Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1526
2008-10-24 23:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: GEAGEA STRUGGLING WITH MARCH 14 ALLIES

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5537
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1526/01 2982301
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 242301Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3365
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3082
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3291
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001526 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR AMBRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA STRUGGLING WITH MARCH 14 ALLIES
OVER CHRISTIAN CANDIDATES

REF: A. BEIRUT 1516

B. BEIRUT 1513

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001526

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR AMBRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA STRUGGLING WITH MARCH 14 ALLIES
OVER CHRISTIAN CANDIDATES

REF: A. BEIRUT 1516

B. BEIRUT 1513

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea told the
Ambassador October 24 that he and his March 14 allies were
still negotiating their candidate lists for the 2009
parliamentary elections. Geagea said he was having the most
difficulty convincing Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt that the
Christian parties needed to select the Christian candidates
in Muslim areas. Geagea also denied any possibility of
reconciliation with his rival, pro-opposition Marada leader
Suleiman Franjieh. He also believed the opposition,
especially Michel Aoun, was planning to exploit the Deputy
Prime Minister's threat to boycott cabinet meetings to incite
Christian-Sunni conflict from now until the elections.
Geagea welcomed the idea of having international election
observers in Lebanon to deter intimidation and violence,
especially in the months leading up to the elections.
However, he expressed a strong preference for a European
Union delegation rather than an American body, citing
security concerns.


2. (C) Geagea envisioned a new dimension to the Middle East
Peace Process if Israel was serious about recent reports that
it was considering a "non-belligerence" pact with Lebanon,
but said this would require the U.S. to play an aggressive
role. Geagea was not pleased by recent European overtures to
Syria and said the Syrians were getting recognition "for
nothing in return." He characterized his recent visit to
Egypt as "very successful," and said he plans to make visits
to several Gulf countries in the near future. End summary.

SQUABBLES CONTINUE
AMONG MARCH 14 LEADERSHIP
--------------


3. (C) In a ninety-minute meeting, Lebanese Forces (LF)
leader Samir Geagea explained to the Ambassador on October 24

that he and his March 14 coalition allies, especially Sunni
majority leader Saad Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and
Kataeb leader Amine Gemayel, are still working out
differences over the unified March 14 candidate lists for the
spring 2009 parliamentary elections. However, Geagea claimed
that the lists would be finalized by the end of year.
Geagea, accompanied by advisors Elie Khoury and Joseph
Nehmeh, confided that Hariri and Jumblatt were the biggest
obstacles because they have not yet accepted that Christian
candidates in Sunni or Druze areas should be decided by
Christians, rather than selected by Hariri or Jumblatt.
Geagea also accused Hariri of not paying enough attention to
the Christian areas that could determine the election. He
appeared annoyed with Christian ally Gemayel, saying Gemayel
was "playing a dirty game" to gain more candidates seats for
his own Kataeb party over and above the numbers in line with
Kataeb supporters.


4. (C) By contrast, LF was looking at the electoral landscape
realistically, Geagea said. LF's strategy to win the
elections is to reach out to more independent candidates
(non-allied and those supportive of March 14) to run as
candidates, especially in swing Christian districts, such as
Zahle and Baabda, he said. Geagea said that he was not
frustrated yet, and assured the Ambassador that the "big
dinosaurs" would come to an agreement among themselves.


5. (C) Geagea admitted that March 14 had not yet defined a
unified message, but said the coalition was studying the
issue. He was quick to add, however, that while there will
be common denominators in the campaigns of March 14 partners,
specific and distinct messages were needed for the "Christian
street, the Sunni street, etc." LF, he said, had completed
one trial of "successful" test messages, and was planning to
begin another test round. He was proud to say that LF "would
not be short of slogans."

BEIRUT 00001526 002 OF 003




6. (C) Geagea flatly denied the possibility of reconciliation
between himself and his rival, pro-opposition Marada leader
Suleiman Franjieh. He said that while the Christian
community would welcome reconciliation, Franjieh, he
believed, was not really serious because he was always
creating new conditions. LF did "all it could do," he said.

AOUN'S ELECTION STRATEGY IS
TO CREATE PROBLEMS, GEAGEA SAYS
--------------


7. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Issam Abou Jamra's threats to
boycott future cabinet meetings has turned a small problem
into a "small issue with big impact," Geagea said. (Note:
Abou Jamra, an Orthodox opposition minister appointed by Free
Patriotic Movement (FPM) Christian leader Michel Aoun,
created a stir October 22 when he walked out of a cabinet
meeting after repeated refusals by Prime Minister Siniora
(Sunni) to discuss the powers of the Deputy PM on the
cabinet's agenda (reftels). Siniora and March 14 called this
a constitutional, not a political, issue. Deputy Speaker of
Parliament Farid Mekkari, also Orthodox, publicly criticized
Abou Jamra, while Orthodox Bishop Audi told March 14 contacts
he would raise his discontent with Abou Jamra and Siniora.
End note.) Aoun, Geagea theorized, planned to exploit the
Abou Jamra issue to verbally attack the Sunnis from now until
the elections, and surmised that perhaps Siniora could have
handled the issue differently before. Now, Geagea says, the
only solution seemed to be a counterattack directed against
the Shia.


8. (C) Geagea believed the Doha agreement emboldened and
empowered the opposition parties, rather than holding them
accountable for the May 2007 crisis that led to Doha. Doha,
he said, did not adequately address security concerns. He
expected that once "the opposition realizes it will not win
the elections," it will turn to its "preferred way of doing
things, through intimidation and violence."

EU ELECTION OBSERVERS
PREFERRED OVER AMERICANS
--------------


9. (C) Geagea told the Ambassador he was very much in favor
of having international election observers in Lebanon,
especially in the months before the parliamentary elections.
International observers, he said, would provide a deterrent
to the use of harassment, intimidation or violence. However,
he expressed a strong preference for a European Union
delegation over American organizations. Geagea argued that
having U.S. organizations or citizens as election observers
could make electoral issues "more complex" should anything
happen to the observers. Geagea specifically suggested
observers from Sweden, Norway, and Poland because he viewed
them as "courageous" and neutral. Other European Union
countries, as well as Canada and Australia would be
acceptable, he said. Geagea's advisor, Nehmeh, suggested it
would also be wise to have observers from EU countries that
are not also contributing forces to UNIFIL to ensure that the
observers felt free to monitor without other policy
constraints.

REGIONAL ISSUES: PROGRESS ON SHEBA'A
HELPFUL, EU OVERTURES TO SYRIA ARE NOT
--------------


10. (C) On regional issues, Geagea assessed that while making
progress on Ghajar would be a small step forward, progress on
resolving Sheba'a Farms would be decisive. However, he
admitted that the March 14 leadership had not seriously
discussed the issue yet. Geagea said he was more intrigued
by recent press reports that Israel was considering some sort
of "non-belligerence" pact with Lebanon. If the Israelis are
serious, Geagea said the new U.S. administration would have
to play an aggressive role with the Israelis to convince them
to move all 350,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to the
West Bank and Gaza and to place Palestinian "military bases"
under international authority. If this were to occur, Geagea
envisioned a Lebanon that "would return to normal."

BEIRUT 00001526 003 OF 003




11. (C) However, Geagea was bewildered by what he called
"additional western openings" to Syria. He was disturbed by
reports that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem might
travel to the United Kingdom and that British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown was considering visiting Damascus. Geagea said
it was "sufficient" that French President Nicolas Sarkozy
went to Syria; any additional overtures to Syria are
"exaggerated." The Ambassador stressed that the U.S.
positions towards Lebanon and Syria had not changed. Geagea
agreed and said that the U.S. position was clear. However,
the Europeans were creating additional problems by giving
Syria recognition for nothing in return, he said.
Furthermore, this type of continued engagement with Syria,
would also hurt Egypt and Saudi Arabia, he commented.

VISIT TO EGYPT SUCCESSFUL,
OTHER TRIPS PLANNED
--------------


12. (C) Geagea characterized his October 19-21 visit to Egypt
as "very successful." He said he was received by Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak, Foreign Minister Ahmed AbulGheit,
and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa. The Egyptians,
he said, shared the same views as March 14. Geagea reported,
however, that the Egyptians were concerned about Syria troop
deployment along the Lebanon-Syria border and were
pessimistic about the Middle East Peace Process. Geagea said
he had accepted invitations to visit the United Arab
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Turkey, but the agendas and
timing of these trips was not yet determined. Additionally,
Geagea said he would like to visit with the new U.S.
administration in late February or early March.


COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) The more Geagea discussed the internal disagreements
among his March 14 allies, the more it appeared March 14 was
still far from a unified strategy and message for the
parliamentary elections. End comment.

SISON