christian choice, unaligned with Aoun or Geagea, is
necessary and needs to be encouraged. Separately, Aoun and
Michel Murr should give Sleiman a Christian seat in Jbeil,
Sleiman's home district.

...AND WILL MOVE SLOWLY ON DIALOGUE
--------------


8. (C) Sleiman, according to Harb, is content with
slow-moving National Dialogue discussion and will not risk
failure by pushing agreements on disputed issues. Harb told
the Ambassador that Aoun during the November 5 meeting will
propose putting Hizballah under "moral control" of the LAF
without ceding any decision-making authority to the army
command. Aoun's proposal, unpalatable to March 14, and
expected disagreements regarding meeting participation,
probably will force the postponement of discussions until
after spring parliamentary elections.

"CAN'T TURN DOWN GIFTS"
--------------


9. (C) Harb assessed the Iranians will likely offer President
Sleiman military aid during his November 24 and 25 visit to
Tehran. Harb described the U.S. as Lebanon's "biggest
friend" but said Sleiman would be unable to refuse a "gift"
from the Iranians, even if it would be used as a political
tool. Harb also said Sleiman would avoid confrontation with
Syria during his term unless an exceptional bilateral issue
arose.

CONCERN FOR JUMBLATT'S MESSAGE IN WASHINGTON
--------------


10. (C) Harb also expressed concern that Druze leader
Jumblatt will stray from the March 14 line during his
upcoming trip to Washington. Jumblatt will be the first
March 14 leader to meet the transition team and Harb fears
Jumblatt may ask the new U.S. administration to work with
Hizballah in order to avoid conflict in Lebanon.

SISON